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A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP  
ON THE CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SYSTEM 
PETER K. YU* 
Today, the Chinese intellectual property system has garnered considerable 
global policy and scholarly attention.  To help develop a more sophisticated, 
complex, and nuanced understanding, this Article reviews the past five decades 
of English-language scholarship on the system.  It begins by creating a taxonomy 
of this body of literature based on the most common method—chronology.  It then 
turns to an alternative method of organizing and categorizing scholarly 
literature—disciplinary focus.  The second half of the Article identifies the 
continuing challenges to researchers studying the Chinese intellectual property 
system.  It further explains why it is important for intellectual property scholars 
to study China and for China scholars to study intellectual property 
developments.  The Article concludes with some observations on the future 
directions in scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system. 
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The first modern Chinese intellectual property law was established 
in August 1982, offering protection to trademarks.1  Although that law 
was primitive by today’s standards, it launched China’s journey into the 
world of modern intellectual property protection.  Two years later, 
China adopted a modern patent law,2 which has since been revised 
three times and is currently undergoing yet another revision.3  In the 
early 1990s, China also adopted a copyright law4 and a law against 
unfair competition.5  While the former is currently being amended for 
the third time,6 the latter recently underwent its first complete 
                                               
 1. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983) (China) 
[hereinafter 1982 Trademark Law]. 
 2. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985) (China). 
 3. Since its adoption, the Patent Law has been amended in September 1992, 
August 2000, and December 2008.  The fourth revision of the Patent Law is currently 
under consideration. 
 4. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991) (China) 
[hereinafter 1990 Copyright Law]. 
 5. Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective 
Dec. 1, 1993) (China). 
 6. Since its adoption, the Copyright Law has been amended in October 2001 and 
February 2010.  The last amendment was not a complete overhaul, but was adopted 
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overhaul.7 
In December 2001, China became the 143rd member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).8  Such membership requires the country 
to, among other obligations, abide by the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights9 (TRIPS Agreement), the most 
comprehensive intellectual property agreement ever adopted by the 
international community.  In the past decade, China has also actively 
participated in the negotiation of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade 
agreements,10 including most notably the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP).11 
Today, the Chinese intellectual property system has garnered 
considerable global policy and scholarly attention.  Based on the 
statistics compiled by the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), China had the world’s second largest number of international 
applications filed through the Patent Cooperation Treaty12 in 2017, 
behind only the United States.13  Among corporate applicants, China-
based Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation had the first and 
                                               
primarily to implement a WTO panel report.  See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement 
Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1097–98 (2011) (discussing the amendment of Article 4 
of the Chinese Copyright Law in an effort to comply with the WTO panel report). 
 7. Law of the People’s Republic of China Against Unfair Competition 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective 
Jan. 1, 2018) (China). 
 8. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s 
Accession (Nov. 11, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm. 
 9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 288–95 (discussing the scholarship covering 
these topics). 
 11. For the Author’s discussions of the RCEP negotiations, see generally Peter K. 
Yu, TPP, RCEP, and the Crossvergence of Asian Intellectual Property Standards, in GOVERNING 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER:  REGULATORY 
DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE IN THE AGE OF MEGAREGIONALS 277 (Peng Shin-yi et al. 
eds., 2018); Peter K. Yu, TPP, RCEP and the Future of Copyright Normsetting in the Asia-
Pacific, in MAKING COPYRIGHT WORK FOR THE ASIAN PACIFIC?  JUXTAPOSING 
HARMONISATION WITH FLEXIBILITY (Susan Corbett & Jessica Lai eds., forthcoming 
2018); Peter K. Yu, The RCEP and Trans-Pacific Intellectual Property Norms, 50 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 673 (2017). 
 12. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231. 
 13. Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_201
7.pdf (last visited May 9, 2018). 
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second largest volume of international patent applications, respectively.14  
For the same year, China ranked third in the number of international 
trademark applications15 under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the 
International Registration of Marks and its related protocol.16 
Despite these rather impressive figures, many policymakers, 
commentators, and industry representatives continue to question the 
quality of patents issued by the State Intellectual Property Office of 
China (SIPO).17  They also lament the country’s inadequate levels of 
intellectual property protection, which do not compare favorably with 
those offered by other world leaders, such as the European Union or the 
United States.18  Only last year, the United States Trade Representative 
                                               
 14. Id. 
 15. Who Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_
madrid_2017.pdf (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 16. Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 
14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967); Protocol Relating to 
the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, June 27, 
1989, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-41. 
 17. As Dan Prud’homme observed, 
While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also on the rise, 
patent quality has not proportionately kept up and in fact the overall strength of 
China’s actual innovation appears overhyped.  Statistical analysis . . . not only 
reveals concerning trends in the quality of China’s patents at present, but 
suggests that while patent filings in China will likely continue to notably grow in 
the future, patent quality may continue to lag these numbers. 
DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE CUTTING-EDGE:  HOW PATENT-RELATED POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN CHINA 1 (2012) (emphasis omitted).  See generally 
Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality:  Running the Numbers and Possible Remedies, 11 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478 (2012) (questioning the quality of Chinese patents 
and offering suggestions for reform). 
 18. See, e.g., China:  Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous 
Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy, at xiv, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub. 4226 
(May 2011) (Final) [hereinafter ITC Report], https://www.usitc.gov/publications/ 
332/pub4226.pdf (estimating that “firms in the U.S. [intellectual property]-intensive 
economy that conducted business in China in 2009 reported losses of approximately 
$48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR [intellectual property right] 
infringement in China”); INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. ALL., 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT OF 
COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 6 (2017), http://www.iipawebsite.com/ 
rbc/2017/2017SPEC301CHINA.PDF (“China’s legacy of piracy continues to distort 
the market, including by severely depressing licensing revenues, and its continued 
pursuit of policies that deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. content producers 
and distributers threatens to undermine the progress that has been achieved.”); 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 28 (2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FI
NAL.PDF (“Serious challenges in China continue to confront U.S. intellectual 
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(USTR) launched an investigation of China under section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974.19  This investigation focused on Chinese laws, policies, 
and practices in the areas of intellectual property, innovation, and 
technology development.20  In the past two years, the USTR also placed 
Alibaba’s Taobao on his list of notorious online markets.21 
Regardless of one’s assessment of the Chinese intellectual property 
system, there is no denying that China has made considerable progress 
since the establishment of its modern intellectual property system in 
the early 1980s.  Indeed, no other country in history has achieved as 
much in the intellectual property field in only three short decades.22  
To a large extent, China is now entering a new, and somewhat 
unprecedented, stage of development that warrants serious review and 
rethinking.  Not only has the country moved away from utilizing legal 
transplants to modernize its intellectual property system,23 it has also 
                                               
property (IP) right holders with respect to adequate and effective protection of IP, as 
well as fair and equitable market access for U.S. persons that rely upon IP 
protection.”). 
 19. Section 301 permits the U.S. President to investigate and impose sanctions on 
countries engaging in unfair trade practices that threaten the United States’ economic 
interests.  See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2012); see also Press Release, Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, USTR Announces Initiation of Section 301 Investigation of 
China (Aug. 18, 2017), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2017/august/ustr-announces-initiation-section [hereinafter Section 301 
Investigation Press Release]. 
 20. Section 301 Investigation Press Release, supra note 19. 
 21. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF 
NOTORIOUS MARKETS 20–23 (2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/ 
Reports/2017%20Notorious%20Markets%20List%201.11.18.pdf; OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, 2016 OUT-OF-CYCLE REVIEW OF NOTORIOUS MARKETS 12–13 
(2016), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2016-Out-of-Cycle-Review-Notorious-Markets.pdf. 
 22. See CHEN JIANFU, CHINESE LAW:  CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 568 n.13 (2008) 
(quoting Árpád Bogsch, the former Director General of WIPO, as reportedly saying in 
1994 that “China has accomplished all this at a speed unmatched in the history of 
intellectual property protection”); Peter K. Yu, Building the Ladder:  Three Decades of 
Development of the Chinese Patent System, 5 WIPO J. 1, 15 (2013) [hereinafter Yu, Building 
the Ladder] (describing China’s effort to “build its present patent system from the 
ground up” in only three decades as “a feat that no country has ever achieved”); Peter 
K. Yu, Trade Secret Hacking, Online Data Breaches, and the China Cyberthreat, 2015 CARDOZO 
L. REV. DE NOVO 130, 139 (stating that China “has built a new intellectual property 
system from the ground up faster than any other country in history”); Jack Valenti, 
Letter to the Editor, China’s Pirated Disks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1998, at A26 (stating that 
“China has accomplished what no other country has achieved” when it seized over 
seven million video compact disks in response to the USTR’s pressure). 
 23. As I noted in an earlier article, 
[T]he development of the Chinese intellectual property system has changed 
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reached a crossroads that requires the country to devise its own 
intellectual property strategy.24 
As I noted in a recent special issue on the first thirty-five years of the 
Chinese intellectual property system, that system is now entering the 
proverbial middle age.25  It will therefore be interesting to see whether 
the system will start hitting its prime or facing a hard-to-predict mid-
life crisis.26  Should the system hit its prime, it will make China an even 
stronger global competitor than it is today.  Such competition in turn 
will lead to even more intense scrutiny.  By contrast, if the system is 
facing the proverbial mid-life crisis, its developments will become 
erratic and perplexing.  These developments will equally attract 
attention.  In short, regardless of its developments, China will feature 
prominently in future international intellectual property debates. 
To help develop a more sophisticated, complex, and nuanced 
understanding of the Chinese intellectual property system, this Article 
reviews the past five decades of English-language scholarship on the 
system.  Part I creates a taxonomy of this body of literature based on 
the most common method—chronology.  This Part contends that the 
scholarship in the past half-century can be separated into five broad 
phases that at times have been punctuated by isolated major incidents.  
Each phase contains a fairly distinctive body of scholarship. 
Part II turns to an alternative method of organizing and categorizing 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system—disciplinary 
focus.  While most scholarship in this area has focused on law and policy, 
this Part identifies three other broadly defined multi-disciplinary clusters 
                                               
from actively transplanting laws from abroad to introducing amendments that 
are specifically tailored to rapidly changing local conditions.  Although China 
will continue to borrow from foreign models and experiences, the country’s 
intellectual property system, to a large extent, has already aged beyond the 
point where it can benefit significantly from copying models from abroad.  
Instead, the country needs to start exploring models that would best suit its 
needs, interests, conditions and priorities while figuring out how to improve 
these models to maximize their benefits. 
Peter K. Yu, When the Chinese Intellectual Property System Hits 35, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. 
PROP. 3, 6 (2018). 
 24. See STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGY], http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm (providing 
the outline of a new national intellectual property strategy). 
 25. See Yu, supra note 23, at 3 (“[A]s far as the modern Chinese intellectual property 
system is concerned, it would not be too far-fetched to suggest that the system began 
in the early to mid-1980s and is now entering, or approaching, its middle age.”). 
 26. See id. 
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within which an expanding body of scholarship has emerged:  (1) 
philosophy and culture; (2) economics, innovation, and cultural 
industries; and (3) politics and international relations.  Described as the 
interdisciplinary turn in scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system, this Part not only highlights the scholarship’s growing richness, 
diversity, and sophistication, but also its increasing inter- and multi-
disciplinarity.  The latter development is particularly interesting 
because scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
became more inter- and multi-disciplinary just when intellectual 
property scholarship in other areas moved in the same direction. 
Part III identifies the continuing challenges to researchers studying 
the Chinese intellectual property system.  Taking note of the 
considerably improved environment for undertaking research in this 
area, brought about in part by the transparency requirements of the 
TRIPS Agreement,27 this Part contends that the challenges confronting 
researchers on the Chinese intellectual property system have greatly 
reduced.  Nevertheless, many challenges still remain and have 
continued to hinder researchers in this area. 
Part IV explores why it is imperative to study the Chinese intellectual 
property system and its rapidly changing developments.  This Part 
underscores both the need for intellectual property scholars to study 
China and for China scholars to study intellectual property 
developments.  This Part shows that scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system should be seen as facilitating a two-way 
dialogue.  This dialogue not only allows China scholars to explore how 
the country addresses an issue that is of great importance to the outside 
world, but also enables intellectual property scholars to examine a 
system that has become increasingly influential at the global level.28 
Part V concludes with some observations on the future directions in 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system.  While these 
observations build on nearly two decades of my research and are 
undeniably personal, they draw on developments that have already 
begun in the area of Chinese legal scholarship or intellectual property 
scholarship in general.  By exploring these future directions, this 
                                               
 27. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 63 (detailing the transparency obligations). 
 28. See Peter K. Yu, Editorial, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2018) 
(“[D]evelop[ing] a more holistic, sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the 
past three decades of intellectual property developments in China . . . is particularly 
important considering that not only have global intellectual property developments 
influenced China, but Chinese intellectual property developments have also begun to 
influence the globe.”). 
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Article aims to convey the impression that scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system will only become richer, more diverse, and 
more sophisticated in the future.  Such richness, diversity, and 
sophistication are certainly not what many early scholars on the 
Chinese intellectual property system expected when they started 
studying this system a half-century ago. 
I. A CHRONOLOGY-BASED TAXONOMY 
Chronology provides the easiest method to create a taxonomy of 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system.  Thus far, fairly 
distinctive bodies of scholarship have emerged in five disparate phases:  (1) 
prehistoric development; (2) imitation and transplantation; (3) 
standardization and customization; (4) integration and assimilation; and 
(5) indigenization and transformation.  This Part discusses each phase in 
turn and shows how these phases are interrelated, episodic, and cyclical.  
Section I.F offers four closing observations linking the five phases together. 
A. Prehistoric Development 
The first phase concerns those intellectual property developments 
that occurred before the establishment of the modern Chinese 
intellectual property system.  While this phase is described as “prehistoric 
development”—due largely to the Article’s specific focus—whether this 
phase is categorized as prehistoric or simply historical will largely depend 
on perspective and focus.  The further back in history researchers trace 
the Chinese intellectual property system to indigenous notions,29 the 
                                               
 29. As Ken Shao observed, it has been highly difficult to locate information about 
early indigenous intellectual property notions in China: 
[I]nformation about China’s intellectual property is scarce and cannot be 
found in a single discipline.  For instance, to perceive the emergence of 
Chinese copyright in the 11th and 12th centuries, one needs to observe the 
expansion of the commercial publishing industry and, in that, discover judicial 
recognition of copyright claims.  For trademark, the focus should be on 
analysing the scale and nature of Chinese commodity economy.  This has 
already been extensively examined by economic historians, and its inherent 
link with the unique distinctive nature of trade marks in the context of the 
commodity economy has been observed.  Although on the one hand there is 
no evidence to suggest that China had ever adopted an indigenous patent 
practice, on the other hand property rights or know-how for inventions and 
technologies had existed for thousands of years.  To understand this, one 
should liberate the definition of intellectual property from the limitations of 
modern intellectual property laws.  Accordingly, only a highly interdisciplinary 
approach can knit together the rich variety of sources of information to form 
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less they would prefer the term “prehistoric development.” 
As with any historical research involving prehistory, determining 
when prehistory ends and history begins is not that difficult.  Given this 
Article’s focus on the modern Chinese intellectual property system, the 
prehistoric phase understandably ended with the system’s establishment.  
Notwithstanding this logical endpoint, it remains unclear when prehistory 
actually began.  Indeed, because this phase could go back as far as the 
researcher’s interests and attention allow, this Section merely offers 
suggestions on some possible starting points. 
Although Western commentators widely believe that indigenous 
notions of intellectual property rights did not exist in China30 before 
foreign powers introduced these rights through gunboat diplomacy, 
trade pressures, legal assistance, or other forceful means,31 Chinese 
scholars have questioned those beliefs, which they find culturally 
                                               
more comprehensive arguments. 
Ken Shao, History is a Key Decoder:  Why China Aims at Re-Emerging as a Global Leader of 
Innovation, 29 LAW IN CONTEXT:  A SOCIO-LEGAL J. 117, 123 (2013) (footnote omitted). 
 30. See, e.g., R. Michael Gadbaw, Republic of Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS:  GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT?  272, 275 (R. Michael Gadbaw & 
Timothy J. Richards eds., 1988) (“This cultural gap is typical of many East Asian 
countries, where the historical attitude toward intellectual property is noticeably 
different from that in the West.”); John R. Allison & Lin Lianlian, Evolution of Chinese 
Attitudes Toward Property Rights in Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 
737 (1999) (“In . . . tracing of Chinese attitudes toward invention and discovery, one 
can see that a culture deeply embedded with traditions completely antithetical to the 
patenting of inventions and to the granting of property rights in other forms of 
intellectual products has recently moved toward recognition of the necessity of a 
modern patent system.”); William Hennessey, Deconstructing Shanzhai—China’s Copycat 
Counterculture:  Catch Me if You Can, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 609, 639–61 (2012) (discussing 
the Chinese culture’s focus on masters, rather than creators); Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey 
Mouse” in China:  Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996) (“[P]unishing copyright violation contradicts traditional 
Chinese moral standards.”); Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and 
the Former Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International Trade:  A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1, 11 (1998) (“The Soviet model reflected traditional Chinese attitudes toward 
intellectual property and expounded the socialist belief that by inventing or creating, 
individuals were engaging in social activities based on knowledge that belonged to all 
members of society.”); Wang Liwei, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 15, 36–56 (1993) (discussing those Chinese traditions that were 
inimical to a new patent law and how Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders utilized 
these traditions). 
 31. See PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 3 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that 
substantive intellectual property protection arrived “with such inventions and novel 
ideas as the gunboat, opium, ‘most favoured nation’ trading status and 
extraterritoriality”). 
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stereotypical at times.32  The most informative source documenting the 
existence of indigenous notions of intellectual property rights in China 
is a Chinese-language anthology put together by Zhou Lin and Li 
Mingshan.33  Covering the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing dynasties and 
the Republican and Communist eras, this highly valuable volume 
collected historical documents that showed indigenous copyright 
notions in China.34 
Thus far, most scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system traced the system’s origin to the late Qing period.  For example, 
some commentators emphasized the laws adopted by the Qing 
government, such as the Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910 (Da Qing 
Zhuzuoquan Lu).35  Meanwhile, others traced the system earlier to new 
measures introduced during the short-lived Hundred-Day Reform 
(1898)36 or the somewhat territorially limited Taiping Rebellion 
                                               
 32. For criticisms of culture-based claims regarding the Chinese intellectual 
property system, see generally Ken Shao, Chinese Culture and Intellectual Property:  Let’s 
Realise We Have Been Misguided, 4 WIPO J. 103 (2012) [hereinafter Shao, Chinese 
Culture]; Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property:  What if China Is Not a Born 
Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341 [hereinafter Shao, Global Debate]; Shi Wei, Cultural 
Perplexity in Intellectual Property:  Is Stealing a Book an Elegant Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. 
& COM. REG. 1 (2006). 
 33. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF CHINA’S COPYRIGHT LAW (Zhou Lin & Li Mingshan 
eds., 1999) (in Chinese) [hereinafter HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS]; see also Feng Xiaoqing 
et al., Awakening of a Sleeping Dragon:  The Evolution of Copyright Conception in China, 
51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 615 (2004) (discussing the historical evolution of the 
copyright concept in China); Ken Shao, The Promotion of Learning in Chinese History:  
Discovering the Lost Soul of Modern Copyright, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 63 (2010) (examining 
the historical environment in which copyright was practiced in traditional China). 
 34. HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 33. 
 35. Da Qing Zhuzuoquan Lu [Great Qing Copyright Law] (1910) (China), reprinted 
in HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 33, at 89–94 (in Chinese).  Reenacted by the 
Republican government in the form of a provisional act, the Great Qing Copyright 
Law is translated in NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF 
TRADE-MARKS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADE-NAMES IN CHINA 112–21 (1924).  See 
generally Li Yufeng & Catherine W. Ng, Understanding the Great Qing Copyright Law of 
1910, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 767 (2008) (discussing the Law).  The term 
“zhuzuoquan” is better translated as “author’s right,” which brings with it the 
European tradition.  Nevertheless, this Article translates the term as “copyright” due 
to its preferred usage in official English translations. 
 36. See ZHENG CHENGSI WITH MICHAEL D. PENDLETON, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER LAW 52 (1987) (noting that, in 1898, a late Qing 
emperor attempted to introduce the Regulations to Promote Industrial Technology 
during the famous “Hundred-Day” Reform).  The “Hundred-Day” Reform of 1898, 
which lasted for only 103 days, was a short-lived reform movement that sought radical 
change in the political and social systems during the reign of Emperor Guangxu of the 
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(1850–1864).37  Those researchers who were willing to go further in 
time even caught glimpses of intellectual property protection in those 
rights that Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty (Han Wudi) granted to 
individual merchants to “smelt iron, distill salt, and mint coin” more 
than two millennia ago.38 
That researchers have located primitive forms of intellectual 
property rights in early Chinese history is unsurprising.  After all, 
commentators have traced the Western intellectual property system to 
the Venetian Republic in the fifteenth century39 or even earlier.40  They 
have also considered the Statute of Monopolies of 1624 the origin of 
the Anglo-American patent system.41  Moreover, many pioneering 
                                               
Qing dynasty.  See generally IMMANUEL C.Y. HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 373–76 (6th 
ed. 2000) (discussing the reform movement). 
 37. As one commentator observed, 
During the period of the Taiping Rebellion, the leader Hong Renxuan put 
forward his concept of a patent system, noting that “if someone can design a 
kind of train as we see in foreign countries which can run 8,000 kilometers in 
a day and a night, he should be granted a patent and be given the power to 
allow others to imitate.”  He also maintained that “people [should be] 
encouraged to improve craftsmanship and sell their technical inventions or 
innovation . . . [and] . . . those who counterfeit will be punished.” 
Flora Wang, An Overview of the Development of the Chinese Patent System, in CHINESE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE 3, 3 (Mark A. Cohen et al. eds., 1999). 
 38. Id. 
 39. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:  NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 6 (1975) (stating that the Venetian Republic did not 
formalize such protection until the adoption of the first patent law on March 19, 1474). 
 40. As Ted Sichelman and Sean O’Connor observed, 
[T]here is very strong evidence to rebut [the claim] that the first exclusionary 
patent rights for what we would today label “technological” inventions appeared 
in a directive limited to silk inventions passed in the late fourteenth or early 
fifteenth century.  Rather, the first evidence of such exclusionary rights appears in 
1416, when Ser Franciscus Petri, from Rhodes, was granted a patent by the Grand 
Council of Venice for his device for fulling wool (that is, turning it into felt). 
Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition:  The Guild Origins 
of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 1276 (2012) (footnote 
omitted); see also Christopher May, The Venetian Moment:  New Technologies, Legal 
Innovation and the Institutional Origins of Intellectual Property, 20 PROMETHEUS 159, 160 
(2002) (stating that intellectual property protection “existed in some form in Venetian 
law as a customary practice” before the law’s codification in the late fifteenth century). 
 41. Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ 
aep/Ja1/21/3; see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF 
THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT 
SYSTEM 3 (Comm. Print 1958) (by Fritz Machlup) (“The Statute of Monopolies is the 
basis of the present British patent law, and became the model for the laws elsewhere.”); 
Oren Bracha, The Commodification of Patents 1600–1836:  How Patents Became Rights and 
1056 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1045 
 
inventions have emerged throughout the nearly five millennia of 
Chinese civilization,42 such as the compass, gunpowder, papermaking, 
and woodblock printing.43  Such inventions have inevitably raised 
questions about the incentive structure or arrangement that led to their 
creation in the first place.  It is also worth noting that, even though the 
term “intellectual property” was not translated into Chinese until the 
1970s,44 the Chinese term “zhishi chanquan” can be traced back to “a 
very ancient historical record, ‘Guo-Yu,’ which was written some 3,000 
years ago in the late Zhou Dynasty.”45 
In short, a growing volume of literature has revealed a much longer 
and richer history of intellectual property developments in China than 
many Western scholars have suggested in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Notwithstanding this body of scholarship, this Part focuses on the 
research published in only the past fifty years—that is, a period starting 
only a decade before the establishment of the modern Chinese 
intellectual property system.  Such a durational focus has three 
justifications.  First, it will make the scholarship review conducted in this 
Article more manageable.  Second, reaching back to a decade before 
the establishment of the modern Chinese intellectual property system 
will enable us to capture most, if not all, of the scholarship on the 
preparatory work that was undertaken to establish this system.  Finally, 
having a more limited focus is highly practical because English-
language scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system was 
                                               
Why We Should Care, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 177, 191 (2004) (“The origin of Anglo-
American patent law is usually traced to the 1624 Statute of Monopolies and a handful 
of monumental common law decisions from the early seventeenth century.” (footnote 
omitted)); Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents:  An Intellectual History, 
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1272–73 (2001) (“[T]he Statute of Monopolies 
represents the first definitive step toward the shift away from royal prerogative and 
privileges to common law and legal rights.”). 
 42. See ALBERT CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1 (4th ed. 2011) (noting “nearly five thousand years of a continuous 
history of civilisation” in China). 
 43. For discussions of scientific developments in China, see generally BENJAMIN A. 
ELMAN, ON THEIR OWN TERMS:  SCIENCE IN CHINA, 1550–1900 (2005); JOSEPH NEEDHAM, 
SCIENCE AND CIVILISATION IN CHINA (1956–2004); ROBERT TEMPLE, THE GENIUS OF 
CHINA:  3,000 YEARS OF SCIENCE, DISCOVERY & INVENTION (2007). 
 44. See ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 78 (2005) (quoting a September 1995 article in the People’s Daily 
that states that the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade “had 
rendered [the term ‘intellectual property’], for the first time, into the Chinese 
equivalent, zhishi chanquan” when China sent a delegation to WIPO in November 1973). 
 45. ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 36, at 51. 
2018] A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1057 
 
very rare before the mid-1970s.46 
Within the first decade or so of the past half-century, very little 
English-language scholarship can be found.  Hsia Tao-tai and Kathryn 
Haun provided a pioneering analysis of the attitudes within China 
toward industrial, literary, and artistic property.47  It is notable that 
their study was published in 1973, the year when China sent its first 
delegation to WIPO.48  Five years later, Barden Gale published an 
article examining the concept of “intellectual property” in China.49  
That article analyzed the historical policies that had provided 
incentives for inventive and innovative activities.50 
On occasion, researchers focused on a specific branch of intellectual 
property rights, as opposed to the entire field.  In the trademark area, 
Heinz Dawid examined the 1950 Provisional Regulations Concerning 
the Registration of Trademarks and the 1963 Regulations Concerning 
the Control of Trademarks.51  Although the latter was abolished during 
the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), it was subsequently restored and 
remained in force until the adoption of the 1982 Trademark Law.52  
John Butler also offered a treatise-like analysis of the 1963 Regulations.53  
Such article-by-article analysis, while rare in this phase, had become 
more popular in later phases.  Indeed, books and treatises on Chinese 
intellectual property law began to appear after this phase.54 
                                               
 46. Rare exceptions are the works of the former U.S. Consul Norwood Allman.  See, e.g., 
ALLMAN, supra note 35; N.F. Allman, China Trade-Mark Situation, 40 TRADEMARK REP. 303 
(1950); N.F. Allman, Chinese Equivalents of Word-Marks, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 36 (1947); N.F. 
Allman, Chinese Regulations for Control of Patent Medicines, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 131 (1947); N.F. 
Allman, The Chinese Trademark Law and Extraterritoriality, 3 CHINA L. REV. 78 (1926). 
 47. Hsia Tao-tai & Kathryn A. Haun, Laws of the People’s Republic of China on 
Industrial and Intellectual Property, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 274 (1973). 
 48. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 78. 
 49. Barden N. Gale, The Concept of Intellectual Property in the People’s Republic of China:  
Inventors and Inventions, 74 CHINA Q. 334 (1978). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Heinz Dawid, Trademark Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 9 DENV. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 217 (1980). 
 52. See Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and Patent Law in the People’s Republic of 
China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 273 (1986) (“After the Cultural Revolution, the 1963 
Trademark Regulations remained the primary Chinese trademark legislation.”). 
 53. John I. Butler, Trademarks in the People’s Republic of China, 65 TRADEMARK REP. 89 (1975). 
 54. For treatise-like discussions of Chinese intellectual property law, see generally 
LAURENCE J. BRAHM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN CHINA 
(2d ed. 1994); CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS (Rohan 
Kariyawasam ed., 2011); FENG, supra note 31; REBECCA ORDISH & ALAN ADCOCK, CHINA 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY—CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS:  AN ESSENTIAL BUSINESS GUIDE 
(2008); PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA (Stefan Luginbu ̈hl & Peter Ganea eds., 2014); 
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In the copyright area, Dietrich Loeber explored how authors and 
their publications were protected in China in the 1970s, drawing on 
interviews and field research conducted shortly before the end of the 
Cultural Revolution.55  His research was illuminating because China 
would not adopt a modern copyright law until more than a decade 
later.56  In a memorial lecture sponsored by the Copyright Society of 
the U.S.A., Jon Baumgarten, a former general counsel of the U.S. 
Copyright Office, also shared observations on the changing U.S.-China 
copyright relations57 following the signing of the Agreement on Trade 
Relations Between the United States of America and the People’s 
Republic of China58 (“1979 Agreement”) in July 1979. 
B. Imitation and Transplantation 
The second phase began with the establishment of the modern 
Chinese intellectual property system.  Like its predecessor, this phase 
included several possible starting points.  The phase could begin with 
the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee in 
December 1978,59 in which Deng Xiaoping and his fellow leaders made a 
decisive push for the “Four Modernizations” to develop China’s world-
                                               
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA (Mary L. Riley ed., 1997); 
CATHERINE SUN, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FOR FOREIGN BUSINESS (2004); TAN 
LOKE KHOON, PIRATES IN THE MIDDLE KINGDOM:  THE NEW FRONTIER (3d ed. 2017); XUE 
HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2002); XUE HONG & ZHENG CHENGSI, SOFTWARE PROTECTION IN CHINA:  A COMPLETE 
GUIDE (1999) [hereinafter XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION]; ZHENG CHENGSI, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA:  LEADING CASES AND COMMENTARY 
(1997); ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 36. 
 55. Dietrich A. Loeber, Copyright Law and Publishing in the People’s Republic of China, 
24 UCLA L. REV. 907 (1977). 
 56. 1990 Copyright Law, supra note 4. 
 57. Jon A. Baumgarten, Copyright Relations Between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China—The Seventeenth Annual Jean Geiringer Memorial Lecture, 27 BULL. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 419 (1980). 
 58. Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United States of America and the 
People’s Republic of China, China-U.S., July 7, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 4652 [hereinafter 1979 
Agreement]. 
 59. See STAFF OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON U.S. TRADE WITH CHINA OF THE H. COMM. 
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONGRESS, CHINA’S NEW PATENT LAW AND OTHER 
RECENT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 5–6 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter 1984 H. COMM. 
PRINT] (by the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress) (discussing the 
restoration of the Chinese legal system at the Third Plenary Session); see also CHEN, 
supra note 42, at 42 (“[T]he return to the idea of a socialist legal system (and the 
related idea of socialist democracy) was the result of a conscious policy choice of the 
post-Mao leadership.”). 
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class strengths in agriculture, industry, science and technology, and 
national defense by 2000.60  The leaders also normalized the country’s 
diplomatic and commercial relationships with the United States, Japan, 
and other Western developed countries.61  Without these policy reversals, 
it is quite certain that China would not have developed the modern 
intellectual property system so quickly after the end of the Cultural 
Revolution.62  Indeed, sufficient evidence existed to document the gradual 
expansion of domestic governmental support for the establishment of this 
new system.  As Andrew Mertha recounted chronologically, 
In 1978, . . . the State Council charged the State Science and 
Technology Commission (SSTC) with developing a patent system 
for China.  In March 1979, the drafting group of the Chinese Patent 
Law was established.  [In June 1979, the Chinese Patent Office, or 
State Patent Bureau, was established, assuming the responsibilities 
of the drafting group.]  On October 17 of the same year, the formal 
request for the establishment of a patent system in China was 
submitted to the State Council by the SSTC.  On January 14, 1980, 
the State Council approved the request, and on March 3, China 
became a member of [WIPO].63 
                                               
 60. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 803–14 (providing a comprehensive overview of the 
Four Modernizations). 
 61. See id. at 858–69 (discussing the Open-Door Policy that China adopted in 
December 1978, which provided “a complete reversal of the Maoist policy of seclusion 
that had been in force . . . between 1958 and 1978”). 
 62. The development of the intellectual property system went hand in hand with 
the development of these new policies.  As Ren Jianxin, the Director of the Legal 
Affairs Department of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, 
declared in September 1980, “[The Chinese] government is getting ready to institute 
a patent system in order to protect and encourage invention, to expand international 
exchange of technology, and to import advanced technology for acceleration of the 
four modernizations.”  Ren Jianxin, Some Legal Aspects of Our Import of Technology and 
Utilization of Foreign Investment, 1 CHINA L. REP. 85, 89 (1980).  Similarly, in an interview, 
William Alford observed, 
The fledgling intellectual property law movement owes as much to internal 
considerations as external ones.  The Chinese government has been 
endeavoring to develop intellectual property law in part to encourage internal 
economic development.  It believes that technological development was 
hindered because scientists were reluctant to share data and lacked adequate 
incentives to make scientific advances.  Proponents of the development of 
intellectual property law contend that it will both reward individual initiative 
and enhance collegiality among scientists.  These two goals may seem slightly 
contradictory, but in the leadership’s mind they are not. 
Chinese Living Law:  An Interview with Professor William Alford, 7 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
135, 137 (1989). 
 63. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 81–82. 
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The second possible starting point is the signing of the 1979 
Agreement, which entered into force on February 1, 1980.64  This 
agreement is significant in the intellectual property context because it 
called for the reciprocal protection of copyrights, patents, and 
trademarks owned by the nationals of the other party.65  The 
agreement is equally noteworthy in the international context because 
it created in China “an international legal obligation for intellectual 
property rights protection before [the country] had established a 
domestic intellectual property protection system.”66 
The third possible starting point is the beginning of China’s WIPO 
membership.  China joined this U.N. specialized agency on March 3, 
1980 and became a member three months later.67  Although the 
country was unable to join the agency before reestablishing 
international ties, its involvement in the organization actually began 
much earlier.  As Professor Mertha recounted, 
As early as November 1973, after the Chinese delegation to [WIPO] 
returned to Beijing, delegation leader Ren Jiaxin, who would later 
become Chief Justice of China’s Supreme Court, proposed the 
establishment of a patent system in China.  According to the People’s 
Daily, 
This was the first time that New China has sent 
representatives to an international conference related to 
intellectual property rights.  At that time, many people in 
China found the term “Intellectual Property” rather 
unfamiliar.  The [China Council for the Promotion of 
International Trade (CCPIT)] had rendered it, for the first 
time, into the Chinese equivalent, zhishi chanquan.68 
The last possible starting point is the adoption of the 1982 
                                               
 64. 1979 Agreement, supra note 58. 
 65. See id. art. VI (3) (“Both Contracting Parties agree that each Party shall seek, 
under its laws and with due regard to international practice, to ensure to legal or 
natural persons of the other Party protection of patents and trademarks equivalent to 
the patent and trademark protection correspondingly accorded by the other Party.”); 
id. art. VI (5) (creating the same obligation in the copyright area). 
 66. XUE & ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 54, at 5. 
 67. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=1 (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 68. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 78; see also William O. Hennessey, Protection of 
Intellectual Property in China (30 Years and More):  A Personal Reflection, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 
1257, 1283 (2009) (discussing Ren’s 1973 visit to WIPO).  Although the CCPIT is 
“nominally a nongovernmental organization, [it] is an essential arm of [China’s] 
foreign trade apparatus.”  Stanley B. Lubman, Trade Between the United States and the 
People’s Republic of China:  Practice, Policy, and Law, 8 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 17 (1976). 
2018] A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1061 
 
Trademark Law.69  Using this historic milestone as the beginning is 
quite popular among legal researchers.  After all, the Trademark Law 
was the first statute in the modern Chinese intellectual property 
system.  From a research standpoint, the early adoption of a new 
trademark law in China is noteworthy because such adoption showed 
that trademark law reform did not face as much domestic resistance as 
reform in the copyright or patent area.  As Peter Feng explained, 
trademarks “were a state planning tool before they became a 
marketing device and private property.”70  As such, they “survived 
China’s socialist transformation of the 1950s, and registration 
continued even during the Cultural Revolution.”71 
In view of the existence of these four starting points, it has been 
rather difficult to determine the beginning of the second phase.  It has 
also been quite challenging to determine what scholarship would fall 
within this particular phase.  Typically, scholarship on new laws and 
policies emerge when they are proposed or considered, not after they 
have been adopted.  Researchers therefore often have to reach back to 
scholarship published before the chosen starting point. 
For analytical convenience and effectiveness, this Section focuses on 
scholarship that has been published since China’s reopening to the 
outside world in the late 1970s.  The use of literature from that period 
can be easily justified by the researchers’ tendency to use the 
beginning of China’s WIPO membership or the 1982 Trademark Law 
as the starting point of this second phase.  The choice of this earlier 
starting point also makes great sense considering that the country’s 
reopening marked the critical juncture at which foreign researchers 
became curious about the Chinese legal system, resulting in a growing 
volume of English-language scholarship on this system.72 
                                               
 69. 1982 Trademark Law, supra note 1. 
 70. FENG, supra note 31, at 344. 
 71. Id. at 293; see also MERTHA, supra note 44, at 197 (noting that “trademarks 
existed throughout [China], even during the Cultural Revolution, although . . . the 
constriction in the universe of ‘politically correct’ brand names— . . . often obscured 
the identity of the actual manufacturer—and in the process made trademarks largely 
meaningless”); Sidel, supra note 52, at 272 (“Marks such as ‘Red Flag,’ ‘East Wind’ and 
‘Worker-Peasant-Soldier’ appeared on thousands of similar and dissimilar goods 
during the 1966–1976 period and many lasted into the late 1970s and early 1980s.”). 
 72. See, e.g., VICTOR H. LI, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS:  A COMPARATIVE VIEW OF LAW IN 
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES (1977) (providing an accessible account of the Chinese 
legal system and dispelling the common American misconceptions of that system); 
Jerome Alan Cohen, China’s Changing Constitution, 1978 CHINA Q. 794 (1978) 
(discussing the 1978 Constitution and its ramifications for legal development in 
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Similar to publications in the previous phase, scholarship in this 
second phase tended to be rather straightforward; it focused mostly on 
newly emerging laws and policies.  For instance, the adoption of the 
1982 Trademark Law and the 1984 Patent Law sparked a significant 
volume of literature.73  A notable example is a special issue collecting 
articles on the new Patent Law that Maria Lin guest-edited for the 
AIPLA Quarterly Journal.74  In addition to scholarship in the trademark 
and patent areas, one could find scholarship exploring the upcoming 
Copyright Law,75 even though that body of scholarship remained scant 
                                               
China); William C. Jones, An Approach to Chinese Law, 4 REV. SOCIALIST L. 3 (1978) 
(advancing an approach to understanding the Chinese legal system through trade 
laws); Lubman, supra note 68 (surveying the problems concerning laws and policies 
involved in U.S.-China trade). 
 73. For discussions of the 1982 Trademark Law, the 1984 Patent Law, or both, see 
generally Jesse T.H. Chang & Charles J. Conroy, Trade-mark Law in the People’s Republic 
of China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA 427 (Michael J. Moser ed., 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE, 
INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW]; Michael J. Moser & David Y.W. Ho, The Registration and 
Protection of Patents in China, in FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW, supra, at 453; 
William E. Beaumont, The New Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC):  Evidence 
of a Second Chinese “Renaissance”?, 27 IDEA 39 (1986); Charles L. Gholz, China’s New 
Trademark Law, 2 CHINA L. REP. 103 (1982); Kim Seong-Ki, Patent Law of China, 18 
KOREAN J. COMP. L. 90 (1990); Maria C.H. Lin, The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 107 (1985); T. Traian Moga, China’s Patent Law Considered and 
Compared, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 335 (1987); Jeanette L. Pinard & Lian Chun-cheng, Patent 
Protection Under Chinese Law, 1 J. CHINESE L. 69 (1987); P.D. Woods, Trademark and 
Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 13 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 473 (1988); 
L. Mark Wu-Ohlson, A Commentary on China’s New Patent and Trademark Laws, 6 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 86 (1984); Zheng Chengsi, China:  The Alternatives:  Patent, Utility Model 
or Design Registration, 9 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 103 (1987); David Ben Kay, Comment, 
The Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China in Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 331 (1985); 
Ross J. Oehler, Note, Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China:  A Primer, 8 N.Y.L. SCH. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451 (1987). 
 74. Symposium, 13 AIPLA Q.J. 98–164 (1985). 
 75. See generally Guo Shoukang, Some Opinions on Copyright in the People’s Republic of 
China, 1 J. CHINESE L. 63 (1987) (offering personal observations on the forthcoming 
Chinese Copyright Law and its related questions and challenges); Shen Yuanyuan, China’s 
Protection of Foreign Books, Video Tapes and Sound Recordings, 12 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 
78 (1989) (discussing the protection of foreign books, videotapes, and sound recordings 
in China before the introduction of the 1990 Copyright Law); Mark Sidel, The Legal 
Protection of Copyright and the Rights of Authors in the People’s Republic of China, 1949–1984:  
Prelude to the Chinese Copyright Law, 9 COLUM.-VLA J. ART & L. 477 (1985) (providing a 
historical survey on the regulation of authors’ rights in China and observations on the 
possible content of the forthcoming Copyright Law); Joseph T. Simone, Copyright in the 
People’s Republic of China:  A Foreigner’s Guide, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1988) 
(discussing the draft Chinese Copyright Law); Zheng Chengsi, The Future Chinese Copyright 
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until the law’s late adoption in the early 1990s.76  Some commentators 
also explored the protection of computer software, which at that time 
could be offered through either copyright law or a sui generis regime.77 
Apart from the three main branches of intellectual property law, some 
commentators broadened the research focus to cover law relating to 
foreign investment, technology licensing and transfer, and dispute 
settlement78—topics that were of great practical importance to 
attorneys who had clients doing business in China.79  Because little 
English-language scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system appeared before this phase, most scholarship in the second phase 
offered a historical overview of developments in the relevant areas.80 
                                               
System and Its Context, 15 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 141 (1984) (offering a 
pioneering discussion of the future of copyright protection in China). 
 76. 1990 Copyright Law, supra note 4. 
 77. For early discussions of efforts to protect computer software in China, see 
generally Elisa Cirillo, Note, The Legal Protection of Computer Software in the People’s 
Republic of China, 7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 387 (1989); William P. Fuller V, Note, 
The Protection of Computer Software in the People’s Republic of China, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD 
L.J. 57 (1989).  China eventually chose to protect computer software by establishing a 
sui generis regime.  See Regulations on the Protection of Computer Software of the 
People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the State Council, June 4, 1991, effective 
Oct. 1, 1991) (China) (providing sui generis protection for computer software).  For 
early discussions of protection of computer software in China, see generally XUE & 
ZHENG, SOFTWARE PROTECTION, supra note 54; Du Juan & K.H. Pun, Practical Aspects of 
Software Copyright in China, 22 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 520 (2000); K.H. Pun, A Critique 
of Copyright Protection for Computer Software in the People’s Republic of China, 16 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 227 (1994); Zheng Chengsi, The Protection of Computer Programs Under the 
Chinese Copyright Law, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 344 (1995). 
 78. See FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND THE LAW, supra note 73 (providing a 
collection of articles covering trade, investment, and intellectual property law in 
China); Chwang Tek Ling & Richard L. Thurston, Technology Takes Command:  The 
Policy of the People’s Republic of China with Respect to Technology Transfer and Protection of 
Intellectual Property, 21 INT’L LAW. 129, 134–42, 164–67 (1987) (discussing laws relating 
to foreign investment, technology transfer, and dispute settlement); T. Traian Moga, 
Making Foreign Things Serve China:  A Western Licensor’s Guide to the Chinese Market, 28 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 771 (1984) (providing a foreigner’s guide to licensing in China); David 
E. Pierce, The Legal Regime for Technology Imports in the People’s Republic of China, 10 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 206 (1988); Mitchell A. Silk, Recent Efforts in China’s Drive to Promote 
Investment Through the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights:  The 1988 Trademark Rules 
and the 1988 Technology Import Contract Rules, 15 SYR. J. INT’L L. & COM. 215, 225–29 
(1989) (covering the 1988 Technology Import Contract Rules). 
 79. Such a broadened focus continued into the next phase of standardization and 
customization.  See generally DANIEL C.K. CHOW, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES 
AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA (2002) (providing a primer on 
intellectual property laws and other laws regarding foreign investment enterprises). 
 80. See Beaumont, supra note 73, at 40–48 (1986) (providing a brief history of science 
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Complementing this body of scholarship was a helpful report the Far 
Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress prepared for the 
Special House Subcommittee on U.S. Trade with China.81  Written in 
1984 by Hsia Tao-tai, who co-authored one of the pioneering articles 
mentioned in the previous Section,82 this highly influential report 
provided in-depth analysis of the 1984 Patent Law and the much-
needed contextual background surrounding its development.83  
Particularly commendable is the report’s inclusion of Chinese-
language sources84 that helped bridge the rather significant language 
and access barriers encountered by virtually all early scholars of the 
Chinese intellectual property system.85 
C. Standardization and Customization 
The third phase began in the early 1990s.  Covering issues both 
inside and outside China, this phase featured scholarship on the 
United States’ aggressive intellectual property policy toward China and 
China’s active preparation for WTO accession.  At the beginning of this 
phase, China made a dedicated effort to reintegrate with the outside 
world following the international crisis precipitated by its handling of 
the 1989 student protests in Tiananmen Square.86  The protests and 
their aftermath not only resulted in sanctions from the international 
community,87 but also led foreign policymakers and commentators to 
view China with a different lens—with greater emphasis on the rule of 
                                               
and technology developments in China and discussing the challenge of encouraging 
innovation under Communism); Chwang & Thurston, supra note 78, at 131–34 
(discussing the evolution of Chinese trademark and copyright laws); Sidel, 52 52 
(providing a historically informed discussion of the Chinese intellectual property 
regime); Kay, supra note 73 (providing a historical survey of the regulations concerning 
invention awards and discussing the challenges to developing the 1984 Patent Law). 
 81. 1984 H. COMM. PRINT, supra note 59. 
 82. See supra text accompanying note 47 (discussing the previous article). 
 83. 1984 H. COMM. PRINT, supra note 59, at iii, 18–35. 
 84. See id. at 18–35. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 340–42 (discussing the lack of research 
materials for early scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system). 
 86. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 926–41 (discussing the protests and their aftermath). 
 87. See id. at 942 (noting the “universal condemnation[,] . . . severe international 
economic and military sanctions [and] diplomatic ostracism” after 1989). 
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law88 and human rights protection, for instance.89 
In the intellectual property area, the international sanctions and 
heightened global scrutiny greatly complicated policy and scholarly 
discussions.90  For example, on May 19, 1989, China and the United 
                                               
 88.  See generally Jeffrey W. Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.:  
Impediments to Protection and the Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 1 (1996) 
(highlighting the multiple impediments to protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights in China and arguing that the development of rule of law principles 
will be needed to remove these impediments); Li Yiqiang, Evaluation of the Sino-
American Intellectual Property Agreements:  A Judicial Approach to Solving the Local 
Protectionism Problem, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 391, 412–22 (1996) (advancing a judicial 
approach to address local protectionism). 
 89. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 960–67 (discussing policies made by the first Bush 
and Clinton administrations out of their concerns over human rights abuses in China).  
Although the human rights issues remained of great concern to U.S. policymakers and 
the American public, the Clinton administration delinked human rights protection 
from its trade policy in the early 1990s.  See JAMES MANN, ABOUT FACE:  A HISTORY OF 
AMERICA’S CURIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA, FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 292–314 
(2000) (discussing such delinkage). 
  Interestingly, the greater focus on human rights affects our views in both 
directions.  It sheds light on not only the Chinese intellectual property system, but also 
on a country’s foreign intellectual property policy toward China.  In his critique of the 
American foreign intellectual property policy, Professor Alford noted that “[t]he real 
irony, and even tragedy, . . . is that it impairs the advancement of fundamental rights 
and the attainment of our stated goals regarding intellectual property as well as 
broader national interests of both the United States and China.”  William P. Alford, 
Making the World Safe for What?  Intellectual Property Rights, Human Rights and Foreign 
Economic Policy in the Post-European Cold War World, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 135, 143 
(1996).  As he elaborated, 
What is tragic about the current U.S. intellectual property policy toward China 
is the way it sacrifices our—and China’s—longer-term national interests for 
perceived short-term electoral and commercial gain.  A democratic, law-abiding 
China surely will be a more stable, predictable, and dependable partner than 
the alternative—be it for the attainment of freer trade, national security, non-
proliferation and arms control, human rights, a sound environment, or 
cooperation in dealing with any of the world’s myriad other problems.  Such a 
China will also advance its own people’s interests more amply than the 
alternative.  The United States impairs the realization of these vital interests 
when, in its emphasis on results over process, it uses law as little more than a 
blunt instrument to press Beijing to reconsolidate control.  Such actions 
strengthen the position of those in Beijing most skeptical about legal processes 
and least interested in the devolution of power from central administrative 
authorities and the empowerment, through law, of the citizenry. 
Id. at 145–46. 
 90. As Joseph Massey, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Japan and 
China, recounted, 
Tiananmen stilled the voices within the interagency process in Washington who 
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States signed the first intellectual property-related memorandum of 
understanding (“MOU”) after China reopened to the outside world.91  
Focusing mostly on copyright protection and addressing software 
protection in particular,92 this MOU “paved the way for the eventual 
adoption of the Copyright Law in September 1990 and a separate set 
of computer software regulations the year after.”93  Yet, scholarship 
from both Chinese and non-Chinese intellectual property scholars 
seldom mentions this MOU.94 
Similar complications arose with respect to scholarship on the 
adoption of the 1990 Copyright Law.  Although the U.S. government 
and copyright industries had been lobbying heavily for this law since 
the mid-1980s,95 they remained reluctant to recognize its adoption as a 
                                               
had been calling, on “geopolitical” or other grounds, for the negotiators to 
moderate trade and IPR demands on China and accept lesser Chinese concessions.  
At the same time, however, the US decided not to press for criminal penalties for 
IPR piracy, a decision that (although appropriate at a time of severe political 
repression in China) would lead to problems in IPR enforcement later on. 
Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away:  China’s Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 234 (2006); see also MARTIN K. 
DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE:  THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 
147 (2009) (“Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, it has not been desirable or 
politically viable for the United States to encourage police involvement in any type of policy 
implementation.”); Warren H. Maruyama, U.S.-China IPR Negotiations:  Trade, Intellectual 
Property, and the Rule of Law in a Global Economy, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
AND PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 165, 172 (“While IPR would have been a source of 
friction in any case, the disputes cannot be separated from the U.S. internal struggle 
to define a credible post-Tiananmen policy toward China.”). 
 91. See PRC Agrees to Push for Copyright Law that Will Protect Computer Software, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. REP. 151 (July 1989) (reprinting the 1989 MOU). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in 
China, in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 20, 25 
(Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) [hereafter CHINA AND EUROPE]. 
 94. Part of the reason why scholars seldom mention this MOU is that it was 
unratified.  See MERTHA, supra note 44, at 124 (noting its legal status).  Nevertheless, a 
few works have mentioned this MOU.  See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS 
AN ELEGANT OFFENSE:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 112–13 
(1995) (criticizing the U.S. government’s priorities and its negotiation for the 1989 
MOU); Massey, supra note 90, at 234 (noting the negotiations of the 1989 MOU); Shen 
Jianming, The P.R.C.’s First Copyright Law Analyzed, 14 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
529, 556 (1991) (mentioning the 1989 MOU); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic 
Development, and the China Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:  
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173, 186 (Daniel 
J. Gervais ed., 1st ed. 2007) (noting the signing of the 1989 MOU). 
 95. As I noted in an earlier book chapter, 
[In the mid-1980s], the United States’ main intellectual property concern was 
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success.  Their reluctance was due largely to the strained diplomatic 
relationship between China and the United States and the suspension 
of bilateral talks “in 1989 and 1990 as part of the U.S. sanctions.”96  This 
lack of governmental engagement, in turn, caused U.S. policymakers 
and scholars to pay little attention to the compromise facilitating the 
adoption of the 1990 Copyright Law97—namely, the denial of copyright 
protection to censored works.  This compromise proved to be 
problematic for U.S. copyright industries down the road.98  As the next 
Section will discuss, Article 4 of the 1990 Copyright Law, which stated 
that “works the publication and/or dissemination of which are 
prohibited by law shall not be protected by this Law,”99 would 
eventually become a key part of the WTO complaint the United States 
                                               
copyrights, not patents.  Although China had already adopted new trademark 
and patent laws a few years before, it had yet to introduce a new copyright law.  
Part of the delay was caused by the need for censorship and control of 
information flows in China.  The lack of copyright protection was particularly 
problematic, as a lack of both copyright protection and market access had 
made it difficult for the politically powerful [U.S.] movie, music and software 
industries to protect their content. 
Yu, supra note 93, at 25; see also Maruyama, supra note 90, at 186 (“At a 1985 meeting 
to the U.S.-China Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade (JCCT), the U.S. for the 
first time expressed concerns about weak Chinese IPR standards.  In 1987, the U.S. put 
IPR protection on the agenda for U.S.-China market access talks.”). 
 96. Massey, supra note 90, at 235; accord MERTHA, supra note 44, at 42 (“One 
outcome of the worldwide condemnation of [China following the Tiananmen 
incident] was that ‘it was impossible to get the USTR to even talk to China between 
June 1989 and autumn 1990.’” (quoting documented but undisclosed interview)). 
 97. As Andrew Mertha recounted, 
In the post-June 4 period, many conservative elements in the government felt 
that the copyright debate involved issues of ideological “correctness” and that 
such issues should be explicitly included in the [Copyright Law].  By contrast, 
copyright proponents argued that ideological issues should not clutter up the 
Copyright Law—that the [Law] should not be used as a blunt instrument for 
meting out punishment for ideological crimes—and that such issues should 
be covered by the Criminal Law.  This debate was particularly protracted, and 
it resulted in the compromise that was enshrined in Article 4 . . . . 
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 125 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 121–22 (noting the 
debate about the sequencing of the publishing and copyright laws). 
 98. Another policy that had harmed these industries in the early 1990s was the U.S. 
government’s reluctance to press for criminal penalties due to its concern over 
political repression.  See Massey, supra note 90, at 234 (noting the decision “not to press 
for criminal penalties for IPR piracy” in the late 1980s and early 1990s); accord 
DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 147 (“Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, it has 
not been desirable or politically viable for the United States to encourage police 
involvement in any type of policy implementation.”). 
 99. 1990 Copyright Law, supra note 4, art. 4. 
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was to file more than a decade and a half later.100 
Notwithstanding the considerable complications in the early part of 
this phase, two specific developments radically changed the discourse 
on the Chinese intellectual property system.  First, on April 26, 1991, the 
USTR designated China as a priority foreign country for the first time.101  
This designation indicated that China “ha[d] the most onerous or 
egregious acts, policies, or practices that . . . deny adequate and effective 
intellectual property rights or . . . fair and equitable market access to 
[intellectual property rights holders].”102  Such designation paved the way 
for the first Bush administration’s announcement of $1.5 billion of 
retaliatory tariffs on “Chinese textiles, shoes, electronic instruments, 
and pharmaceuticals” in January 1992.103 
Second, and more crucial for Chinese legal research, the economic 
conditions in China changed rapidly following Deng Xiaoping’s visit 
to Guangzhou, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai in January 1992.104  In the wake 
of this so-called “southern tour” (nanxun),105 China not only 
accelerated the opening up of its economy, but also actively prepared 
for WTO accession. 
To capture these two pathbreaking developments, this Section 
highlights two distinct strands of scholarship.  The first strand 
concerned the American intellectual property policy toward China.  
Prescient, informative, and of great practical relevance, this strand of 
scholarship was largely sparked by the USTR’s designation of China as 
a priority foreign country in April 1991, a designation that would soon 
repeat on June 30, 1994, and April 30, 1996.106  The scholarship also 
covered other actions that the USTR had imposed on China or 
threatened the country with, such as economic sanctions, trade wars, 
                                               
 100. See infra text accompanying notes 134–50 (discussing this dispute and the 
related scholarship). 
 101. Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners:  Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the 
Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 141 (2000).  Ironically, April 26 would 
eventually become the World Intellectual Property Day, which WIPO launched in 
September 2000.  Press Release, WIPO, First World Intellectual Property Day to Be 
Marked on April 26 Under Banner of “Creating the Future Today” (Apr. 23, 2001), 
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/prdocs/2001/wipo_pr_2001_264.html.  That 
date was chosen because it was “the date on which the Convention establishing WIPO 
entered into force in 1970.”  Id. 
 102. 19 U.S.C. § 2242(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
 103. Yu, supra note 101, at 142. 
 104. See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 945–47 (discussing Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour”). 
 105. Id. at 945. 
 106. Yu, supra note 101, at 144, 148. 
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non-renewal of most-favored-nation status, and opposition to China’s 
entry into the WTO.107 
In addition, this strand of scholarship documented the back-and-forth 
engagement between China and the United States, including the 
multiple threats and counterthreats, the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property in January 
1992,108 the adoption of the Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property 
Rights in February 1995,109 and the exchange of a report on the 1995 
Agreement in June 1996.110  Although these bilateral instruments, in my 
view, have been largely ineffective—creating what I have referred to as a 
“cycle of futility”111—they have presented highly attractive topics for 
                                               
 107. See id. at 140–51 (describing the United States’ use of section 301 sanctions and 
various trade threats to induce China to strengthen protection of intellectual property rights). 
 108. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, 
China-U.S., Jan. 17, 1992, T.I.A.S. No. 12036 (1995); see also Massey, supra note 90, at 
235 (describing the 1992 MOU as “the first full bilateral IPR agreement” between 
China and the United States). 
 109. Agreement Regarding Intellectual Property Rights, China-U.S., Feb. 26, 1995, 
34 I.L.M. 881 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Agreement]; see also The U.S.-China Intellectual 
Property Rights Agreement:  Implications for U.S.-Sino Commercial Relations:  Joint Hearing 
Before the Subcomms. on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of 
the H. Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing a transcript of a 
congressional hearing on the 1995 Agreement). 
 110. TRADE COMPLIANCE CTR., PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
1995 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AGREEMENT—1996 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 
REPORT], http://tcc.export.gov/trade_agreements/all_trade_agreements/exp_0053
61.asp; see also The U.S.-China Intellectual Property Rights Agreement and Related Trade Issues:  
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and 
the Pacific of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1996) (providing the 
transcript of a congressional hearing on the effectiveness of intellectual property 
protection in China in the run-up to the 1996 Report).  Some commentators have 
referred to this report as the 1996 accord or an “exchange of letters.”  As Professor 
Mertha surmised, the use of the report format 
was a nod to Chinese sensibilities:  to call the 1995 agreement a Memorandum 
of Understanding . . . would imply that the Chinese had failed to implement the 
1992 MOU.  The Chinese insisted the second agreement not be in the form of 
an MOU; understanding the semantic significance, the U.S. side complied. 
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 14. 
 111. Peter K. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years:  Intellectual Property, Post-WTO 
China, and the Avoidable Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 143, 143 (2005); see 
also Yu, supra note 101, at 140–48 (discussing this “cycle of futility”).  As I described in 
an earlier article, 
That cycle went as follows:  The United States began by threatening China with 
trade sanctions (often with an ancillary threat of nonrenewal of China’s most-
favored-nation status).  China responded with threats of retaliatory sanctions 
of a similar amount.  After several months of negotiations, both countries 
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research on the Chinese intellectual property system.112 
Before the early 1990s, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual 
property system did not focus much on American intellectual property 
policy toward China113 or issues relating to intellectual property 
enforcement in the country.114  This prior scholarship seemed to have 
                                               
agreed to an eleventh-hour compromise that usually led to a written 
document.  While intellectual property protection improved during the first 
few months immediately following the agreements, piracy and counterfeiting 
problems worsened once international attention was diverted.  Within a short 
period of time, American businesses again complained to the U.S. 
government, and the cycle repeated itself. 
Yu, supra, at 149; see also MERTHA, supra note 44, at 15 (“External pressure may have 
succeeded in getting Beijing to promulgate satisfactory IPR-related laws and regulations, 
but the enforcement of intellectual property, as with most policy in China, falls within 
the domain of China’s complex bureaucracies and local government officials.”). 
 112. See generally Alford, supra note 89 (criticizing the wrong-headedness of the 
American intellectual property policy toward China); Li, supra note 88, at 402–11 
(noting the shortcomings of the enforcement mechanisms created by the 1995 
Agreement and the 1996 report and underscoring the need for the use of a judicial 
approach to address local protectionism and other underlying political, economic, 
and social problems); Michael Yeh, Note, Up Against a Great Wall:  The Fight Against 
Intellectual Property Piracy in China, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 503, 515–21 (1996) 
(exploring why the U.S. government’s strategy of using economic influence has not 
led to the establishment of an effective intellectual property regime in China). 
 113. A rare exception is Baumgarten, supra note 57 (discussing the changing U.S.-
China copyright relations following the signing of the 1979 Agreement). 
 114. A rare exception is Stuart C. McCormack, Counterfeits in China, 77 TRADEMARK 
REP. 133 (1987) (discussing the procedures and avenues for trademark holders to 
address counterfeit goods in China).  For later scholarship in this area, see generally 
Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China:  How a 
Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749 (2010); Daniel 
C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (2000) 
[hereinafter Chow, Counterfeiting]; Daniel C.K. Chow, Enforcement Against Counterfeiting 
in China, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 447 (2000); Daniel C.K. Chow, Organized Crime, Local 
Protectionism, and the Trade in Counterfeit Goods in China, 14 CHINA ECON. REV. 473 
(2003); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 203 (2006) [hereinafter Chow, Commercial Piracy]; Eric Priest, The Future 
of Music and Film Piracy in China, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 795 (2006).  For articles 
offering useful practical tips for enforcing intellectual property rights, see generally 
Jack Chang, Practical Enforcement of IP in China:  Suggestions and Comments from the Quality 
Brands Protection Committee (QBPC), in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 54, at 367; John Donaldson & Rebecca Weiner, 
Swashbuckling the Pirates:  A Communications-Based Approach to IPR Protection in China, in 
CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 37, at 409; Eric M. 
Griffin, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A Proactive Approach to Copyright Protection in the 
People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 169, 187–96 (1998); Thomas 
Lagerqvist & Mary L. Riley, How to Protect Intellectual Property Rights in China, in 
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taken for granted (somewhat naïvely) that China would effectively 
enforce intellectual property laws once they had been put in place.  
The scholarship after the mid-1990s, however, no longer make this 
misguided assumption.115  Instead, a growing volume of literature 
closely examined the piracy and counterfeiting problems in China and 
proposed solutions to address them. 
Specifically, the scholarship covered the introduction of a special 
enforcement period through the 1995 Agreement,116 the 
reinstatement of this period in June 1996,117 and the various 
enforcement campaigns that China subsequently launched.  This 
coverage shows that policymakers and commentators started to 
become aware that the intellectual property problems in China were 
less about the lack of intellectual property laws than about the failure 
to enforce those laws.118  As the USTR noted in the 2001 National Trade 
Estimate Report, shortly before China’s admission to the WTO, rampant 
intellectual property violations in the country were largely attributed 
to “poor enforcement of existing laws and regulations, combined with 
                                               
PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 54, at 7. 
 115. See, e.g., ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA:  THE ROOTS OF 
THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCEMENT viii (1996) (“There has been an expanding literature 
on the intellectual property situation in China but most of it is devoted to an exposition 
of what is found in the laws, that is in the black letter aspect of them, as opposed to 
the relevance of those laws to, and impact on, the social, economic and technological 
conditions . . . in China now or in the foreseeable future.”). 
 116. See Action Plan for Effective Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, pmbl., § IC, in 1995 Agreement, supra note 109 (providing for a six-
month special enforcement period, during which China would make intensive efforts 
to crack down on major infringers of intellectual property rights and to target regions 
in which infringing activity was particularly rampant at the time of the agreement). 
 117. See 1996 REPORT, supra note 110 (“The United States asked China for a second major 
step—reinstatement of the ‘Special Enforcement Period’ provided for in the Agreement.”). 
 118. See Peter Ganea & Jin Haijun, China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA:  LAW, 
ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND POLITICS 17, 31–32 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph Straus eds., 
2009) (“[M]odern laws transplanted from the West exist only on the books but are of 
little practical relevance.  In China, the gap between law on the books and actual 
enforcement is the problem, not so much the remaining shortcomings of the present 
legislation.”); Shi Wei & Robert Weatherley, Harmony or Coercion—China-EU Trade 
Dispute Involving Intellectual Property Enforcement, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 439, 443 (2007) (“The 
crucial issue for China lies not in the enactment of new laws, but in the application of 
existing laws.”); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II):  Protecting Intellectual 
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901, 923–46 (2006) (“[T]he problem with 
China is not a lack of laws, but the existence of too many.”); see also William P. Alford, 
How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter:  American Approaches to Intellectual Property Law 
in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 21 (1994) (noting that he was “tempted to write 
an article entitled ‘Why China Has Too Much Law—And Too Little Legality’”). 
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weak punishments.”119 
Another major strand of scholarship appearing in this phase focused 
on those changes China made to the intellectual property system in its 
run-up to WTO accession.120  This strand of scholarship complemented 
and reinforced the previous strand of scholarship, because WTO 
accession and related reforms helped address the concerns the U.S. 
government and intellectual property industries had over inadequate 
intellectual property protection in China.  Because WTO reforms are 
often examined together, this strand of scholarship inevitably touched 
on China’s “reform and open” (gaige kaifang) policies.  These policies 
garnered even more policy, scholarly, and media attention following 
the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s.121  While this crisis deeply 
affected countries such as Japan, South Korea, and other leading Asian 
economies, China’s economy managed to grow on a steady pace.122 
The discussion of WTO-related developments in this phase is 
complex and challenging.  Not only did scholars need to capture fast-
pace developments, which were often moving targets, they also had to 
                                               
 119. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE 
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 55 (2001), https://ustr.gov/archive/assets/ 
Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2001/2001_NTE_Report/asset_upload_fil
e535_6560.pdf. 
 120. See generally Li Yahong, The Wolf Has Come:  Are China’s Intellectual Property 
Industries Prepared for the WTO?, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 77 (2002) (discussing the 
amendments China introduced in the run-up to the WTO membership and the impact 
such membership would have on the country and its intellectual property industries); 
Julia Cheng, Note, China’s Copyright System:  Rising to the Spirit of TRIPS Requires an 
Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 2005–12 (1998) 
(discussing the potential improvements in the Chinese intellectual property system 
that WTO accession could spark). 
 121. See CHANG HA-JOON, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE:  THE MIRACLE, 
THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE 179–225 (2006) (discussing the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
and its implications). 
 122. See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA:  THE BALANCE SHEET:  WHAT THE WORLD 
NEEDS TO KNOW NOW ABOUT THE EMERGING SUPERPOWER 18 (2006) (“China has been 
the world’s fastest growing economy for almost three decades, expanding at any 
average pace of almost 10 percent.”); Yu, supra note 94, at 173 (“Since the late 1980s, 
the Chinese economy has been growing at an enviable average annual rate of about 
ten per cent.”); see also ROBERT G. SUTTER, CHINA’S RISE IN ASIA:  PROMISES AND PERILS 
178 (2005) (noting “Beijing’s careful responses to the crisis, including its pledges to 
maintain economic growth, eschew devaluation of the Chinese currency, support IMF 
rescue efforts, and provide supplementary support of $1 billion to Thailand and a 
reported several billion dollars to Indonesia”); Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 
44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 953, 996 (2011) (noting China’s ability to provide financial 
assistance to Thailand, Indonesia, and other Asian countries during the Asian financial 
crisis and its decision not to exacerbate the crisis by devaluing the renminbi). 
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address the substantial changes that were simultaneously occurring in 
the international intellectual property regime in the early to 
mid-1990s.  These changes included, most notably, those caused by the 
arrival of the TRIPS Agreement123 and the mainstreaming of the 
internet.124  Taking note of these changes, some scholarship in this 
phase not only focused on domestic intellectual property reforms in 
China, but also featured discussion of the dramatic changes within the 
international intellectual property regime.125 
When considered together, these two major strands of scholarship 
reveal a clean break from scholarship in the previous phase.  While there 
were occasional articles covering the transition of the Chinese intellectual 
property system from the mid-1980s,126 scholarship in this phase seems to 
have broken the timeline and jumpstarted with a new direction.  This new 
direction was generated externally by the United States’ aggressive 
intellectual property policy toward China, internally by reforms that 
China eagerly undertook in its effort to join the WTO, or both. 
                                               
 123. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS 3–27 (3d ed. 2008) (describing the origins and development of the TRIPS 
Agreement); DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  THE 
TRIPS AGREEMENT (2002) (examining the role of intellectual property industries in 
the TRIPS negotiations); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 96-120 (2003) 
(recounting the trilateral discussions among the United States, the European Union, 
and Japan); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11–47 (2001) (recounting the negotiation process for the 
TRIPS Agreement); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 369, 371–79 (2006) (examining four different accounts of the origins of the 
TRIPS Agreement). 
 124. See generally COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. 
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:  INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2000) (discussing the challenges the internet has 
posed to the copyright system). 
 125. For discussions of the Chinese intellectual property system in relation to the 
TRIPS Agreement, see generally Reiko R. Feaver, Comment, China’s Copyright Law and 
the TRIPS Agreement, 5 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 431 (1996); Michael N. Schlesinger, 
Note, A Sleeping Giant Awakens:  The Development of Intellectual Property Law in China, 
9 J. CHINESE L. 93 (1995); Amy E. Simpson, Comment, Copyright Law and Software 
Regulations in the People’s Republic of China:  Have the Chinese Pirates Affected World Trade, 
20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 575 (1994). 
 126. Notable examples are the discussions of the 1990 Copyright Law and the 1992 
Patent Law.  For these discussions, see generally Shen, supra note 75; Yang Yiping, The 
1990 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 260 (1993); 
Laurence P. Harrington, Note, Recent Amendments to China’s Patent Law:  The Emperor’s 
New Clothes, 17 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 337 (1994). 
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D. Integration and Assimilation 
The fourth phase began with China’s accession to the WTO.  Unlike 
the first three phases, this phase is the most clearly identifiable.  At the 
Doha Ministerial Conference in November 2001, WTO members 
approved the proposal to admit China to the international trading 
body.127  After fifteen years of exhaustive negotiations,128 China formally 
became the organization’s 143rd member on December 11, 2001.129 
In this phase, the scholarship built heavily on scholarship in the 
previous phase.  Indeed, the overlap between these two phases has led 
researchers to lump together the two phases in their analyses.  
Combining these two phases is also an approach I have taken in past 
scholarship.130  While the previous phase covered the customization 
and standardization efforts before China’s WTO accession, the present 
phase focused on post-accession developments.131 
                                               
 127. See Paul Blustein & Clay Chandler, WTO Approves China’s Entry, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 11, 2001, at A47 (reporting China’s admission to the WTO); Joseph Kahn, World 
Trade Organization Admits China, amid Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at 1A (same). 
 128. As Michael Schlesinger observed, 
China was a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
[GATT] in 1947, but in the aftermath of the retreat of Chiang Kaishek’s 
Nationalist forces to the island of Taiwan in October 1949 and the rise to power 
of the Communists on the mainland, the Nationalist government gave 
notification to the GATT Secretariat in March 1950 that China was withdrawing 
from the GATT.  On July 14, 1986, the government of the People’s Republic of 
China formally notified the GATT Secretariat of its intention to seek 
“resumption” of its status as a contracting party[.]  From late 1986 until the 
founding of the WTO on January 1, 1995, China has been permitted to 
participate in the GATT Uruguay Round of negotiations as an observer.  
However, China ultimately failed in its primary objective:  persuading the GATT 
contracting parties to allow it into the GATT before the founding of the WTO. 
Schlesinger, supra note 125, at 135–36 (footnotes omitted). 
 129. For discussions of China’s entry into the WTO, see generally CHINA IN THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:  DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT (Frederick M. 
Abbott ed., 1998) [hereinafter CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; GORDON G. 
CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA 187–212 (2001); NICHOLAS R. LARDY, 
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1–28 (2002); PETER NOLAN, CHINA AND 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:  NATIONAL CHAMPIONS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE BIG BUSINESS 
REVOLUTION 195–209 (2001); SUPACHAI PANITCHPAKDI & MARK CLIFFORD, CHINA AND 
THE WTO:  CHANGING CHINA, CHANGING WORLD TRADE (2002); Peter K. Yu et al., China 
and the WTO:  Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003). 
 130. See Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 22, at 9–10 (combining the two phases 
under the stage of standardization and customization); Yu, supra note 23, at 4–6 
(dividing the development of the modern Chinese intellectual property system into 
three distinct phases). 
 131. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRIPS COMPLIANCE IN CHINA:  CHINESE 
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Notwithstanding the continuity from the pre-accession phase to the 
post-accession phase, this Part separates scholarship in the 
customization and standardization phase from scholarship in the 
integration and assimilation phase.  Such separation makes salient the 
latter’s focus on China’s integration efforts and legal and policy 
responses following WTO accession.  For instance, a significant volume 
of scholarship in the integration and assimilation phase analyzed the 
amendments China adopted shortly before WTO accession.132  These 
amendments included the Second Amendment to the Patent Law, the 
First Amendment to the Copyright Law, and the Second Amendment 
to the Trademark Law, which China adopted in August 2000, October 
2001, and October 2001, respectively.133 
One major incident that attracted considerable policy and scholarly 
attention in this phase was the U.S.-China WTO dispute over the lack 
of protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights under 
the TRIPS Agreement.134  This dispute marked the first time the United 
States used the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process to address 
the massive piracy and counterfeiting problems in China.135  Filed on 
April 16, 2007, the United States’ complaint included four issues:  (1) the 
                                               
AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES (Paul Torremans et al. eds., 2007) (collecting articles that 
discuss China’s effort to comply with the TRIPS Agreement following WTO accession). 
 132. For this body of scholarship, see generally Chen Jiwen, Better Patent Law for 
International Commitment—The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, 2 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & 
BUS. 61 (2001); Feng Xiaoqing & Frank Xianfeng Huang, International Standards and 
Local Elements:  New Developments of Copyright Law in China, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 
917 (2002); Ran Ruixue, Well-Known Trademark Protection in China:  Before and After the 
TRIPS Amendments to China’s Trademark Law, 19 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 231 (2002); Louis 
S. Sorell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in China and the United 
States, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y 319 (2002). 
 133. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, amended Oct. 27, 2001, effective 
Nov. 1, 2001) (China); Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Aug. 25, 2000, 
effective July 1, 2001) (China); Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, amended 
Oct. 27, 2001, effective Dec. 1, 2001) (China). 
 134. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2009) 
[hereinafter WTO Panel Report].  For the Author’s discussions of this dispute, see 
generally Yu, supra note 6; Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 
26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 727 (2011). 
 135. See Disputes by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm (last visited May 9, 2018) (listing 
the disputes involving the TRIPS Agreement). 
1076 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1045 
 
high thresholds for criminal procedures and penalties in the intellectual 
property area; (2) the failure of the Chinese customs authorities to 
properly dispose of infringing goods seized at the border; (3) the denial 
of copyright protection to works that have not been authorized for 
publication or dissemination within China; and (4) the unavailability 
of criminal procedures and penalties for infringing activities that 
involved either reproduction or distribution, but not both.136 
By the time the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel to 
address the complaint, the two parties had already resolved the fourth 
claim.137  As a result, the panel considered only the three remaining 
claims.  In January 2009, after some initial delay, the WTO panel finally 
released its long-awaited report.138  While China prevailed on the claim 
concerning criminal thresholds,139 the United States won the censorship 
claim.140  The remaining customs claim was somewhat divided between 
the two parties,141 with each side declaring victory.142  With a 2–1 outcome, 
neither China nor the United States appealed the panel decision to the 
WTO Appellate Body.143 
                                               
 136. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Measures Affecting 
the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/1 
(Apr. 16, 2007) (providing the complaint). 
 137. Yu, supra note 6, at 1055. 
 138. WTO Panel Report, supra note 134. 
 139. See id. ¶ 8.1(a) (stating that the first sentence of Article 4 of the Chinese 
Copyright Law is inconsistent with China’s obligations under Article 5(1) of the Berne 
Convention as incorporated by Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement and under Article 
41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement); id. ¶¶ 7.396–.682 (analyzing the claim on criminal 
thresholds); id. ¶ 8.1(c) (stating that “the United States has not established that the 
criminal thresholds are inconsistent with China’s obligations under the first sentence 
of Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement”); Yu, supra note 6, at 1056–69, 1083–90 
(discussing this claim and analyzing its limitations). 
 140. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶¶ 7.1–.192 (analyzing the censorship 
claim); Yu, supra note 6, at 1074–81, 1096–1101 (discussing this claim and analyzing 
its limitations). 
 141. See WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, ¶ 8.1(b)(ii)–(iii) (stating that “the 
United States has not established that the Customs measures are inconsistent with 
Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, as it incorporates the principles set out in the first 
sentence of Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement . . . [but that those] measures are 
inconsistent with Article 59 of the TRIPS Agreement, as it incorporates the principle 
set out in the fourth sentence of Article 46 of the TRIPS Agreement”); ¶¶ 7.193–.395 
(analyzing the customs claim); Yu, supra note 6, at 1056–74, 1091–96 (discussing this 
claim and analyzing its limitations). 
 142. See Yu, supra note 6, at 1081–82 (discussing the reactions and assessments of 
the Chinese and U.S. governments and other commentators). 
 143. Id. at 1082. 
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Although scholarship on this dispute existed long before the release of 
the WTO panel report,144 most commentaries emerged after the report 
and well into the next phase of indigenization and transformation.145  A 
notable collection of articles on this report was published as a special issue 
on “The WTO China—IPR Case in Perspective” in the Journal of World 
Intellectual Property.146  These “post-mortems” not only assessed the 
dispute’s outcome and its ramifications for the WTO and its TRIPS 
Agreement, but also covered many different aspects of the WTO panel 
report, including interpretive methodology,147 TRIPS flexibilities,148 
                                               
 144.  See, e.g., Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over:  The U.S.-China WTO 
Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 113–86 (2008) (analyzing the 
complaint’s merits); Yu, supra note 118, at 923–46 (articulating five reasons why the 
United States should not file a formal complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body over the inadequate enforcement of intellectual property rights in China); Yu, 
supra note 111, at 144–51 (arguing that the United States’ WTO complaint could 
create a new “cycle of futility” and suggesting ways to avoid such a cycle); Zhu Lanye & 
Liu Jiarui, Sino-US Intellectual Property Dispute:  A New Chapter in WTO History, 3 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. & PRAC. 194, 199–200 (2008) (analyzing the four claims in the United States’ 
WTO complaint). 
 145. For discussions of the WTO panel report, see generally Rogier Creemers, The 
Effects of World Trade Organisation Case DS362 on Audiovisual Media Piracy in China, 31 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 568 (2009); Daniel Gervais, China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 549 (2009); 
Xue Hong, An Anatomical Study of the United States Versus China at the World Trade 
Organisation on Intellectual Property Enforcement, 31 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 292 (2009); 
Peter K. Yu, Shaping Chinese Criminal Enforcement Norms Through the TRIPS Agreement, in 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY 
RESEARCH 286 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2012); Yu, supra note 6; Yu, supra note 134; see 
also infra note 146 (listing additional sources collected in a special issue of the Journal 
of World Intellectual Property). 
 146. This special issue includes the following articles:  Tomer Broude, It’s Easily 
Done:  The China—Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Dispute and the Freedom of 
Expression, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 660 (2010); Li Xuan, The Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Flexibilities on Intellectual Property Enforcement:  
The World Trade Organization Panel Interpretation of China—Intellectual Property 
Enforcement of Criminal Measures and Its Implications, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 639 
(2010); Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, China—Intellectual Property Rights:  Implications for 
TRIPS-plus Border Measures, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 620 (2010); Jayashree Watal, US-
China Intellectual Property Dispute—A Comment on the Interpretation of the TRIPS Enforcement 
Provisions, 13 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 605 (2010). 
 147. See generally Watal, supra note 146 (discussing the panel report’s significance 
for the interpretation of TRIPS enforcement provisions). 
 148. See generally Li, supra note 146 (examining the panel report’s findings on the 
claim on criminal thresholds and their implications for TRIPS flexibilities). 
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border measures,149 and freedom of expression.150 
Another major incident that received considerable policy, scholarly, 
and media attention worldwide was the Beijing Olympics in August 
2008.151  The hosting of this world sporting event was a great source of 
national pride among the Chinese populace.152  In the view of one 
commentator, such hosting “not only would help position the country 
in the global economy, but might also trickle ripple effects to 
accelerate reforms in the country,” including intellectual property 
reforms.153  Scholarship covering the Beijing Olympics therefore 
discussed issues ranging from international integration to trademark 
protection to intellectual property enforcement.154 
                                               
 149. See generally Ruse-Khan, supra note 146 (examining the panel report’s findings on 
the customs claim and their potential application to TRIPS-plus enforcement measures). 
 150. See generally Broude, supra note 146 (exploring the human rights implications 
of the panel report’s findings on the censorship claim and the potential negative 
effects on the legal framework of the freedom of expression in China). 
 151. See Jim Yardley, Games Open in a New China, Dazzling an Age of New Media, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 2008, at A1 (reporting the opening of the Beijing Olympics). 
 152. See Peter K. Yu, The Curious Case of Fake Beijing Olympics Merchandise, in 
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND TERRITORIALITY CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 259, 
272 (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 2014) (“The pride Chinese nationals derived 
from Beijing’s successful bid to host the Olympics was understandable, especially 
against a background of China’s painful struggle with the ‘century of humiliation’ and 
the ongoing and repeated criticisms the country has received from the United States 
and other foreign powers.  As with citizens of any host country of major international 
sporting events, these proud individuals wanted to showcase the country’s ability to 
meet international standards in the face of heavy media scrutiny.”). 
 153. Id. at 262; see also Steve Friess, The Trouble with Olympic Trinkets, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 
2001, at 6B (quoting Michael Payne, marketing director of the International Olympic 
Committee, in his assertion that “there are high expectations and hopes that the Olympics 
will be an important catalyst for China’s trademark protection, just as it was in Korea”). 
 154. See generally Yu, supra note 152 (closely scrutinizing the intellectual property 
developments during and in the run-up to the Beijing Olympics to determine whether 
this important world event has provided the much-needed example to show that China 
could effectively address the counterfeiting problem when national interests are at 
stake); Brenda Pamela Mey (Ongech), China, the “Intellectual Property Black Hole” Hosts 
the XXIX Olympiad:  Measures the People’s Republic of China Undertook to Secure the Protection 
of Olympic-Related Intellectual Property Rights, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 153 (2009) 
(discussing the efforts China undertook to protect Olympics-related intellectual 
property rights and the continuing problems in the country); Yu, supra note 118, at 
991–99 (discussing the Chinese authorities’ heightened efforts to protect trademarks 
used in relation to the 2008 Beijing Olympics); Jennifer L. Donatuti, Note, Can China 
Protect the Olympics, or Should the Olympics Be Protected from China?, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
203 (2007) (discussing the challenges that would prevent China from offering 
sufficient protection to intellectual property rights related to the Beijing Olympics); 
Stacey H. Wang, Note, Great Olympics, New China:  Intellectual Property Enforcement Steps 
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Notwithstanding the significance of both the WTO panel report and 
the Beijing Olympics, the timing of these events has presented some 
taxonomical challenges for scholarship in this phase.  Although both 
events were held just when China was changing its intellectual property 
system from a transplant-based model to one focusing on independent 
innovation, scholarship regarding these events fit much better here 
than in the next phase of indigenization and transformation. 
From a chronological standpoint, the United States filed the WTO 
complaint in this phase even though the WTO panel did not release 
its report until two years later.  Likewise, China had been planning the 
Beijing Olympics since its winning bid in July 2001.155  Those years of 
planning took place long before the development of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy. 
From a research standpoint, the scholarship on both events also tie 
well to scholarship in this phase.  Both the WTO panel report and the 
Beijing Olympics reflected China’s effort to assimilate international 
standards and to integrate with the outside world.  Scholarship on the 
latter, in particular, foregrounded issues about global integration.  
Because the International Olympic Committee had dictated many new 
intellectual property standards the same way the WTO did,156 the 
scholarship on the Beijing Olympics and post-WTO accession 
adjustments bore remarkable similarities. 
E. Indigenization and Transformation 
The last phase began with the State Council’s release of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy in June 2008,157 a couple of months 
before the Beijing Olympics.  This nationwide strategy provided a 
comprehensive plan to improve the creation, utilization, protection, 
and administration of intellectual property rights.158  Specifically, 
                                               
up to the Mark, 27 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291 (2005) (discussing the unique 
opportunity provided by the Beijing Olympics to set the framework needed to 
strengthen foreign intellectual property rights). 
 155. See Jere Longman, Beijing Wins Bid for 2008 Olympic Games, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2001, at A1 (reporting China’s winning bid). 
 156. See Yu, supra note 152, at 264 (“Since the 1996 Atlanta Olympics, the 
[International Olympic Committee] has focused an increased amount of attention on 
the intellectual property aspects of the Games.”); see also id. at 262–64 (discussing Beijing 
Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad and a wide variety of legal 
measures that China introduced in the run-up to the Olympics); Donatuti, supra note 
154, at 206–09 (discussing the Committee’s role in the Olympic Games). 
 157. NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGY, supra note 24. 
 158. See id. pmbl. (“This Outline is formulated for the purpose of improving China’s 
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paragraph 7 emphasized the need for active development of 
independent or self-controlled intellectual property (zizhu zhishi 
chanquan).159  As this Section will discuss further, this emphasis would 
eventually cause policymakers and commentators from the United 
States, Europe, and other parts of the world to link its discussion to 
protectionist indigenous innovation policies.160 
The origin of China’s National Intellectual Property Strategy traced 
back to the mid-2000s when government leaders began to consider 
major changes to move the economy forward.  These laws were well 
aware of the need to develop a new overall economic strategy to “avoid 
what policymakers and commentators have described as the ‘middle-
income trap’—the proverbial state of development at which a country 
is stuck after it has attained a certain level of wealth, but has yet to catch 
up with its more developed counterparts.”161 
In February 2006, the State Council released the National Long-term 
Scientific and Technological Development Program, formally 
declaring its commitment to turn China into an innovation-based 
economy within fifteen years.162  Since then, top Chinese leaders 
increasingly recognized the economic and strategic significance of a 
well-functioning intellectual property system.  As the State Intellectual 
Property Office recounted in its 2008 report, 
During the Ninth Collective Study of the 17th [Chinese Communist 
Party] Politburo, General Secretary Hu Jintao stressed specifically the 
importance of sticking to innovation with Chinese characteristics, 
energetically implementing the strategy of making the country 
prosperous with science and technology, the strategy of capitalizing 
on talent to make the country strong, IP [intellectual property] 
strategy, and accelerating the construction of innovative country.  
                                               
capacity to create, utilize, protect and administer intellectual property, making China 
an innovative country and attaining the goal of building a moderately prosperous 
society in all respects.”). 
 159. Id. ¶ 7. 
 160. See infra text accompanying notes 168–77 (discussing the linkage between the two). 
 161. Yu, supra note 93, at 27. 
 162. State Council, The Outline of the National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science 
and Technology Development (2006–2020) § II(1) (2006), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-
02/09/content_183787.htm and translated in http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/ 
123%286%29.pdf.  For discussions of this fifteen-year plan, see generally Cao Cong et 
al., China’s 15-Year Science and Technology Plan, PHYSICS TODAY, Dec. 2006, at 38; Feng 
Xiaoqing, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent Innovation and 
Patent Protection:  A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law of the P.R. China, 
9 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2009); Liang, supra note 17, at 483–84. 
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When addressing the Party’s meeting mobilizing the study and 
practice of scientific outlook on development, Premier Wen Jiabao 
said, “One thing necessary to stress is to concretely strengthen IPR 
[intellectual property right] protection.  In the new era, competition 
of world science and technology as well as economy is mainly 
competition of IPRs.  Underscoring IP protection is underscoring and 
inspiring innovation.”  . . .  Vice Premier Wang Qishan published an 
article in his own name entitled China no longer tolerates piracy, 
infringement on the Chinese version of the Wall Street Journal . . . .163 
Although there had been lengthy policy discussion, scholarship on 
the National Intellectual Property Strategy did not emerge in 
intellectual property literature until after the launch of the new 
strategy.164  Until then, that strategy was occasionally mentioned.  
Moreover, because China released its National Intellectual Property 
Strategy only a few months before the adoption of the Third 
Amendment to the Patent Law in December 2008,165 scholarship in this 
                                               
 163. State Intellectual Property Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s 
Intellectual Property Protection in 2008, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/whitepapers/ 
200904/t20090427_457167.html (last visited May 9, 2018); see also PANG LAIKWAN, 
CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS:  CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES 8 (2012) (“If gaige kaifang (reform and open) was the 
dominant policy principle of the [Chinese] government in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
recent Hu Jintao government has shifted its attention to gaige chuangxin (reform and 
innovation), emphasizing the importance of innovation and production of the new.” 
(Chinese characters omitted)); Wu Handong, One Hundred Years of Progress:  The 
Development of the Intellectual Property System in China, 1 WIPO J. 117, 120 (2009) 
(“Strengthening the building of China’s system of intellectual property right and 
vigorously upgrading the capacity of creation, management, protection and 
application regarding intellectual property are our urgent need for the purpose of 
enhancing independent and self-driven innovation capabilities and building an 
innovation-oriented country.” (quoting President Hu Jintao’s remarks in the Group 
Study of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party in May 2006)). 
 164. See generally PRUD’HOMME, supra note 17 (discussing the impact of China’s new 
patent policies and practices on innovation); Liang, supra note 17, at 483–91 
(discussing China’s plans to become an innovative society); Ken Shao, Neoliberal 
Capitalism and China’s Strategic Patent Framework for the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 
8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 15 (2018) (discussing how the neoliberal capitalist view 
of the global intellectual property regime fails to explain the design and 
implementation of China’s strategic patent framework); Peter K. Yu, Five Oft-Repeated 
Questions About China’s Recent Rise as a Patent Power, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 78, 
88–101 (discussing China’s national intellectual property strategy and the push for the 
active development of independent intellectual property); Yu, supra note 6, at 1122–
24 (discussing the concerns raised by China’s domestic innovation policies). 
 165. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 
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phase often discussed the two topics together.166 
From a research standpoint, the development of this amendment 
was particularly noteworthy, as it reflected China’s eagerness to make 
adjustment to its intellectual property system based mostly on internal 
needs, as opposed to external demands.167  Up to that point, 
intellectual property reforms in China focused primarily on 
compliance with external norms.  The development of the strategy and 
the new patent law amendment also redirected scholarship on the 
Chinese intellectual property system.  Instead of continuing to address 
issues that are of great concern to foreign governments and rights 
holders—such as the massive piracy and counterfeiting problems in 
China—scholarship emerging after this point has turned to other 
issues that are equally interesting and significant to Chinese 
policymakers and the local populace. 
In this phase of indigenization and transformation—which is still 
ongoing—the scholarship has focused mostly on law and policy 
changes that China has introduced to implement and “perfect” its 
National Intellectual Property Strategy.  In addition to the latest round 
of amendments to the copyright, patent, trademark, and unfair 
competition laws, scholarship in this phase has covered new topics such 
as indigenous innovation168—a topic that has greatly troubled foreign 
                                               
2009), arts. 39–40 (China). 
 166. See, e.g., LI YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA:  THE ROLE OF PATENTS 
IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES 2–3 (2010) (linking the strategy’s 
discussion with that of the new patent law amendment); Stefan Luginbühl, China’s 
Patent Policy, in PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA, supra note 54, at 3, 4–11 (same); Stefan 
Luginbuehl & Thomas Pattloch, China’s New Patent Policy, 33 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
274 (2011) (same). 
 167. See Guo He, Patents, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY 
LAWS, supra note 54, at 25, 28 (“The impetus for the early amendments came from 
outside, whilst the need for the third amendment [to the Patent Law] originated from 
within China, that is to say, the majority of the third amendment was to meet the needs 
of the development of the domestic economy and technology originating in China.”); 
Yu, supra note 93, at 27–28 (noting that “China, for the first time, adjusted its patent 
standards based on its own needs”). 
 168. For discussions of China’s independent innovation policies, see PRUD’HOMME, 
supra note 17, at 75–115; Feng Xiaoqing, Challenges to China’s Self-Driven Innovation and 
Intellectual Property Practice, in INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA:  
STRATEGIES, CONTEXTS AND CHALLENGES 80 (Ken Shao & Feng Xiaoqing eds., 2014) 
[hereinafter INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA]; An Siyuan & Brian 
Peck, China’s Indigenous Innovation Policy in the Context of Its WTO Obligations and 
Commitments, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 375 (2011); Daniel C.K. Chow, China’s Indigenous 
Innovation Policies and the World Trade Organization, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 81 (2013); 
Ken Shao, Zizhu Chuangxin and China’s Self-Driven Innovation:  Calling for a Holistic 
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governments and intellectual property industries.169  Indeed, China’s 
new indigenous innovation policies were so problematic that the 
Trump administration launched a section 301 investigation of China 
in August 2017.170  The WTO complaint that the USTR recently filed 
also underscored the concerns raised by these policies.171  Focusing on 
Articles 3 and 28 of the TRIPS Agreement,172 the complaint alleged 
that “China deprive[d] foreign intellectual property rights holders of 
the ability to protect their intellectual property rights in China as well 
as freely negotiate market-based terms in licensing and other 
technology-related contracts.”173 
As I noted in prior scholarship, indigenous innovation is actually not 
                                               
Perspective, 2013 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 168, 169; Yu, supra note 6, at 1122–24. 
 169. As the U.S. International Trade Commission stated in its 2011 report, 
China’s indigenous innovation policies, which promote the development, 
commercialization, and procurement of Chinese products and technologies, 
are of recent origin.  In some industries, they appear to have eroded the 
competitive positions of U.S. and other foreign firms in China while creating 
new barriers to foreign direct investment . . . and exports.  More generally, 
U.S. firms are concerned about the future implications of China’s evolving 
policies in such areas as preferential support to Chinese firms and the 
implementation of China-specific technical standards. 
ITC Report, supra note 18, at xiii; see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
2010 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 69 (2010) (“A 
troubling trend that has emerged . . . is China’s willingness to encourage domestic or 
‘indigenous’ innovation at the cost of foreign innovation and technologies.”); Yu, 
supra note 93, at 35–36 (“Since the release of [the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy], US policymakers have translated the term as ‘indigenous intellectual 
property’, suggesting China’s intention ‘to encourage domestic or “indigenous” 
innovation at the cost of foreign innovation and technologies.’”); Travis Tanner, 
Foreword to Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, China’s IP Transition:  Rethinking 
Intellectual Property Rights in a Rising China 6–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Asian Research, NBR 
Special Report No. 29, 2011) (“The release of government procurement catalogues 
and other government actions based on the nation’s policy of indigenous innovation 
have . . . heightened foreign anxiety that China plans to develop domestic industries 
by unfairly protecting the development of homegrown champions and forcing 
technology transfers that undermine the rights of IP developers.”). 
 170. See Section 301 Investigation Press Release, supra note 19 (launching a section 
301 investigation on Chinese laws, policies, and practices in the areas of intellectual 
property, innovation, and technology development). 
 171. See Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Certain Measures 
Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 
2018) [hereinafter WTO Complaint] (providing the complaint). 
 172. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 3 (providing for national treatment); 
id. art. 28 (conferring patent rights). 
 173. WTO Complaint, supra note 171, at 1. 
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the best term to describe the focus of China’s new policies.174  A better 
term is independent, self-driven, or self-controlled innovation.  After all, 
as far as those policies are concerned, the innovation involved does not 
have to be homegrown or indigenous.  As I noted in an earlier article, 
As with many other Chinese terms, the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” 
does not translate well from Chinese to English.  While [“zi”] can be 
easily translated to “self,” “zhu” is much more complicated.  As a noun, 
the word refers to “master,” “owner,” or “host.”  As a verb, the word 
refers to “direct” or “manage.”  As an adjective, the word refers to 
“chief” or “main.”  Thus, policymakers, commentators, and the media 
have translated “zizhu” to “self-relied,” “self-driven,” “self-controlled,” 
“self-owned,” “indigenous,” “homegrown,” or “independent.”  Out of 
all the terms, the word “independent” seems to best capture the term’s 
original meaning while preserving its useful Western connotations.175 
Thus, when the term is put in the right cultural, linguistic, and 
historic contexts, its emphasis is on independence, self-reliance, and 
control.176  To some extent, the term zizhu zhishi chanquan and the 
                                               
 174. As I noted in an earlier article, 
[T]he term “zizhu” intellectual property certainly covers more than 
“indigenous” or “homegrown” intellectual property.  Although the term 
“independent intellectual property” does not provide a direct translation, it 
accurately reflects that “zizhu” intellectual property can be developed or 
acquired from abroad or involve China-based entities with minority foreign 
ownership.  The key to identifying certain intellectual property as “zizhu” is 
whether such an asset is independently controlled by Chinese individuals, 
firms, or the government. 
Yu, supra note 164, at 94–95; see also Shao, supra note 168, at 170 (offering a definition 
of zizhu chuangxin, or self-driven innovation).  Dan Prud’homme traced the origin of 
the term “zizhu zhishi chanquan” to the automotive policies in the mid-1990s: 
Consultations suggest that the term originated in the mid-1990s [when] it was 
used in policy advice to build domestic IPR in the Chinese automobile 
industry.  At the turn of the new millennium, the term was used in important 
policy guidance, which is still in effect, from state leader Jiang Zemin at an 
April 2nd 2000 conference on the Exhibition on China’s Fifteen-Year 
Achievements in Patent Work. 
 There is solid evidence . . . that the term typically means IP ownership, 
including acquired ownership, by a Chinese entity, which in some cases 
expressly is said to exclude entities with a majority foreign ownership. 
PRUD’HOMME, supra note 17, at 79 (footnotes omitted). 
 175. Yu, supra note 164, at 94 (footnote omitted). 
 176. As Feng Xiaoqing observed, 
The goal of China’s zizhu chuangxin (self-driven innovation) is to improve 
China’s ability in innovation.  The key is to realize the combination of the 
breakthrough of core technologies within institutional innovation; its basic 
meaning is to emphasize the autonomy of innovation, or to consider that self-
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introduction of the National Intellectual Property Strategy reflected 
the Chinese leaders’ frustration with the massive foreign control of 
intellectual property rights, the licensing of which had drained a 
considerable amount of the country’s foreign exchange reserves.177  
Regardless of one’s terminology, however, scholarship in this phase 
has focused on two related issues:  (1) how China’s new strategy has 
affected, or will affect, foreign businesses; and (2) whether that strategy 
complies with WTO and other international standards. 
One major strand of scholarship that the ongoing discussion of 
independent innovation has sparked concerns the innovation models 
                                               
driven innovation is the advanced stage of technological innovation or 
scientific and technical innovation. 
Feng, supra note 168, at 80; see also Ken Shao, The Cores and Contexts of China’s 21st-Century 
National Innovation System, in INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA, supra 
note 168, at 1, 6 (“Self-driven innovation means that Chinese enterprises perform with 
their own power source, depend less on external or third-party intellectual fruits, and 
thus increase their share in the global value chain.  Self-driven innovation can and should 
be achieved through different means, such as home-developed patents and original 
cultural goods, foreign technology acquisition, share control, takeover, exclusive 
licenses, collaborations, and marketing and branding strategies.”). 
 177. As Chen Jianfu noted, 
Chinese firms are now paying hefty prices for foreign technology.  According 
to the Vice Minister for Science and Technology, Shang Yong, royalties now 
paid to foreign firms amount to 20% of the mobile phone sales price and 30% 
of the computer sales price, and for each DVD machine sold, the Chinese firm 
only makes US$1 in profit, and 10 yuan for each TV sold. 
CHEN, supra note 22, at 617–18; see also Chow, supra note 168, at 89 (“[T]he U.S. 
licensor will typically charge licensing fees or royalties, which may be onerous.  [In 
addition], the U.S. licensor may be unwilling to license its most advanced, cutting-edge 
technologies, but will only license secondary or outdated technologies to the Chinese 
licensee.”); Xue Hong, Between the Hammer and the Block:  China’s Intellectual Property 
Rights in the Network Age, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 291, 300 (2005) (“The high licence 
fees of IPRs are taking a toll on China’s economic development . . . .  Foreign IPRs are 
believed to suffocate market competition and to reinforce the dominant status of 
foreign enterprises in the Chinese market.”); Yu, supra note 101, at 189–90 (noting 
that “Chinese leaders consider[ed] intellectual property rights as weapons that were 
designed specifically to protect the West’s dominant position and the United States’s 
hegemony, to drain the Chinese purse, and to slow down China’s economic progress 
and its rise in world affairs” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Edgardo Buscaglia, Can Intellectual 
Property in Latin America Be Protected?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING 
MARKETS 96, 111 (Clarisa Long ed., 2000) (noting that Latin American countries “have 
traditionally used intellectual property rights as an instrument for regulating 
technology transfer and avoiding royalty payments on innovations from the developed 
world”); Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global 
Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) (“Paying for imports or 
royalties is thus seen as an economic burden fostering a negative balance of trade.”). 
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and innovative capabilities of Chinese companies, especially those of 
the national champions in the high-technology area.178  Although this 
body of scholarship, which Section II.B will discuss in greater detail,179 
originates from mostly business and management scholars, it has been 
well received by legal scholars and has attracted considerable attention 
from those conducting empirical research or policy analyses.180 
An additional, but somewhat limited, strand of scholarship in this 
phase pertains to China’s changing position in the international 
trading and intellectual property systems.181  As China is slowly moving 
from its oft-discussed roles of a norm-breaker and a norm-taker to the 
new roles of a norm-shaker and a norm-maker, this body of literature 
                                               
 178. As Daniel Chow explained, 
One key goal of [China’s indigenous innovation policies] is to develop “national 
champions”:  Chinese companies that aspire to compete effectively with the 
largest and most powerful multinational companies . . . in the world today.  
Since innovation and advanced technology are crucial requirements of 
competitiveness in the modern global economy, a key component of these 
strategies is to spur Chinese entities to develop the capacity to create innovative 
and advanced technologies . . . .  In China’s view, it can never ascend to the 
leading ranks of industrialized nations if it continues to be a recipient or 
importer of advanced technologies or IP created by innovator countries, such as 
the United States.  Innovator countries are often reluctant to provide access to 
their “core” technologies but often only provide access to their secondary 
technologies in order to preserve a competitive advantage.  China wants to 
become a leading innovator country in its own right and does not want to 
depend on access to technology from the United States, Japan, and western 
European nations, which now dominate the area of technology innovation. 
Chow, supra note 168, at 82–83; see also ITC Report, supra note 18, at 5–27 (discussing 
how China’s indigenous innovation policies have contributed to the success of 
“national champions” in the country). 
 179. See infra text accompanying notes 248–59 (discussing this body of scholarship). 
 180. See Peter K. Yu, The Rise and Decline of the Intellectual Property Powers, 34 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 525, 571–73 (2012) (discussing this body of scholarship). 
 181. See generally Bryan Mercurio, China, Intellectual Property Rights and the WTO:  
Challenging but Not a Challenge to the Existing Legal Order, in CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER:  NEW DIRECTIONS AND CHANGING PARADIGMS 293, 316 (Lisa Toohey et 
al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER] (discussing 
how China has “narrowly interpret[ed] its commitments and engage[d] in excessive 
legalism as a shield against unwelcome scrutiny”); Peter K. Yu, The First Decade of TRIPS 
in China [hereinafter Yu, First Decade], in CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE:  CHINA’S 
FIRST DECADE IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 126 (Zeng Ka & Liang Wei eds., 2013) 
[hereinafter CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE] (reviewing the intellectual 
property developments in China in its first decade of the WTO membership); Peter K. 
Yu, The Middle Kingdom and the Intellectual Property World, 13 OR. REV. INT’L L. 209 (2011) 
[hereinafter Yu, Middle Kingdom] (discussing China’s participation in the international 
intellectual property regime and its role in both the WTO and WIPO). 
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has become quite significant.182  Because the literature involves not 
only legal scholars but also those interested in geopolitics and 
international relations, Section II.C will provide further discussion.183 
F. Closing Observations 
The previous Sections have discussed the five phases in which fairly 
distinctive bodies of scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system have emerged.  To enrich our understanding of the evolution 
of this system, and to bring the five disparate phases closer to each 
other, this Section offers four closing observations. 
First, as the previous Sections have shown, the separation between 
the different phases is not always clear-cut.  For example, scholarship 
in the third phase of customization and standardization and the fourth 
phase of integration and assimilation overlapped considerably, with 
WTO accession being the main divide.  Similarly, scholarship on the 
WTO panel report and the Beijing Olympics fit better with the fourth 
phase, even though both events occurred after the beginning of the fifth 
phase of indigenization and transformation.  For researchers studying 
the Chinese intellectual property system, understanding the continuity 
from phase to phase and the historical contexts behind each phase will 
likely be essential.  After all, this system has been developing in an 
incremental fashion.  As many commentators have noted, such 
incremental developments can be vividly captured by the phrase 
“groping for stones to cross the river” (mozhe shitou guohe),184 a concept 
                                               
 182. In an earlier article, I noted the path of norm engagement China has 
undertaken in the international intellectual property arena: 
Although piracy and counterfeiting remain major problems within the country, 
China is not the traditional norm breaker one typically infers from its 
disappointing record of intellectual property protection.  Instead, the country 
has been a norm taker for most of its participation in the international 
intellectual property regime.  As its strength, experience, and self-confidence 
grow, it slowly assumes the additional roles of a norm shaker and a norm maker. 
Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 181, at 258–59; see also Henry Gao, China’s Ascent in Global 
Trade Governance:  From Rule Taker to Rule Shaker and, Maybe Rule Maker?, in MAKING 
GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE WORK FOR DEVELOPMENT:  PERSPECTIVES AND PRIORITIES FROM 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 153 (Carolyn Deere Birkbeck ed., 2011) (noting China’s move 
from rule-taker to rule-shaker to rule-maker in the international trade regime). 
 183. See infra text accompanying notes 283–308 (discussing this body of scholarship). 
 184. See JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004) (“[T]he Beijing 
Consensus still holds tightly to [Deng Xiaoping’s] pragmatic idea that the best path 
for modernisation is one of ‘groping for stones to cross the river,’ instead of trying to 
make one-big, shock-therapy leap.”); Yu, supra note 93, at 27 (“[A] stronger focus on 
intellectual property developments fits within the incremental approach that Chinese 
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endorsed by Deng Xiaoping.185 
Second, even though the phases discussed in this Part are arranged by 
chronological order, they have been episodic and punctuated by isolated 
major incidents.  Similar to what Bruce Ackerman has coined 
“constitutional moments,”186 these incidents have attracted so much 
scholarly attention that they have inevitably colored scholarship in the 
relevant phase.  Indeed, China scholars are accustomed to discussing 
incidents.187  Key incidents explored in the previous Sections included the 
signing of the 1979 Agreement; the adoption of the trademark, patent, 
and copyright laws in the 1980s and early 1990s; the U.S.-China trade wars 
in the early to mid-1990s; China’s WTO accession; the U.S.-China TRIPS 
dispute; the Beijing Olympics; the adoption of the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy; and China’s active involvement in or exclusion from 
bilateral, regional, and plurilateral trade negotiations. 
Third, it remains unclear what phase, or phases, will follow the fifth 
phase of indigenization and transformation, which is still ongoing.  
Indeed, it will be quite difficult to predict how the Chinese or 
international intellectual property system will evolve in the future.  Adrian 
Johns showed provocatively how “profound shift[s] in the relation 
between creativity and commerce”188 had occurred “about once every 
                                               
leaders have carefully implemented over the years, which some commentators have 
referred to as ‘groping for stones to cross the river’ . . . .”); Yu, supra note 164, at 99 
(“[I]t is the Chinese leaders’ pragmatic approach in ‘groping for stones to cross the 
river’ (mozhe shitou guohe) and their willingness to consider a wide variety of options.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 185. See CHEN, supra note 22, at 623 (“Deng Xiaoping was not only pragmatic, he 
was also realistic.  Thus he neither pushed for ‘Big Bang’ therapy, nor did he try to 
change the politico-economic system as defined in the Constitution overnight.  He 
undertook a gradual process of transformation, politically, economically and 
administratively.”). 
 186. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE 266–94 (1991) (discussing 
“constitutional moment[s]” and the higher lawmaking process). 
 187. See generally Keith J. Hand, Using Law for a Righteous Purpose:  The Sun Zhigang 
Incident and Evolving Forms of Citizen Action in the People’s Republic of China, 45 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 114 (2006) (discussing citizen action surrounding the Sun Zhigang 
Incident); Jiang Min, Internet Events, in THE INTERNET IN CHINA:  CULTURAL, POLITICAL, 
AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS (1980–2000S) 211 (Ashley Esarey & Randolph Kluver eds., 
2014) (outlining the major actors, issues, causes, places, and mobilization of Chinese 
internet events or incidents in China); Liu Chenglin, Profits Above the Law:  China’s 
Melamine Tainted Milk Incident, 79 MISS. L.J. 371 (2009) (discussing the food safety 
regulatory issues surrounding the tainted milk incident in China). 
 188. ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY:  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO 
GATES 498 (2009). 
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century, in fact, since the end of the Middle Ages.”189  As he reminded us, 
The last major [turning point] occurred at the height of the 
industrial age, and catalyzed the invention of intellectual property.  
Before that, another took place in the Enlightenment, when it led 
to the emergence of the first modern copyright system and the first 
modern patents regime.  And before that, there was the creation of 
piracy in the 1660s–1680s.  By extrapolation, we are already overdue 
to experience another revolution of the same magnitude.  If it does 
happen in the near future, it may well bring down the curtain on 
what will then, in retrospect, come to be seen as a coherent epoch 
of about 150 years:  the era of intellectual property.190 
Professor Johns’s prognostication, while provocative, seems to be well 
supported by all the ongoing and pathbreaking developments 
surrounding digital communication, Big Data, Internet of Things, 3D 
printing, blockchains, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous 
vehicles, nanotechnology, and synthetic biology.191 
Finally, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system has 
been cyclical.  As a result, the scholarship in one phase can easily engage 
with the scholarship in another.  For instance, the discussion of China’s 
responses to U.S. trade policy in the third phase of customization and 
standardization easily brings to mind similar responses regarding the 
various commercial treaties that China signed in the wake of its defeat 
following the Boxer Uprising in 1900.192  A notable example is the 1903 
                                               
 189. Id. at 508. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Mark Lemley captured some of these developments: 
3D printers can manufacture physical goods based on any digital design.  
While home 3D printers are so far quite limited in size and materials, there 
are tens of thousands of printing designs available on the Internet already, and 
larger commercial-scale printers can print anything from circuit boards to 
rocket engines to human organs on site for the cost of the raw materials and 
some electricity.  Synthetic biology has automated the manufacture of copies 
of not just existing genetic sequences, but also any custom-made gene 
sequence, allowing anyone who wants to create a gene sequence of their own 
to upload the sequence to a company that will “print” it using the basic 
building blocks of genetics.  And advances in robotics generalize the principle 
beyond goods, offering the prospect that many of the services humans now 
supply will be provided free of charge by general-purpose machines that can 
be programmed to perform a variety of complex functions. 
Mark A. Lemley, IP in a World Without Scarcity, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 460, 461–62 (2015) 
(footnote omitted). 
 192. During the Boxer Uprising, members of a fin-de-siècle secret society, backed by 
Empress Dowager, brutally murdered missionary families, foreign ministers and 
diplomats, and Chinese converts.  They also besieged embassies and burned churches 
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Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the 
Commercial Relations Between Them,193 which has been frequently 
mentioned in scholarship on the early history of the Chinese 
intellectual property system.  Referred to by some commentators as the 
Shanghai Treaty based on the place of signing, this treaty built upon 
the newly adopted Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property,194 to which the United States acceded in 1887.195  It granted 
copyright, patent, and trademark protection to Americans in return for 
reciprocal protection to the Chinese.196  As William Alford observed, 
this treaty had the distinction of being “one of the first efforts by the 
United States anywhere to use its strength bilaterally to bring about 
greater intellectual property protection.”197 
Taken together, these four closing observations have shown that 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system has been 
interrelated, episodic, and cyclical.  Although these observations are by 
no means exhaustive, they provide useful insights into the five distinct 
phases of developments that the Chinese intellectual property system 
has seen thus far. 
II. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY TURN 
The previous Part has provided a chronology-based taxonomy of 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system.  Although 
most scholarship in this area has focused on law and policy, the 
scholarship in the past two decades have brought with them scholars 
from many other disciplines.  To some extent, the increasingly 
interdisciplinary nature of scholarship on the Chinese intellectual 
                                               
and shops that sold foreign merchandise and books.  See HSÜ, supra note 36, at 387–
418 (discussing the Boxer Uprising). 
 193. Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the 
Commercial Relations Between Them, China-U.S., Oct. 8, 1903, reprinted in 1 TREATIES 
AND CONVENTIONS WITH OR CONCERNING CHINA AND KOREA, 1894–1904, TOGETHER WITH 
VARIOUS STATE PAPERS AND DOCUMENTS AFFECTING FOREIGN INTERESTS 135 (William 
Woodville Rockhill ed., 1904) [hereinafter 1903 Treaty]. 
 194. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 
U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967). 
 195. WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=2 (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 196. 1903 Treaty, supra note 193, arts. 9–11.  Interestingly, out of the three 
commercial treaties China signed with Great Britain, Japan, and the United States in 
the early 1900s, only this treaty included patent protection.  See ALFORD, supra note 94, 
at 37–38 (discussing the 1903 Treaty). 
 197. Alford, supra note 89, at 138. 
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property system has paralleled a similarly interdisciplinary turn in 
intellectual property scholarship in other areas.198  As the profile of 
intellectual property law and policy rises, scholars in other disciplines 
have become attracted to this fast-growing field.199  With the arrival of 
these scholars, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
has become more inter- and multi-disciplinary as a result. 
Thus far, intellectual property scholarship has featured many 
                                               
 198. See Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 923, 940 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law] 
(noting that “the ‘law and . . .’ movement has finally spread to international 
intellectual property law, and the subject has become increasingly multidisciplinary”).  
As I suggested in a previous article, 
[B]ecause of the ever-expanding scope of intellectual property rights and the 
ability for these rights to spill over into other areas of international regulation, 
intellectual property training and educational programs should feature inter- 
and multi-disciplinary perspectives.  Many of the existing programs focus 
primarily on the legal aspects of intellectual property.  However, it is 
increasingly important to consider other aspects of intellectual property, such 
as political, economic, social, and cultural. 
Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Training and Education for Development, 28 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 311, 328 (2012) (footnotes omitted). 
 199. As Professor Alford recounted, 
It is scant exaggeration to suggest that until the 1970s, American legal 
academe generally regarded intellectual property law as a subject of modest 
intellectual merit, at least compared to such mainstays as constitutional law or 
contract.  As a consequence, with a few notable exceptions such as Professors 
Melville Nimmer of UCLA and Edmund Kitch of the University of Virginia, 
courses in this area were typically taught on a part-time basis by adjuncts and 
addressed, if at all, in important scholarly journals in a highly doctrinal or 
technical manner.  Relatively little of the economic, philosophical, or other 
extra-legal disciplinary frameworks that had already begun to inform other 
areas of the law was brought to bear in this area. 
William P. Alford, How Theory Does—and Does Not—Matter:  American Approaches to 
Intellectual Property Law in East Asia, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 8, 9 (1994); see also 
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 23 (“[U]ntil recently IPR remained a third-tier, ‘technical’ 
issue in the lexicon of U.S. trade policy because it is often articulated in a seemingly 
arcane discourse that presupposes a considerable degree of specialization and 
expertise.  As a result, much discussion on intellectual property remains somewhat 
esoteric and inaccessible.”); William P. Alford, Intellectual Property, Trade and Taiwan:  
A GATT-Fly’s View, 1992 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 97, 98 (“I can remember when intellectual 
property was seen as a backwater issue—particularly as concerns East Asia.  That, of 
course, changed enormously in the 1980s.”); Yu, Teaching International Intellectual 
Property Law, supra note 198, at 924 (“Intellectual property law was in the backwater 
only a few decades ago.  The Section on Intellectual Property Law of the Association 
of American Law Schools . . . was not even founded until the early 1980s, and the 
creation of intellectual property specialty programs has been a recent phenomenon.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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disciplines.  To highlight the growing inter- and multi-disciplinary 
interests, the WIPO Journal has devoted the first issue of each volume 
to a different area of disciplinary focus.  The areas that the journal has 
covered in its past eight volumes are law and policy, economics, 
political science and international relations, culture, history, 
geography, philosophy, and development studies.200  Although the 
limited length and scope of this Part do not allow for a comprehensive 
analysis of the different disciplinary engagement with the Chinese 
intellectual property system, this Part illustrates the interdisciplinary 
turn in scholarship by focusing on three broadly defined multi-
disciplinary clusters within which scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system has emerged outside the area of law and 
policy:  (1) philosophy and culture; (2) economics, innovation, and 
creative industries; and (3) politics and international relations. 
A. Philosophy and Culture 
Chinese philosophy and culture has been an important entry point 
to understanding not only intellectual property law and policy in 
China, but also the Chinese legal system in general.201  It is not 
uncommon for scholars in both areas to discuss the historic distinction 
between li (rituals or rites) and fa (law and punishment) in Chinese 
culture.202  Such distinctions trace back to the age-old tension between 
                                               
 200. See Peter K. Yu, Five Decades of Intellectual Property and Global Development, 8 WIPO J. 
1, 7 (2016) (“[E]very year since its inception, [the WIPO Journal] has devoted a special issue 
to highlighting intellectual property research in a different discipline.  Thus far, the journal 
has published special issues on law and policy (Vol.1), economics (Vol.2), politics and 
international relations (Vol.3), culture (Vol.4), history (Vol.5), geography (Vol.6) and 
philosophy (Vol.7).”); id. at 10 (stating that the special issue in Volume 8 “has been 
devoted to the development aspects of intellectual property rights”). 
 201. See Koen Lemmens, Comparative Law as an Act of Modesty:  A Pragmatic and Realistic 
Approach to Comparative Legal Scholarship, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN COMPARATIVE LAW 
302, 306 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2014) (“Law is first and foremost a 
cultural phenomenon, and a deep understanding of a legal order presupposes sound 
knowledge of the culture in which it is embedded.”); Gary Watt, Comparison as Deep 
Appreciation, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 82, 84–85 (Pier Giuseppe Monateri ed., 
2012) (“Comparison between the laws of national jurisdictions will remain superficial 
unless we week to appreciate those laws in the contexts of their local cultures, and 
comparison between laws in their cultures will remain superficial unless we appreciate 
that law is not alien to other cultural arts, but is closely akin to them.”). 
 202. As I elaborated in an earlier article, 
Broadly defined, li extended beyond one’s proper conduct or etiquette and 
covered the whole range of political, social, and familial relationships that 
encompass a harmonious Confucian society.  People who were guided by this 
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Confucianism and Legalism.203  While the former focuses on normative 
roles, responsibilities, obligations, and a wide range of political, social, 
and familial relationships, the latter sought to use penal law, physical 
                                               
concept always understood their normative roles, responsibilities, and 
obligations to others.  They were also ready to adjust their views and demands in 
order to accommodate other people’s needs and desires, to avoid confrontation 
and conflict, and to preserve harmony.  As a result, litigation and promotion of 
individual rights became unnecessary in a Confucian society. 
 In contrast to li, “fa is a penal concept; it is associated with punishment, 
serving to maintain public order through the threat of force and physical 
violence.”  Unlike the Confucianists, the Legalists believed that it was impossible 
to teach people to be good.  Thus, fa is needed to tell people what to do and to 
induce them to do what they should do.  Except in the Qin dynasty in the third 
century B.C., fa jia (legalism) has never been the dominant Chinese ideology.  
In fact, the Chinese always viewed fa unfavorably and associated it with the harsh 
and despotic Qin rule, which unified China and centralized its bureaucracy.  
They assumed that “when government leans heavily on fa to reinforce its 
authority, it does so because it has no effective ability to rule by li.”  To the 
Chinese, fa should always be employed as the last resort. 
Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives:  An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure 
the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 33–34 (2001) (footnotes 
omitted); see also THE ANALECTS OF CONFUCIUS 88 (Arthur Waley trans., Vintage 1989) 
[hereinafter ANALECTS] (“Govern the people by regulations, keep order among them 
by chastisements, and they will flee from you, and lose all self-respect.  Govern them 
by moral force, keep order among them by ritual and they will keep their self-respect 
and come to you of their own accord.” (quoting Book II, ¶ 3)). 
Notwithstanding the distinction between the two, li and fa have coexisted in 
Chinese society.  As the introductory comment in book I of the Tang Code declared, 
Virtue and morals are the foundation of government and education, while 
laws and punishments are the operative agencies of government and 
education.  The former and the latter are necessary complements to each 
other, just as it takes morning and evening to form a whole day, or spring and 
autumn to form a whole year. 
CHEN, supra note 42, at 17 (quoting the translation in John C.H. Wu, The Status of the 
Individual in the Political and Legal Traditions of Old and New China, in THE CHINESE MIND:  
ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 340, 361 (Charles A. Moore ed., 
1967)); JOHN W. HEAD, CHINA’S LEGAL SOUL:  THE MODERN CHINESE LEGAL IDENTITY IN 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 48 (2009) (“Legalism and Confucianism were inextricably 
bound together, in a new compound material, a legal alloy, that was strong enough to 
last for the next two thousand years as a central core of China’s government and 
culture.”); see also CHEN, supra note 22, at 18 (“The theory of Yin-Yang . . . justified the 
supplementary function of punishment in governing a state, with li, being Yang, as the 
first instrument, and punishment, being Yin, as a supplementary tool for governing a 
state.  In this way [Yin-Yang] laid down the theoretical foundation for the 
harmonisation between Confucianism and Legalism.”). 
 203. For discussions of the debate between the Confucianists and the Legalists, see 
generally Pat K. Chew, The Rule of Law:  China’s Skepticism and the Rule of People, 20 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 43, 48–51 (2005); Yu, supra note 202, at 32–38. 
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punishment, threats, and coercion to maintain public order.204 
As far as intellectual property scholarship is concerned, one of the 
seminal works on the Chinese intellectual property system is William 
Alford’s To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense.205  Although this work 
covered not only Chinese philosophy but also political culture, it has 
been most widely cited for its discussion of the interplay between 
Confucian culture and intellectual property reforms in China.206  As I 
noted in earlier writings,207 there is both a strong form and a weak form 
of Professor Alford’s culture-based argument: 
The strong form states that Confucianism militates against 
intellectual property reforms in China.  It accounts for the failure of 
the many reforms pushed by foreign countries and intellectual 
property rights holders to induce improvements in intellectual 
property protection and enforcement. . . .  [By contrast, t]he weak 
form . . . states that Confucianism has prevented the Western notion 
of intellectual property rights from taking root in China. . . .  [It] 
does not suggest any incompatibility between Confucianism and the 
Western notion of intellectual property rights.  Nor does it contend 
that Confucianism will militate against intellectual property reforms.  
Thus, if such reforms are to be introduced—either internally 
through the borrowing of foreign ideas or externally in response to 
foreign pressure—these reforms may help China establish an 
exogenously developed intellectual property system.208 
While the reality on Chinese soil is unlikely to support the strong 
form of Professor Alford’s culture-based argument,209 many Chinese 
                                               
 204. See supra notes 202–03 (listing sources that discuss the distinctions between li 
and fa and between Confucianism and Legalism). 
 205. ALFORD, supra note 94. 
 206. See id. at 19–29 (discussing how the Confucian culture prevented intellectual 
property protection from taking root in imperial China).  An earlier version of the 
chapter cited here was published as William P. Alford, Don’t Stop Thinking 
About . . . Yesterday:  Why There Was No Indigenous Counterpart to Intellectual Property Law 
in Imperial China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 3 (1993). 
 207. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Confucianism, in DIVERSITY IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND INTERSECTIONS 247, 253–57 (Irene 
Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015) (underscoring the distinction between the 
strong form of Professor Alford’s culture-based claim and its weak form). 
 208. Id. at 253, 256–57. 
 209. As I noted in an earlier article, 
While copying may be an important living process for a Confucian Chinese to 
understand life, culture, and society, Chinese poets and literary theorists 
widely disagreed on the appropriate extent of copying.  It is therefore 
problematic to put all of these poets and theorists together.  After all, 
traditional Chinese culture does not always call for verbatim copying, the 
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scholars have equally questioned the weak form of that argument.210  
After all, if intellectual property standards are related to legal or norm-
based incentives that the country has provided to promote creativity 
and innovation throughout its millennia-long existence, it likely will be 
an overstatement to suggest the lack of indigenous notions of 
intellectual property rights in China. 
Regardless of one’s reaction to culture-based arguments, however, 
there is no denying that Chinese culture has contributed to the success 
and failure of the country’s intellectual property reforms.  As far as 
such culture is concerned, Confucianism provides the immediate 
jumping off point for intellectual property scholars.  Indeed, a 
considerable volume of English-language scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system has been devoted to the Confucian impact 
on intellectual property reforms.211  While this type of scholarship has 
provided culture-based analyses that are both insightful and appealing 
to Western readers, it is ill-advised to equate Confucianism with 
Chinese culture.  Indeed, an exclusive focus on Confucianism would 
create a rather incomplete picture of the impact of Chinese culture on 
intellectual property developments. 
To begin with, three dominant schools of philosophy existed in 
traditional Chinese culture:  Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism (which 
derived from the teachings of Laozi and Zhuangzi).  Commentators have 
described these three schools collectively as sanjiao (three schools of 
teachings or three religions).212  Although few commentators have 
                                               
means by which massive piracy and counterfeiting are often conducted.  
Rather, Confucianism has called for the transformative use of preexisting 
works that is tailored to the user’s needs and conditions. 
Id. at 253–54 (footnote omitted). 
 210. See supra note 32 (listing sources that criticize culture-based claims relating to 
the Chinese intellectual property system); see also Glenn R. Butterton, Pirates, Dragons 
and U.S. Intellectual Property Rights in China:  Problems and Prospects of Chinese Enforcement, 
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1081, 1110–23 (1996) (drawing on economic analysis to provide 
alternative explanations for China’s intellectual property problems). 
 211. For discussions of Confucianism and intellectual property reforms, see 
generally ALFORD, supra note 94, at 19–29; Shao, Chinese Culture, supra note 32; Shao, 
Global Debate, supra note 32; Yu, supra note 207. 
 212. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 11 (noting that, along with Confucianism, “Taoism 
and Buddhism were . . . influential in some periods and in some aspects of life”); 
ARTHUR F. WRIGHT, BUDDHISM IN CHINESE HISTORY 70–85 (1979) (discussing the 
importance of Buddhism and Daoism in Chinese history); Christoph Antons, Legal 
Culture and History of Law in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA 13, 22–23 
(Christopher Heath ed., 2003) (noting the importance of Confucianism, Taoism, 
Buddhism, and Legalism in China); Rollie Lal, China’s Relations with South Asia, in 
1096 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:1045 
 
discussed the linkage between Buddhism and intellectual property 
developments in China,213 I am not yet aware of any scholar providing a 
Daoist analysis of intellectual property law and policy in China.214 
Even if one is to focus narrowly on only Confucianism, there remains 
the oft-raised question concerning which Confucius best represents 
Chinese culture.  Are we focusing on the Confucius from the 
Analects,215 which provided a record of “selected sayings” collected by 
his students?  Or are we discussing the Confucius from 
Neo-Confucianism as propounded by Zhu Xi (1130–1200), a highly 
prominent Confucian scholar in the Song dynasty?216  As Theodore de 
Bary wrote, 
“Whose Confucianism are we talking about?”  If it is the original 
teachings of Confucius in the Analects, then almost nothing said about 
Confucianism today speaks to that.  Indeed even the anti-Confucian 
diatribes earlier in [the twentieth] century spoke rarely to Confucius’ 
own views but only to later adaptations or distortions of them.217 
                                               
CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD:  BEIJING’S STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
133, 133 (Joshua Eisenman et al. eds., 2007) (“China has a long history of relations 
with India, beginning with cultural and religious contact between the two by 100 CE.  
Buddhism traveled from India through the Silk Route in Central Asia to China, mixing 
with the existing Daoist and Confucian philosophies there.”); Charles R. Stone, 
Comment, What Plagiarism Was Not:  Some Preliminary Observations on Classical Chinese 
Attitudes Toward What the West Calls Intellectual Property, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 199, 226 (2008) 
(noting that “Buddhism and Daoism became quite influential in their own right”). 
 213. See Stone, supra note 212, at 202 (“The bulk of early book publishing in China 
was in fact inspired by Buddhism, not Confucianism, and was directed at the acquisition 
of religious merit that appears to have been unrelated, and was perhaps even antithetical, 
to what we today would consider a property right.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 227 
(“Confucianism in its various incarnations played a central role in the development of 
printing and the dissemination of classical texts that . . . contributed to the eventual 
development of Chinese intellectual property, [but] it is probably a mistake to focus 
all of our attention upon Confucianism in the first place.”). 
 214. The closest is my analysis of the application of the Yin-Yang school and 
correlative thinking to the intellectual property field.  See generally Peter K. Yu, 
Intellectual Property, Asian Philosophy and the Yin-Yang School, 7 WIPO J. 1 (2015). 
 215. ANALECTS, supra note 202. 
 216. See generally CHAN WING-TSIT, CHU HSI:  LIFE AND THOUGHT (1987) (discussing 
the life and philosophy of Zhu Xi). 
 217. WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM xi (1991); see also 
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS:  A CONFUCIAN 
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 11 (1998) (“Problems of continuity and change in the 
evolution of major traditions must be considered.  Confucianism should not be 
thought either static or monolithic—that is, taking the sayings of Confucius and 
Mencius just by themselves, to represent an historically developing, often conflicted, 
and yet gradually maturing Confucian tradition.”); Liu Shu-hsien, Confucian Ideals and 
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Likewise, in his introduction to the Analects, Arthur Waley clarified that 
“[t]he Confucius of whom I shall speak here is the Confucius of the 
Analects.”218  He further reminded us of Chinese historian Gu Jiegang’s 
helpful admonition that scholars should study “one Confucius at a 
time.”219  In short, any discussion of Confucian influence on the 
Chinese intellectual property system requires researchers to determine 
in advance which Confucius they want to focus on. 
As if these issues were not complicated enough, Chinese history has 
been filled with many different schools of thought beyond 
Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism.  In the last chapter of Historical 
Records (Shiji), Sima Qian, the grand historian in the Han dynasty 
(206 B.C.–220 A.D.), recalled an essay of his late father classifying 
Chinese philosophies into six dominant schools:  Yin-Yang, 
Confucianism (or, more properly, Rujia), Mohism (Mojia), School of 
Names, Dialecticians, or Logicians (Mingjia), Legalism (Fajia), and 
Daoism.220  Also present in the Chinese territory are many minority 
cultures and beliefs, including those of the Zhuang, Hui, Uygur, Yi, 
Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, and Buyei.221 
A few years ago, when I put together a special issue on intellectual 
property and culture for the WIPO Journal, I went outside 
Confucianism to explore whether other Asian philosophy would 
provide useful insight into intellectual property developments in 
                                               
the Real World:  A Critical Review of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thought, in CONFUCIAN 
TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN MODERNITY:  MORAL EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC CULTURE IN 
JAPAN AND THE FOUR MINI-DRAGONS 92, 92 (Tu Wei-Ming ed., 1996) (noting that the 
term “Confucianism” “may refer to the philosophical tradition represented by 
Confucius and Mencius, or it may refer to the institutions and customs that emerged 
in the long course of Chinese history through the influence of Confucian thought”); 
Benjamin Schwartz, Some Polarities in Confucian Thought, in CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE 
CIVILIZATION 3, 3 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1964) (considering “universal and perennial” 
questions concerning whether “the original teachings of the founders [of 
Confucianism] can be extricated from the interpretations of the followers”). 
 218. ANALECTS, supra note 202, at 13. 
 219. Id. at 14. 
 220. FUNG YU-LAN, A SHORT HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY:  A SYSTEMATIC 
ACCOUNT OF CHINESE THOUGHT FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT DAY 30–31 (Derk 
Bodde ed., 1976). 
 221. See JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS:  AN INTRODUCTION 176 
(6th ed. 1999) (“The largest of the fifty-six minority groups are the Zhuangs (15.4 
million), Hui or Chinese Muslims (8.6 million), Uygur (7.2 million), Yi (6.5 million), 
Tibetans (4.5 million), Miao (7.3 million), Manchus (9.8 million), Mongols (4.8 
million), Bouyei (2.1 million), and Koreans (1.9 million).”). 
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China.222  Specifically, my article focused on the Yin-Yang School, the 
first school of thought mentioned in Historical Records.223  Highlighting 
the duality that often appears in both Chinese and international 
intellectual property laws and policies, that article argued that the Yin-
Yang School’s “focus on contexts, relationships and adaptiveness and 
its high tolerance for contradictions have made it particularly well-
equipped to address the ongoing intellectual property challenges 
concerning both emerging economies and the digital environment.”224 
While the analysis of the philosophical basis of Chinese intellectual 
property law and policy has thus far remained limited to only scholars 
with deep knowledge of Chinese philosophy or culture, a better 
linkage between the notions of intellectual property rights and such 
philosophy or culture can be quite beneficial.  After all, cultural 
barriers have provided a prevailing explanation for the failure of 
externally induced intellectual property reforms in China.225  
Commentators have also noted repeatedly the need to increase public 
consciousness of intellectual property rights.226  Thus, if cultural 
barriers and the lack of public consciousness indeed accounted for 
China’s massive piracy and counterfeiting problems, scholars studying 
the Chinese intellectual property system would have to acquire a 
deeper understanding of Chinese philosophy or culture before they 
could further evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed 
intellectual property reforms. 
B. Economics, Innovation, and Cultural Industries 
The second area worth highlighting concerns economic issues relating 
to intellectual property protection and enforcement in China and the 
country’s growing intellectual property industries.  These issues include 
                                               
 222. See generally Yu, supra note 214 (discussing the application of the Yin-Yang 
school and correlative thinking to the intellectual property field). 
 223. FUNG, supra note 220, at 30; see also CHEN, supra note 22, at 10 (noting the 
influence of Yin-Yang Jia on traditional Chinese conceptions of law). 
 224. Yu, supra note 214, at 2. 
 225. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131–34 (2003) (discussing the common misconception that 
copyright piracy is merely a cultural problem). 
 226. See NIE JIANQIANG, THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 
24 (2006) (noting “the conflictory and complementary relationships between the law-
on-the-books, law-in-operation and law-in-the-mind within Chinese intellectual property 
laws”); Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 331, 428–31 (2003) 
(discussing education and public awareness programs); Yu, supra note 101, at 221–25 
(noting the need to educate the Chinese populace about intellectual property rights). 
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economic growth, industrial development, technological innovation, and 
foreign investment.  They are of great interest to economists, researchers 
in business or management schools, and those in schools or departments 
focusing on innovation and creative industries.  Although there was very 
limited, if any, early scholarship on the economics of intellectual 
property rights in China, scholarship in this area has greatly expanded 
as scholars with economic training or interests in industrial 
development entered the intellectual property field. 
One of the most widely cited early economic analyses of the Chinese 
intellectual property system is a book chapter written by Keith Maskus, Sean 
Dougherty, and Andrew Mertha.227  This chapter examined the relationship 
between intellectual property protection and economic development in 
China.228  While the chapter is insightful on its own, it is particularly 
illuminating when read together with the other chapters in the edited 
volume, all of which featured the latest empirical research on intellectual 
property and development conducted by World Bank economists.229 
Thus far, economists have shown how stronger intellectual property 
protection could lead to an increase in foreign direct investment.  
Their research demonstrates that such a positive link requires the 
presence of two key preconditions:  a strong imitative capacity and a 
large market.230  While China undoubtedly possesses both 
preconditions, it has presented a “puzzle” to economists.  As Professor 
Maskus rightly observed in the World Bank volume, if stronger 
intellectual property protection always led to more foreign direct 
investment, “recent [investment] flows to developing economies 
would have gone largely to sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe . . . 
[rather than] Brazil, China, and other high-growth, large-market 
developing economies with weak protection.”231 
To be sure, weak intellectual property protection could undermine, 
and has undermined, China’s appeal to foreign investors.232  
                                               
 227. See generally Keith E. Maskus et al., Intellectual Property Rights and Economic 
Development in China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT:  LESSONS FROM 
RECENT ECONOMIC RESEARCH 295 (Carsten Fink & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT]. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See generally id. 
 230. See Yu, supra note 94, at 176–80 (discussing the preconditions needed for 
stronger intellectual property protection to attract foreign direct investment). 
 231. Keith E. Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign 
Direct Investment and Technology Transfer, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 227, at 41, 54. 
 232. See Yu, supra note 101, at 192 n.331 (listing sources that discuss the role of 
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Nevertheless, other attractive location advantages, such as low labor 
costs and a large market, have more than compensated for the 
country’s shortcomings in the intellectual property field.233  To a large 
extent, the China case has shown the limits of using intellectual 
property reforms to attract foreign direct investment. 
Another book that has similar contextual significance for 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system is an excellent 
collection of articles Hiroyuki Odagiri, Akira Goto, Atsushi Sunami, 
and Richard Nelson put together to examine the role of the 
intellectual property regime in the development and catch-up 
process.234  Titled Intellectual Property Rights, Development, and Catch-up:  
An International Comparative Study, this edited volume provided 
comparative studies on the catch-up processes that developed, 
emerging, and large developing countries had experienced.235  While 
the book included only one chapter on China236—which featured the 
catch-up story of Huawei Technologies237—its concluding chapter and 
the other country and industrial studies in the volume provided useful 
insights into the challenges and opportunities confronting the 
Chinese intellectual property system.238  Together, these chapters 
underscored the need to consider the impact of the intellectual 
property regime on the catch-up process “in conjunction with 
                                               
intellectual property rights in attracting foreign investment). 
 233. See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field:  Addressing Information Distortion and 
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. REV. 249, 259 (2003) (stating that decisions to 
relocate research and development facilities are likely to be affected by “the level of 
education and training of the local workforce, the condition of its financial sector, the 
health of its legal system, and the transparency of governmental procedures”); Keith E. 
Maskus, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Encouraging Foreign Direct Investment and 
Technology Transfer, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 109, 123 (1998) (identifying “market size 
and growth, local demand patterns, transport costs and distance from markets, low wage 
costs in relation to labor productivity, abundant natural resources, and trade protection 
that could encourage ‘tariff-jumping’ investments” as examples of location advantages). 
 234. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP:  AN 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (Hiroyuki Odagiri et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP]. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See Xue Lan & Liang Zheng, Relationships Between IPR and Technology Catch-up:  
Some Evidence from China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-
UP, supra note 234, at 317 (discussing China’s catch-up process following its reopening 
to the outside world in the late 1970s and documenting the adaptation of domestic 
firms, such as Huawei Technologies, to the intellectual property right system through 
gradual innovation). 
 237. See id. at 350–55 (discussing Huawei Technologies as a success story). 
 238. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP, supra note 234. 
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[industrial] and other government policies.”239 
Apart from these two edited volumes, there are other noteworthy 
economic analyses of the Chinese intellectual property system.  Albert 
Hu and Gary Jefferson explored the cause of China’s rising patenting 
activities that eventually generated what they referred to as “a great wall 
of patents.”240  More recently, Professor Hu, Zhang Peng, and Zhao 
Lijing provided a critical follow-up examination of China’s patent 
surge of the early 2010s, when China surpassed the United States as 
the country filing the largest volume of patent applications.241  In 
addition, Deli Yang undertook comparative study of the Chinese and 
U.S. patent systems to examine pendency, grant ratios, and issues 
relating to national treatment.242  Qian Yi also utilized sales data in the 
Chinese footwear industry to explore ways to optimize enforcement 
against counterfeit trademarked goods.243 
Taken together, all of these economic analyses highlighted the 
tremendous benefits provided by research on the economic dimension 
of the Chinese intellectual property system.  Research in this area is 
badly needed, considering how little economic research has been 
conducted on the Chinese intellectual property system both inside and 
outside the country until the past decade or so.  As Maskus, Dougherty, 
                                               
 239. Hiroyuki Odagiri et al., Conclusion, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP, supra note 234, at 412, 421. 
 240. Albert Guangzhou Hu & Gary H. Jefferson, A Great Wall of Patents:  What Is 
Behind China’s Recent Patent Explosion?, 90 J. DEV. ECON. 57 (2009).  They attributed the 
patent explosion to “[t]he continuing surge of [foreign direct investment] in China, 
pro-patent amendments to China’s patent law, China’s entry to the WTO, the 
deepening of enterprise reform that realigns incentive structures, along with the 
intensification of [research and development] in Chinese industry.”  Id. at 67. 
 241. Albert G.Z. Hu et al., China as Number One?  Evidence from China’s Most Recent 
Patenting Surge, 124 J. DEV. ECON. 107 (2017).  In their view, 
Chinese firms have been aggressively applying for patents as a result of their 
newly acquired capability to invent new technologies and their response to the 
government incentives and other strategic considerations.  While the former 
is most likely to be a result of conscious [research and development] effort, 
the latter would have increased the propensity to patent independent of 
technology innovation. 
Id. at 117. 
 242. Deli Yang & Mahmut (Maho) Sonmez, Global Norm of National Treatment for 
Patent Uncertainties:  A Longitudinal Comparison Between the US and China, 53 J. WORLD 
BUS. 164 (2018); Deli Yang, Intellectual Property System in China:  A Study of the Grant Lags 
and Ratios, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 22 (2007); Deli Yang, Pendency and Grant Ratios 
of Invention Patents:  A Comparative Study of the US and China, 37 RES. POL’Y 1035 (2008). 
 243. Qian Yi, Counterfeiters:  Foes or Friends?  How Counterfeits Affect Sales by Product 
Quality Tier, 60 MGMT. SCI. 2381 (2014). 
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and Mertha lamented in the mid-2000s, 
University scholarship in China (and in other countries) in IPRs is 
overwhelmingly addressed to legal issues.  Many scholars are actively 
involved in assessing shortcomings in the law and in drafting 
revisions, and they also participate in training new intellectual 
property lawyers.  Few economists study the processes of technical 
change in China and how they are affected by market structure, 
competition, and exposure to foreign technologies and investment.  
Fewer still examine the relationship between IPRs, technical 
development, and growth.  Accordingly, economists in China either 
remain unaware of IPR issues or are skeptical about the potential for 
IPRs to increase technological advance and business development.244 
While economic research has been essential to the intellectual 
property field,245 comparative research can provide especially valuable 
insight into the appropriate international minimum standards for both 
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights.  Because 
most developing countries have limited resources to enforce these 
rights246—and considerable tradeoffs existed between intellectual 
                                               
 244. Maskus et al., supra note 227, at 311. 
 245. For literature in this area, see generally ROGER D. BLAIR & THOMAS F. COTTER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  ECONOMIC AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 
(2005); THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (2013); CHRISTINE GREENHALGH & MARK ROGERS, INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (2010); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT, 
supra note 227; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND TRADE (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008); 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (2003); KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY (2000); KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS:  THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); SUZANNE 
SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES (2004); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE 
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND COUNTRIES WITH ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION (2009). 
 246. The lack of enforcement resources is indeed why the TRIPS Agreement 
includes Article 41.5, which states explicitly that a WTO member state is not required 
to devote more resources to intellectual property enforcement than to other areas of 
law enforcement.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 41.5 (“Nothing in [Part III 
of the TRIPS Agreement] creates any obligation with respect to the distribution of 
resources as between enforcement of intellectual property rights and the enforcement 
of law in general.”); see also WTO Panel Report, supra note 134, annex B-4, ¶ 33 
(“Articles 1.1 and 41.5 were key concessions to the developing world, which the United 
States and other developed third parties seek now to dismiss and disregard.”); CARLOS 
M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  A 
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 417 (2007) (“[Article 41.5] was introduced 
upon a proposal by the Indian delegation, and essentially reflects developing 
countries’ concerns about the implications of Part III of the [TRIPS] Agreement.”); 
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property protection and other competing public needs—the costs to 
sectors unrelated to intellectual property could easily make the 
introduction of higher standards of intellectual property protection 
and enforcement highly undesirable.247  It is therefore inevitable that 
developing countries, China included, will have to conduct holistic 
cost-benefit analyses before they explore whether to strengthen 
intellectual property protection and enforcement. 
Finally, as Section I.E has noted, a fascinating body of scholarship 
emerged in the mid-2000s and the early 2010s to examine the fast-
growing innovative capabilities of Chinese firms.  In Run of the Red 
Queen, Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree located in China “a 
remarkably profitable and sustainable model of innovation . . . [that] 
makes China into a critical part of the world innovation system, but . . . 
does not rely on China excelling in cutting-edge novel-product 
[research and development].”248  As they observed, “like the Red 
                                               
UNCTAD-ICTSD PROJECT ON IPRS & SUSTAINABLE DEV., RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 585 (2005) (noting that Article 41.5 “was in fact one of the few 
provisions in Part III where developing countries’ views made a difference”). 
 247. See Carsten Fink, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights:  An Economic Perspective, in 
INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., ISSUE PAPER NO. 22, THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES xiii, 
2 (2009) (“Governments need to make choices about how many resources to spend 
on combating piracy, as opposed to enforcing other areas of law, building roads and 
bridges, protecting national security, and providing other public goods.  Such choices 
are usually not stated in explicit terms, but they underlie every budgetary decision by 
federal and local governments.”); Li Xuan & Carlos M. Correa, Towards a Development 
Approach on IP Enforcement:  Conclusions and Strategic Recommendations, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT:  INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 207, 210 (Li Xuan & Carlos M. 
Correa eds., 2009) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT] (noting that 
the demands for strengthened intellectual property enforcement “seem to overlook 
the cost of the required actions, the different priorities that exist in developing 
countries regarding the use of public funds (health and education would normally be 
regarded as more urgent than IP enforcement) and the crucial fact that IPRs are 
private rights and, hence, the burden and cost of their enforcement is to be borne by 
the right-holder, not the public at large”); Xue Hong, Enforcement for Development:  Why 
Not an Agenda for the Developing World?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT, supra, 
at 133, 143 (“Increment and strength of public enforcement measures will inevitably 
impose an economic burden on the developing countries and divert the priorities of 
these countries, such as prosecution of violent crimes or relief of poverty.”); Peter K. 
Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 2–6 (2010) (discussing the costs 
of strong intellectual property enforcement norms and the resulting trade-offs). 
 248. DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN:  GOVERNMENT, 
INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 4, 19 (2011).  
According to the authors, 
As China has become the global center for many different stages of 
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Queen [in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass], [China] runs as 
fast as possible in order to remain at the cusp of the global technology 
frontier without actually advancing the frontier itself.”249  While the 
emergence of this alternative form of innovation has raised intriguing 
questions concerning economic development, industrial strategy, and 
global competitiveness, the book explained why the Chinese model 
could complement the breakthrough innovation model embraced by 
the United States and other developed countries.250  As Breznitz and 
Murphree observed, 
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the 
iPod and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these 
products without China.  In the world of flexible mass production, 
the Red Queen country [referring to China or other countries with 
a similar innovation model] needs the novel-product innovators to 
keep churning out new ideas, and the novel-product-innovating 
countries need the Red Queen country to keep innovating on almost 
every aspect of production and delivery.251 
Similarly, other scholars have articulated new theories of innovation 
to capture the innovative activities in China.  In Dragons at Your Door,252 
Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson advanced the concept of “cost 
                                               
production, it has also developed a formidable competitive capacity to 
innovate in different segments of the research, development, and production 
chain that are as critical for economic growth as many novel-product 
innovations, and perhaps even more so.  In addition, taken together, China’s 
regional and national systems have developed varied capabilities that amount 
to a specific and highly successful, though inadvertently, created national 
model.  China’s accomplishment has been to master the art of thriving in 
second-generation innovation—including the mixing of established 
technologies and products in order to come up with new solutions—and the 
science of organizational, incremental, and process innovation.  Thus, China’s 
innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or incremental) innovation 
but also in the organization of production, manufacturing techniques and 
technologies, delivery, design, and second-generation innovation.  Those 
capabilities enable China to move quickly into new niches once they have been 
proved profitable by the original innovator. 
Id. at 4; see also id. at 195 (noting the need to dispel the myth concerning “the Western 
techno-fetishism of novelty, which equate innovation only with the creation of new 
technologies and products”). 
 249. Id. at 3. 
 250. See id. at 206 (“Thanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China need 
not be seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.”). 
 251. Id. at 18. 
 252. ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR:  HOW CHINESE 
COST INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007). 
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innovation” and discussed its global implications.253  As they pointed 
out, 
[t]he new competition from China is . . . disruptive because it 
threatens to obsolete much of the established firms’ assets, 
capabilities, and experience base by changing the accepted rules of 
the game, undermining traditional profit models, and growing parts 
of the market that incumbents are poorly equipped to serve.254 
In the authors’ view, “[f]ar from being a zero-sum game . . . , the 
emergence of Chinese companies as significant players in the global 
market promises new benefits to the world’s consumers and new 
opportunities to those established companies that choose the right 
responses and execute them well.”255 
In Chinnovation,256 Tan Yinglan explored how Chinese innovators are 
changing the world by focusing on “process innovation”257 and other 
forms of innovation and entrepreneurship.258  As he explained, 
Most of China’s companies are in the stage of process innovation.  
Start-ups typically learn and adopt business models from other 
geographies and adapt them locally.  Companies are trying to move 
into technological innovation via research and development by 
building on their existing knowledge, the way semiconductor firms 
are moving into thin film in 2010.  Most Chinese firms are still using 
existing technology to create products, rather than creating the 
technology itself (as is done in the United States).  This makes China 
tech markets symbiotic and complementary with the U.S. market 
and those in some other countries.259 
Although all of these discussions suggest that the alternative forms 
of innovation found in Chinese firms complement the breakthrough 
innovation embraced by the United States and other intellectual 
property powers in the developed world, a better understanding of 
                                               
 253. Id. at 1 (describing “cost innovation” as the “tool of choice” for Chinese 
competitors and defining such innovation as “the strategy of using Chinese cost advantage 
in radically new ways to offer customers around the world dramatically more for less”). 
 254. Id. at 55–56. 
 255. Id. at vii. 
 256. TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION:  HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING THE 
WORLD (2011). 
 257. Id. at xii. 
 258. Cf. BREZNITZ & MURPHREE, supra note 248, at 4 (“China’s innovation capabilities 
are not solely in process (or incremental) innovation but also in the organization of 
production, manufacturing techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and second-
generation innovation.  Those capabilities enable China to move quickly into new niches 
once they have been proved profitable by the original innovator.”). 
 259. TAN, supra note 256, at 268. 
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these alternatives will enable us to improve the design and calibration 
of the international intellectual property regime.  To some extent, the 
analyses surrounding alternative forms of Chinese innovation make 
researchers question whether the existing TRIPS-based intellectual 
property standards provide the most suitable arrangements for China.  
After all, those problems that are indicative of China’s lack of progress 
in developing a robust intellectual property system could easily have 
reflected the mismatch between the existing international intellectual 
property standards and the many alternative forms of innovation that 
can now be found in the country.  There is indeed no easy way to tell 
whether the former or the latter is the case.  Fortunately, this emerging 
body of scholarship will help shed light on this difficult question. 
Finally, alongside these three notable books, a growing volume of 
scholarship has emerged to discuss China’s changing innovative 
capabilities, thereby calling into question the hitherto somewhat one-
sided discourse on China’s status as a pirate nation.260  Shaun Rein 
boldly declared “the end of copycat China,”261 building on his earlier 
work on “the end of cheap China.”262  As he observed, “Chinese 
companies no longer just copycat business models from America and 
Europe.  They still grab low-hanging fruit but focus more on 
innovation.”263  Drawing on statistical materials, Denis Fred Simon and 
Cao Cong critically examined the rapid expansion of China’s science 
and technology capabilities, focusing in particular on the 
contributions provided by an increasingly large and well-educated 
talent pool.264  In addition, a number of books examined the rising 
middle class and the expanded interest in luxury goods in China.265  A 
                                               
 260. See Yu, supra note 23, at 6–7 (“While piracy and counterfeiting problems 
continue to exist, and are unlikely to go away any time soon, many policymakers and 
commentators now see China as an innovative power, or at least an emerging one.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 261. SHAUN REIN, THE END OF COPYCAT CHINA:  THE RISE OF CREATIVITY, INNOVATION, 
AND INDIVIDUALISM IN ASIA (2014) (discussing changes in the Chinese economy and 
emphasizing that local companies are shifting away from copying American and 
European business models). 
 262. Id. at xv; SHAUN REIN, THE END OF CHEAP CHINA:  ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL 
TRENDS THAT WILL DISRUPT THE WORLD (2012). 
 263. REIN, supra note 261, at xv. 
 264. DENIS FRED SIMON & CAO CONG, CHINA’S EMERGING TECHNOLOGICAL EDGE:  
ASSESSING THE ROLE OF HIGH-END TALENT (2009). 
 265. See generally SAVIO CHAN & MICHAEL ZAKKOUR, CHINA’S SUPER CONSUMERS:  WHAT 
1 BILLION CUSTOMERS WANT AND HOW TO SELL IT 1–10 (2014) (discussing the rapid 
growth of the group of wealthy and super wealthy customers in China); PIERRE XIAO 
LU, ELITE CHINA:  LUXURY CONSUMER BEHAVIOR IN CHINA (2008) (discussing luxury 
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growing volume of scholarship also covered the active development of 
China’s cultural industries.266  Such development provided an 
intriguing contrast with the “shanzhai” phenomenon that began 
appearing in the late 2000s.267 
C. Politics and International Relations 
In the past decades, scholars have heavily utilized political science 
literature to develop a better understanding of the Chinese legal 
system.  This literature has been particularly insightful because there 
is no clear-cut distinction between law and policy from a Marxist 
standpoint.268  Not only is law a “concrete formulation of the Party’s 
                                               
consumer behavior in China); ERWAN RAMBOURG, THE BLING DYNASTY:  WHY THE REIGN 
OF CHINESE LUXURY SHOPPERS HAS ONLY JUST BEGUN (2014) (discussing the rapid 
growth of luxury shoppers in China). 
 266. For this body of scholarship, see generally HANDBOOK OF CULTURAL AND 
CREATIVE INDUSTRIES IN CHINA (Michael Keane ed., 2016); MICHAEL KEANE, CREATED IN 
CHINA:  THE GREAT NEW LEAP FORWARD (2007); MICHAEL KEANE, CREATIVE INDUSTRIES 
IN CHINA:  ART, DESIGN AND MEDIA (2013); LI WUWEI, HOW CREATIVITY IS CHANGING 
CHINA (Michael Keane ed., 2011); LUCY MONTGOMERY, CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES:  
COPYRIGHT, SOCIAL NETWORK MARKETS AND THE BUSINESS OF CULTURE IN A DIGITAL AGE 
(2011); PANG, supra note 163. 
 267. “Originally, shan zhai was used to refer to a bandit stronghold outside 
government control [in imperial China]; today it is shorthand for a multitude of 
knockoffs, fakes, and pirated products.  These include everything from mobile phones 
to medicine and movies to makeup, and they permeate China’s consumer markets.”  
EDWARD TSE, THE CHINA STRATEGY:  HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE WORLD’S FASTEST-
GROWING ECONOMY 79 (2010); see also Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Asian Values, 
16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 329, 390 (2012) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property and 
Asian Values] (“In recent years, a shanzhai culture emerged in China, raising 
challenging questions about the acceptable boundaries of sequential and cumulative 
innovation.”).  For discussions of the “shanzhai” phenomenon in China, see generally 
YU HUA, CHINA IN TEN WORDS 181–202 (Allan H. Barr trans., 2012); Cheung Ming, 
Shanzhai Phenomenon in China—The Disparity Between IPR Legislation and Enforcement, 
43 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 3 (2012); Hennessey, supra note 30; Sun 
Haochen, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with HiPhone?  Rethinking the Idea of Social Justice in 
Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 387 (2012); Yu, Intellectual Property 
and Asian Values, supra, at 390. 
 268. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 123 (noting that the “Chinese circumstances seem 
to blur the distinction between law and policy”); FENG, supra note 31, at 10 (noting 
that socialist laws “operate within the boundaries of policy directives, under the 
guidance of policy principles and supplemented by various policy tools (such as a Party 
or government circular or notice)”); Berkman, supra note 88, at 35 (“Throughout the 
Cultural Revolution and until Mao’s death in 1976, law was simply a mechanism for 
implementing Party policy, interpreted and reinterpreted to reflect the direction of 
the prevailing political winds.”). 
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policy,”269 but “law will wither away together with the state” in future 
Communist society.270  Throughout Chinese history, law has been 
consistently used as a political or administrative tool.271  Although law 
was abolished during the Cultural Revolution, its subsequent 
restoration272 has precipitated many difficult questions concerning 
what law is and whether researchers should understand legal 
development through Chinese politics.273 
Interestingly, despite the importance of politics to the development 
of Chinese laws and legal institutions, few scholars have devoted 
attention to studying the political dimension of the Chinese 
intellectual property system.274  There are a few notable exceptions, 
                                               
 269. FENG, supra note 31, at 10. 
 270. CHEN, supra note 42, at 8; see also id. at 2 (“Marx seemed to believe that law in 
the bourgeois state was largely a means by which the bourgeoisie maintained their class 
rule over the proletariat, and that in the classless communist society which represented 
the final stage of social evolution, there would be no need for law to exist.”). 
 271. See CHEN, supra note 22, at 20–21 (discussing law as both a political tool and an 
administrative tool). 
 272. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 42 (discussing the impact of the Cultural Revolution 
on the Chinese legal system).  See generally JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS:  THREE DAUGHTERS 
OF CHINA 273–443 (Touchstone 2003) (providing an insightful personal account of 
the Cultural Revolution). 
 273. See CHEN, supra note 42, at 123 (“A preliminary question which might be 
considered in examining the sources of law in mainland China is whether the model 
or conception of law used in describing Western legal systems is appropriate in the 
Chinese context.”).  Determining what law was in the early Chinese legal system after 
its restoration has indeed been quite challenging.  As the late Victor Li noted in regard 
to the challenge of assessing the legal significance of Chinese newspaper articles, 
The mass media, such as the People’s Daily, play a major role in [communicating 
legal norms].  A Chinese newspaper, unlike an American newspaper, is not a 
chronicle of daily events but rather a means by which messages are sent from the 
center to the intermediate levels and then to the bottommost levels.  These 
messages urge particular types of conduct—criticize revisionism, carry out the 
principle of self-reliance, etc.—and also lay down some general guidelines on 
how this work should be carried out.  Good consequences ensue for those who 
carry out these urgings, and less pleasant consequences follow for those who do 
not.  Is this law?  No, not in the sense that we are accustomed to; among other 
things, it lacks the precision and the use of legal institutions and mechanisms 
that we regard as part of law.  And yet it does lay down norms of conduct, norms 
backed by [an] enforcement mechanism . . . . 
LI, supra note 72, at 15; see also KEVIN J. O’BRIEN & LI LIANJIANG, RIGHTFUL RESISTANCE 
IN RURAL CHINA 6 (2006) (“The scope of central policy in China . . . encompasses what 
constitutes law in most other nations but also reaches into far murkier realms, such as 
pledges made by officials on inspection tours, Party propaganda and the ‘spirit of the 
Center’ (zhongyang jingshen).”). 
 274. See generally DIMITROV, supra note 90 (advancing a theory of state capacity 
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however.  In The Politics of Piracy, Andrew Mertha offered a pioneering 
book showing how the organizational structures and complexities 
within Chinese government agencies could affect the implementation 
and enforcement of intellectual property laws.275  More attractively, this 
book—through its separate chapters on the domestic patent, 
copyright, and trademark systems—showed how the differences in 
organizational structures and complexities have affected the respective 
system to a different degree.276  The book explained not only the 
behavior of these agencies, but also the success or failure of select 
campaigns or reforms.  Particularly noteworthy is the book’s discussion 
of the “interbureaucratic competition”277 between two trademark 
enforcement agencies—namely the State Administration for Industry 
and Commerce and the Quality Technical Supervision Bureau.278 
                                               
through the study of intellectual property enforcement in China); Mark A. 
Groombridge, The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in the People’s 
Republic of China, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN EMERGING MARKETS, supra 
note 177, at 11 (examining the political economy of intellectual property protection 
in China and the contradictions inherent in Chinese society); MERTHA, supra note 44 
(discussing the limited impact external pressure has on intellectual property 
enforcement in China even though such pressure has helped shape the laws involved); 
MICHEL OKSENBERG ET AL., ADVANCING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:  INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE COURSE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 6 (1996) 
(providing recommendations on “ways that the public and private sectors in the 
United States and elsewhere outside of China might better cooperate with the Chinese 
government and private sector to help overcome the obstacles they confront in 
improving their IPR regime”); Rebecca G. Hulse & James K. Sebenius, Sequencing, 
Acoustic Separation, and 3-D Negotiation of Complex Barriers:  Charlene Barshefsky and IP 
Rights in China, 8 INT’L NEG. 311 (2003) (discussing the challenges confronting the 
U.S.-China intellectual property negotiations from the viewpoint of former Deputy 
USTR Charlene Barshefsky); Andrew Mertha & Robert Pahre, Patently Misleading:  
Partial Implementation and Bargaining Leverage in Sino-American Negotiations on Intellectual 
Property Rights, 59 INT’L ORG. 695 (2005) (using the U.S.-China intellectual property 
negotiations to develop a model of international negotiation in which states anticipate 
the partial implementation of signed agreements). 
 275. MERTHA, supra note 44. 
 276. See id. at 77–209 (discussing the intellectual property enforcement problems 
in the patent, copyright, and trademark areas). 
 277. Id. at 32; see also Chow, Counterfeiting, supra note 114, at 22 (“[E]nforcement 
actions can be brought with the Administration of Industry and Commerce . . . under 
the Trademark Law or the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, or with the Technical 
Supervision Bureau . . . under the Consumer Protection Law or the Product Quality 
Law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 278. See MERTHA, supra note 44, at 164–209 (discussing such competition in the 
context of trademark enforcement); see also DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 34 (“[M]ultiple 
agencies share an enforcement mandate, sometimes even when they are not interested 
in participating in enforcement.”); Groombridge, supra note 274, at 27 (noting that 
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A few years later, Martin Dimitrov published an equally informative 
book, covering the capacity of government agencies to enforce 
intellectual property rights.279  Drawing on personal interviews, 
newspaper articles, and comparative statistics, this book showed that 
intellectual property enforcement through police raids and campaigns 
in China had been high in volume, yet low in quality (as measured by 
constituency, transparency, and procedural fairness).280  By contrast, 
enforcement through local intellectual property litigation had been 
high in quality, but low in volume.281  This book is illuminating because 
it covered a wide variety of government agencies within the elaborate 
intellectual property enforcement apparatus in China, including the 
General Administration of Customs; the General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine; the National 
Copyright Administration; the Public Security Bureau; the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce; the State Food and Drug 
Administration; the State Intellectual Property Office; and the State 
Tobacco Monopoly Administration.282 
One topic that has thus far received only limited—but slowly 
growing—coverage is China’s role in the international intellectual 
property regime.  This topic is what brought international relations 
scholars to this area.  The limited coverage can be largely explained by 
China’s hitherto low profile in the international trading and 
intellectual property systems.283  Until recently, few scholars—domestic 
and foreign alike—have actively studied the interface between the 
Chinese and international intellectual property systems.  For those 
scholars who managed to study this interface, the focus tends to be on 
                                               
the problem of “too many mothers-in-law (popo tai duo, or yi ge shifu san ge popo)”); 
Andrew C. Mertha, Policy Enforcement Markets:  How Bureaucratic Redundancy Contributes 
to Effective Intellectual Property Implementation in China, 38 COMP. POL. 295 (2006) 
(discussing how bureaucratic redundancy has helped accelerate the evolution of 
enforcement markets in China). 
 279. DIMITROV, supra note 90. 
 280. See id. at 185–220 (using trademark enforcement as an illustration of high-
volume, but capricious and corrupt enforcement). 
 281. See id. at 249–67 (using patent enforcement as an illustration of low-volume, 
but high-quality, rationalized enforcement). 
 282. Id. at 50. 
 283. See Henry S. Gao, China’s Participation in the WTO:  A Lawyer’s Perspective, 11 SING. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 69 (2007) (“Be it in the informal green room meetings, the formal 
meetings of the various committees and councils or the grand sessions of the 
Ministerial Conferences, China has generally been reticent.”); Yu, Middle Kingdom, 
supra note 181, at 229–37 (discussing China’s low profile in the international 
intellectual property arena). 
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the impact of foreign pressure on domestic intellectual property 
reforms—that is, Western impact and Chinese response.284  The focus 
rarely goes the other way around. 
Nevertheless, there has been a growing volume of scholarship on China’s 
increasing role in the international trading system.285  Thanks to the 
marriage of intellectual property with trade via the TRIPS Agreement286 
and China’s growing emphasis on independent innovation, this role has an 
increasingly important intellectual property component.  A case in point is 
scholarship on China’s role in the WTO, which has included a growing 
volume of scholarship covering intellectual property issues.287 
                                               
 284. See supra text accompanying notes 107–19 (discussing scholarship on the 
American intellectual property policy toward China). 
 285. For discussions of China’s role in the WTO-based international economic system, 
see generally CHINA AND GLOBAL TRADE GOVERNANCE, supra note 181; CHINA AND THE 
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:  ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 
2003) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM]; CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 181; CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010); CHINA’S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO (Henry Gao & Donald Lewis eds., 2005). 
 286. See supra note 123 (listing sources that discuss the TRIPS negotiations). 
 287. See generally Gao Lulin, China’s Intellectual Property Protection System in Progress, in 
CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 129, at 127 (discussing the progress 
China has made in the intellectual property area and its effort to comply with the 
TRIPS Agreement); Angela Gregory, Chinese Trademark Law and the TRIPs Agreement—
Confucius Meets the WTO, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 285, at 
321 (exploring whether the 2001 Trademark Law satisfied the minimum standards for 
protection and enforcement of trademark rights under the TRIPS Agreement); Daniel 
Stewart & Brett G. Williams, The Impact of China’s WTO Membership on the Review of the 
TRIPs Agreement, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, supra note 285, at 363 
(discussing the impact of China’s accession on the ongoing negotiations relating to 
the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement); Antony S. Taubman, TRIPs Goes East:  China’s 
Interests and International Trade in Intellectual Property, in CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM, supra note 285, at 345 (discussing how China’s implementation of the TRIPS 
Agreement was consistent with its internal economic and industrial development even 
though the policy changes might have been driven from outside); Yu, First Decade, supra 
note 181 (reviewing intellectual property developments in China in the first decade of 
its WTO membership); Zheng Chengsi, Looking into the Revision of the Trade Mark and 
Copyright Laws from the Perspective of China’s Accession to WTO, 24 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
313 (2002) (examining the amendment of the Chinese copyright and trademark laws 
in preparation for WTO accession); Zheng Chengsi, The TRIPS Agreement and 
Intellectual Property Protection in China, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219 (1998) (discussing 
the preparation China was making to join the WTO and its TRIPS Agreement); Zheng 
Chengsi, TRIPS and the Amendment of Unfair-Competition Laws in China, in CHINA’S 
PARTICIPATION IN THE WTO, supra note 285, at 231 (discussing the inadequacy of the 
Chinese unfair competition laws and the need for reforms to enable the laws to comply 
with the TRIPS Agreement). 
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In the past decade, commentators have also paid greater attention to the 
development of bilateral and regional trade agreements China has 
established with its trading partners.288  These agreements include China’s 
bilateral agreements with Chile, Pakistan, New Zealand, Singapore, Peru, 
Costa Rica, Iceland, Switzerland, South Korea, Australia, Georgia, and the 
Maldives.289  The analyses of these agreements have provided useful contrasts 
to the existing discussions of free trade agreements or economic partnership 
agreements established by the European Union and the United States.290 
Apart from bilateral free trade agreements, China has also actively 
negotiated regional trade agreements.  In November 2000, China 
established the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area with the ten members 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).291  China has 
also actively participated in the RCEP negotiations, a mega-regional 
                                               
 288. See Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements and China’s Global Intellectual Property 
Strategy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION 247 (Christoph Antons & Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015) (discussing China’s growing 
engagement with the developing world, the underlying goals of the bilateral and 
regional trade agreements established by China, and the negotiation strategies behind 
these agreements); Zhang Guangliang, China’s Stance on Free Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property:  A View in the Context of the China-Japan-Korea FTA Negotiations, 24 ASIA PAC. L. 
REV. 36 (2016) (discussing China’s position on the intellectual property negotiations 
relating to the China-Japan-Korea Free Trade Agreement). 
 289. For discussions of China’s free trade agreements, see generally THE CHINA-
AUSTRALIA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:  A 21ST-CENTURY MODEL (Colin Picker et al. eds., 
2018); Henry Gao, The RTA Strategy of China:  A Critical Visit, in CHALLENGES TO 
MULTILATERAL TRADE:  THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND REGIONAL 
AGREEMENTS 53 (Ross Buckley et al. eds., 2008); Marc Lanteigne, Northern Exposure:  
Cross-Regionalism and the China-Iceland Preferential Trade Negotiations, 202 CHINA Q. 362 
(2010); Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, supra note 122. 
 290. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS (Christopher 
Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2007) (collecting articles that discuss free 
trade agreements in the intellectual property context); Robert Burrell & Kimberlee 
Weatherall, Exporting Controversy?  Reactions to the Copyright Provisions of the U.S.-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement:  Lessons for U.S. Trade Policy, 2008 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 259 
(criticizing the U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement); Peter K. Yu, Currents and 
Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property Regime, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 323, 392–
400 (2004) (discussing the growing use of bilateral and regional trade agreements to 
push for higher intellectual property standards). 
 291. The ten current ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam.  ASEAN Member States, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://asean.org/asean/asean-
member-states (last visited May 9, 2018); see Peter K. Yu, The Incremental Development of 
the ASEAN-China Strategic Intellectual Property Partnership, in HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (Christoph Antons ed., forthcoming 2019) 
(discussing the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area and other cooperative efforts between 
ASEAN and China in the intellectual property area). 
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trade agreement that is now being developed between ASEAN, 
Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea under 
the ASEAN+6 framework.292 
A related topic that has garnered considerable scholarly interest and 
attention concerns China’s exclusion from the negotiations for the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement293 (ACTA) and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP).294  While the scholarship in this area,295 like 
scholarship on China and the WTO, is not always limited to intellectual 
property, this body of scholarship has provided important insight into 
China’s emerging role in international intellectual property normsetting. 
From a geopolitical standpoint, having a good grasp of China’s 
normsetting activities can be quite beneficial.  After all, there has been 
growing discussion of the “Beijing Consensus”296—or what noted 
                                               
 292. See supra note 11 (listing sources that discuss the RCEP negotiations). 
 293. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, 50 
I.L.M. 243 (2011). 
 294. Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text. 
 295. See Daniel C.K. Chow, How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to 
Contain China in International Trade, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L. 370 (2017) (explaining why and 
how the United States sought to use the TPP to rein in or constrain China in 
international trade); Peter K. Yu, TPP and Trans-Pacific Perplexities, 37 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 1129, 1132–51 (2014) (discussing China’s experience as a “TPP outsider”).  As 
Shintaro Hamanaka noted, 
[T]he formation of regional integration and cooperation frameworks can be 
best understood as a dominant state’s attempt to create its own regional 
framework where it can exercise some exclusive influence . . . .  For an 
economy that wants to increase its influence, establishing a regional group 
where it can be the most powerful state—dominating other members in terms 
of material capacity—is convenient.  The most powerful state is likely to be 
influential in the group because it can easily assume so-called “structural 
leadership,” which is based on material resources.  While other factors such as 
knowledge can also be a source of power, the exercise of power based on non-
material resources is uncertain.  Thus, having the largest resources in a 
regional grouping is important to increase the likelihood of attaining 
leadership.  By assuming leadership, an economy can set a favorable agenda 
and establish convenient rules.  In addition, the most powerful state can 
increase influence through prestige and asymmetric economic 
interdependence with others. 
Shintaro Hamanaka, Trans-Pacific Partnership Versus Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership:  Control of Membership and Agenda Setting 1–2 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working 
Paper on Regional Economic Integration No. 146, 2014), https://aric.adb.org/ 
pdf/workingpaper/WP146_Hamanaka_Trans-Pacific_Partnership.pdf (footnote and 
citations omitted). 
 296. For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally STEFAN A. HALPER, THE 
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Chinese economist Hu Angang modestly called the “Beijing 
Proposal.”297  Thus far, those frustrated with the existing international 
economic system have touted the Beijing Consensus as a viable 
alternative to the Washington Consensus.298  While the Washington 
Consensus emphasizes free market reforms as a path to economic 
prosperity,299 the Beijing Consensus suggests that economic growth 
“comes from the state directing development to some degree, avoiding 
the kind of chaos that comes from rapid economic opening, and thus 
allowing a nation to build its economic strength.”300  In the intellectual 
property area, the tension and rivalry between the Beijing and 
Washington Consensuses deserve policy and scholarly attention because 
                                               
BEIJING CONSENSUS:  HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE TWENTY-
FIRST CENTURY (2010); THE BEIJING CONSENSUS?  HOW CHINA HAS CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS 
OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Chen Weitseng ed., 2017); RAMO, supra note 184. 
 297. HU ANGANG, CHINA IN 2020:  A NEW TYPE OF SUPERPOWER 17 (2011). 
 298. See Chris Alden, Africa Without Europeans, in CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA:  A RISING 
POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE 349, 355 (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008) (“The 
‘Beijing Consensus’ challenges [the formula dictated by the Washington Consensus] 
and may embolden states, even those not recognized as pariahs, to opt out of the 
complexities that these norms and values introduce to their economic and political 
programmes.”); Dot Keet, South-South Strategic Bases for Africa to Engage China, in THE RISE 
OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA:  CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS 
21, 28 (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds. 2010) (“[T]he means and methods employed in 
Chinese operations in Africa are more likely to provide appropriate models and more 
instructive experiences in the conditions of underdevelopment, lack of basic 
infrastructures and other current technical incapacities in Africa.”); Stephen Marks, 
Introduction to AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA 1, 11 (Firoze Manji & Stephen 
Marks eds., 2007) (citing Nigerians’ appreciation of the Chinese model for providing 
stability and visionary leadership); RAMO, supra note 184, at 3 (“China is marking a path 
for other nations around the world who are trying to figure out not simply how to 
develop their countries, but also how to fit into the international order in a way that 
allows them to be truly independent, to protect their way of life and political choices in 
a world with a single massively powerful centre of gravity.”).  See generally Yu, Sinic Trade 
Agreements, supra note 122, at 1018–22 (discussing the battle between the Beijing 
Consensus and the Washington Consensus). 
 299. John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for 
International Economics, coined the term “Washington Consensus.”  See generally John 
Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT:  
HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 7, 7–20 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (identifying the 
economic policies Washington encouraged other states to adopt in Latin America).  
The Washington Consensus was derived from policy recommendations in ten different 
areas:  (1) fiscal deficits; (2) public expenditure priorities; (3) tax reform; (4) interest 
rates; (5) the exchange rate; (6) trade policy; (7) foreign direct investment; 
(8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights. 
 300. JOSHUA KURLANTZICK, CHARM OFFENSIVE:  HOW CHINA’S SOFT POWER IS 
TRANSFORMING THE WORLD 56 (2007). 
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the TRIPS-based international intellectual property regime was built 
upon the latter set of policy recommendations.301 
The discussion of China’s growing role in the international trading 
and intellectual property systems is also timely and important when it 
is tied to the ongoing exploration of developments in the G-2 (Group 
of 2)302 or the BRICS countries.303  Since its creation, the term “BRICS” 
                                               
 301. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Introduction:  The WIPO Development Agenda and Its 
Development Policy Context, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA:  GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 2–3 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2008) (“The 
Development Agenda . . . reflects developing countries’ growing resistance to the 
upward harmonization of [intellectual property] protection required by the TRIPS 
and subsequent ‘TRIPS-plus’ bilateral free trade agreements . . . .  [It] should be 
understood as part of a broad, multipronged rejection of the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
that shunted aside the [New International Economic Order] and came to dominate 
development policy in the 1980s and early 1990s.”). 
 302. As Fred Bergsten argued, 
The United States should . . . implement a subtle but sharp change in its basic 
economic strategy toward China.  Instead of focusing on bilateral problems 
and complaints, and seeking to coopt China into a global economic system 
that it would try to continue leading by itself, the United States should seek to 
develop a true partnership with China to provide joint leadership of that 
system, even if the system requires substantial modifications to persuade China 
to play that role.  The two economic superpowers should begin to pursue 
together the development of coordinated, or at least cooperative, approaches 
to global issues that can be resolved effectively only through their active co-
management.  Such a “G-2” approach would accurately recognize, and be 
perceived by the Chinese as accurately recognizing, the new role of China as 
a legitimate architect and steward of the international economic order. 
C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE:  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 22–23 (2008); see 
also Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics:  China, the US, and the Global Economy, in CHINA’S 
NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH:  A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE 7, 11 (Dorothy-Grace 
Guerrero & Firoze Manji eds., 2008) (describing “a chain-gang relationship” between 
China and the United States in light of their growing economic interdependence); Niall 
Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, “Chimerica” and the Global Asset Market Boom, 10 INT’L FIN. 215 
(2007) (coining the term “Chimerica”).  But see HALPER, supra note 296, at 216–18 (arguing 
against elevating the U.S.-China relationship to a special G-2 bilateral partnership).  See 
generally ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION:  HOW CHINA AND AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY 
AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT (2009) (discussing the intertwined 
economic relationship between China and the United States). 
 303. See Jim O’Neill, Building Better Global Economic BRICs (Goldman Sachs, Global 
Economics Paper No. 66, 2001) (coining the term “BRIC”); see also JIM O’NEILL, THE 
GROWTH MAP:  ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE BRICS AND BEYOND (2011) [hereinafter 
O’NEILL, THE GROWTH MAP] (providing a later and much broader analysis).  For 
discussions of the BRICS countries, see generally BRICS AND DEVELOPMENT 
ALTERNATIVES:  INNOVATION SYSTEMS AND POLICIES (José Eduardo Cassiolato & Virgínia 
Vitorino eds., 2011); THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE TO GLOBAL COOPERATION (Rostam 
Neuwirth et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE]; ANDREW F. 
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has been used to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South 
Africa—and, for some, also other large developed countries.304  In 
April 2011, China invited South Africa to join Brazil, India, and Russia for 
the first time in Sanya to discuss issues that could benefit from greater 
cooperation.305  Since then, an annual BRICS summit has taken place in 
New Delhi (India), Durban (South Africa), Fortaleza (Brazil), Ufa 
(Russia), Goa (India), and Xiamen (China).306  Although the popularity 
and collective influence of the BRICS countries have slightly declined in 
the past few years, the BRICS concept has continued to garner 
considerable academic and policy attention.307  In the area of international 
intellectual property normsetting, some BRICS countries—such as Brazil, 
China, and India—have also played rather influential roles, even though 
they have not yet utilized their collective clout as a single bloc.308 
                                               
COOPER, THE BRICS:  A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION (2016); AMRITA NARLIKAR, NEW 
POWERS:  HOW TO BECOME ONE AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM (2010); O’NEILL, THE 
GROWTH MAP, supra.  For discussions specifically relating to intellectual property, see 
generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property Negotiations, the BRICS Factor and the Changing 
North-South Debate, in THE BRICS-LAWYERS’ GUIDE, supra, at 148 [hereinafter Yu, The 
BRICS Factor]; Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC Economies, 
43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317 (2006); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging BRIC 
Economies:  Lessons from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Access to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 
34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345 (2008) [hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines]; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The 
Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual 
Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking (Int’l Law & Justice, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working 
Paper No. 2009/5, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785. 
 304. See CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE:  A 
DEVELOPMENT QUESTION 221–22 (2012) (expanding BRICS to cover other emerging 
middle-income economies). 
 305. See Sébastien Hervieu, South Africa Gains Entry to Bric Club, GUARDIAN (Apr. 19, 
2011, 9:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/19/south-africa-
joins-bric-club (reporting that South Africa joined the four BRIC countries in the third 
BRIC summit in Sanya). 
 306. See Themes and Results of BRICS Summits over the Decade, CHINA DAILY 
(Aug. 31, 2017, 2:59 PM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017brics/2017-
08/31/content_31369213.htm (recapitulating the main themes and results of BRICS 
summits over the past decade). 
 307. See supra note 303 (listing sources that discuss the BRICS countries). 
 308. See Yu, The BRICS Factor, supra note 303, at 148 (discussing the BRICS countries’ 
roles in international trade and intellectual property negotiations); Yu, Access to 
Medicines, supra note 303, at 370–87 (discussing the important roles that the BRICS 
countries can play in the international intellectual property regime); see also Amélie 
Robine, Technology Transfer Agreements and Access to HIV/AIDS Drugs:  The Brazilian Case, 
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HIV/AIDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  TRIPS, PUBLIC 
HEALTH SYSTEMS AND FREE ACCESS 120, 126 (Benjamin Coriat ed., 2008) (discussing the 
growing importance of the BRICS countries in the global HIV/AIDS debate). 
2018] A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1117 
 
D. Summary 
This Part has identified three broadly defined multi-disciplinary 
clusters within which scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system has been developed outside the area of law and policy.  Although 
the discussion in this Part is by no means exhaustive, it provides a good 
indication of the different types of research that have slowly emerged to 
cover the Chinese intellectual property system.  Such emergence is 
welcome, because inter- and multi-disciplinary research brings with it 
different interests, assumptions, preoccupations, concepts, 
methodologies, vocabularies, and research questions. 
From a research standpoint, the interdisciplinary turn in scholarship 
on the Chinese intellectual property system is noteworthy because it 
bears strong resemblance to a similar interdisciplinary turn in 
intellectual property scholarship in other areas.  With the adoption of 
the TRIPS Agreement, the increased salience of internet-based 
activities, and the raising profile of intellectual property research, 
scholars have paid growing attention to developments in the 
intellectual property area.  As scholars become more interested in this 
area, some of them have also chosen to conduct research on the 
Chinese intellectual property system. 
III. LESSONS 
A. China Scholars 
In view of the growing volume of scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system, an instructive question to ponder is what 
this body of scholarship can teach China scholars.  While it is hard to 
explain who constitute China scholars, this Article broadly defines the 
term to cover not only Sinologists or China hands,309 but also those 
studying China and its developments.  This broadly defined group 
could draw at least three sets of lessons from scholarship on the 
Chinese intellectual property system. 
First, this body of scholarship has covered developments in an area 
                                               
 309. See Berthold Laufer, Mission of Chinese Students, 13 CHINESE SOC. & POL. SCI. REV. 
285, 286 (1929) (noting that Sinology “is of paramount educational and cultural value 
not only to our country, but to mankind at large” and “has a tendency to broaden our 
minds, to widen our horizon, to deepen our ideals, to contribute to the progress of a 
higher learning and to the discovery of a new and beautiful world that is still unknown 
to us”); see also J. Stapleton Roy, A China Hand:  Young, Witty and Untiring, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 19, 1979, at 7 (noting the emergence of “a new generation of China hands . . . in 
the American government”). 
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in which China has faced considerable pressure from the outside 
world, most notably the United States.310  For instance, those studying 
Chinese law will find scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system filled with rich discussions of the transplant of foreign laws and 
policies.311  Similarly, those studying U.S.-China trade or diplomatic 
relations will find intellectual property an important area through 
which one can better understand the dynamics concerning the 
engagement between the two countries.312 
Second, intellectual property is a highly specialized area of economic 
regulation that has progressed very rapidly in China.  Indeed, intellectual 
property developments have provided an excellent window into the rapid 
development of economic laws and policies since China accelerated its 
reintegration with the global economy in the early 1990s.  Given the 
                                               
 310. See Yu, supra note 101, at 140–51 (describing the United States’ use of section 
301 sanctions and various trade threats to induce China to strengthen intellectual 
property protection); see also MERTHA, supra note 44, at 41–52 (discussing the U.S.-
China intellectual property negotiations from 1989 to 1996). 
 311. See generally ALFORD, supra note 94, at 30–55 (discussing foreign transplants in 
the intellectual property area and how the Chinese “learn[ed] the law at gunpoint”); 
Niklas Bruun & Zhang Liguo, Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Rights in China:  
Norm Taker or Norm Maker?, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 43 (discussing the 
interaction between the transplant of intellectual property laws and the building of 
intellectual property norms as a dynamic process); Li Mingde, Intellectual Property Law 
Revision in China:  Transplantation and Transformation, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra 
note 93, at 65 (discussing the transplant of international intellectual property norms 
to China and the effort the country has made to assimilate those norms into its special 
political, economic, and social structures); Yu, supra note 93 (providing a history of 
the transplant of intellectual property laws in China and discussing the strengths, 
weaknesses, and future of such efforts). 
 312. See generally Alford, supra note 89 (critically examining the U.S. policy toward 
the development of protection for American intellectual property in China and calling 
for the policy’s reformulation); Baumgarten, supra note 57 (providing observations on 
the changing U.S.-China copyright relations following the signing of the 1979 
Agreement); Assafa Endeshaw, A Critical Assessment of the U.S.-China Conflict on 
Intellectual Property, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 295 (1996) (providing a critical assessment 
of the various U.S.-China intellectual property conflicts in the late 1980s and early to 
mid-1990s); Robert S. Rogoyski & Kenneth Basin, The Bloody Case that Started from a 
Parody:  American Intellectual Property Policy and the Pursuit of Democratic Ideals in Modern 
China, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 237 (2009) (discussing the conflict the existing U.S. 
foreign intellectual property policy has posed to American democratic ideals and 
democratic foreign policy objectives); Yu, supra note 101 (criticizing the 
ineffectiveness and shortsightedness of the American intellectual property policy 
toward China in the early to mid-1990s and offering the constructive strategic 
partnership as a new conceptual framework to reformulate the policy); Yu, supra 
note 111 (arguing that the United States’ WTO complaint could create a new “cycle 
of futility” and suggesting ways to avoid such a cycle). 
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tremendous difficulty in studying the varying aspects of economic laws 
and policies, a focus on intellectual property developments will make 
research projects more manageable.  Indeed, intellectual property 
developments provide “an excellent window into the policymaking and 
policy enforcement processes of contemporary China.”313 
Third, the intellectual property area provides international 
benchmarks against which Chinese developments can be easily measured 
against those in the rest of the world—for both good and bad.314  To be 
sure, scholars studying China can debate whether the existing TRIPS-
based international intellectual property standards suit the country’s 
specific local conditions or cultural background.  Nevertheless, the 
existence of two sets of initially drastically different standards inside 
and outside China enables researchers to make the much-needed 
comparison.315  Indeed, a vast divide existed between early socialist 
regulations relating to intellectual property in the 1960s and 1970s316 
and the TRIPS-based intellectual property system that China has 
today.317  Even after China reopened its economy to the outside world, 
the development of the early modern intellectual property laws in the 
1980s, most notably 1982 Trademark Law and the 1984 Patent Law, 
was filled with back-and-forth debates about the different ways to 
introduce intellectual property rights.318  Those debates not only 
                                               
 313. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 26. 
 314. See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 13–17 (2010) 
(discussing the challenge of figuring out how to compare a multitude of countries with 
different sizes, economies, market conditions, technological proficiencies, 
institutional infrastructures, and cultural backgrounds). 
 315. Commentators may question the difference between the current intellectual 
property laws in China and those in other parts of the world, given the harmonization 
brought about by the TRIPS Agreement and other international and regional 
intellectual property agreements.  Nevertheless, as Chen Jianfu rightly reminded us, 
law always operates in local conditions: 
Chinese law has become less Chinese than ever before, both in its form and 
substance.  Law, however, always operates in “local conditions”; that is, in the 
unique political, social, economic and cultural context of the country 
concerned.  However much Chinese law has become “western,” the adoption 
of western law is not necessarily the same as the introduction of the western 
values that underpin the western law. 
CHEN, supra note 22, at 699–700 (footnote omitted). 
 316. See supra Section I.A (providing examples of scholarship in the first phase of 
prehistoric development). 
 317. See text accompanying supra note 120 (discussing China’s effort to comply with 
the TRIPS Agreement). 
 318. For discussions of the debates surrounding the drafting of the 1984 Patent 
Law, see generally ALFORD, supra note 94, at 66, 70; MERTHA, supra note 44, at 84–86; 
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explained the design of those laws, but also reflected the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current international intellectual property regime. 
B. Intellectual Property Scholars 
The previous Section has explored what China scholars can learn 
from developments in the intellectual property area.  This Section asks 
the reverse question about what developments in China can teach 
intellectual property scholars.  There are at least five specific lessons. 
First, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
provides updates on the latest developments in a country that has a 
growing influence on the international intellectual property 
community.  Whether the focus is on the massive piracy and 
counterfeiting problem, the millions of patents that Chinese applicants 
file annually,319 or the new international intellectual property norms that 
China has helped establish through the RCEP negotiations,320 
intellectual property developments involving China are likely to have 
considerable impacts at the domestic, regional, and international 
levels.  For those studying the competition between China and the 
United States—or, for that matter, between China and other 
countries—scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
will provide useful information about the state of bilateral 
competition, opportunities for increased cooperation, and possibilities 
for greater rivalry or confrontation.  Although scholarship on the 
Chinese intellectual property system has thus far focused on the impact 
of the international intellectual property regime on China—the 
primary focus of the first four phases321—it is high time that researchers 
undertook more in-depth study of China’s impact on the international 
intellectual property regime.322 
                                               
Yu, Building the Ladder, supra note 22, at 6. 
 319. See Table 1 Statistics on Applications for Inventions from Home and Abroad, STATE 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/ 
1111449.htm (last visited May 9, 2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 
1,381,594 applications for invention patents); Table 2 Statistics on Applications for Utility 
Model and Design from Home and Abroad, STATE INTELLECTUAL PROP. OFFICE, 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/2017s/201712/1111448.htm (last visited May 9, 
2018) (stating that in 2017 SIPO received a total of 1,687,593 applications for utility 
model patents and 628,658 applications for design patents). 
 320. See supra note 11 (listing sources that discuss international intellectual property 
normsetting through the RCEP negotiations). 
 321. See supra Sections I.B–D (discussing scholarship in the three phases of imitation 
and transplantation, standardization and customization, and integration and assimilation). 
 322. In various forums, I have made a similar claim with respect to internet 
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Second, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
encourages researchers to think more deeply about the different 
justifications for and treatment of intellectual property rights in non-
market economies.  Although intellectual property laws in China have 
been repeatedly revamped to ensure compliance with the TRIPS-based 
international minimum standards,323 a historical analysis of the early 
developments of the Chinese intellectual property system provides 
especially helpful insights into the different ways to promote creativity 
and innovation.324  The limited scholarship in the first two phases also 
raises important questions about the compatibility and mismatch 
between intellectual property rights and what commentators have 
referred to as “socialist legality with Chinese characteristics.”325  While 
China—or, for that matter, other socialist economies—may not 
protect intellectual property rights to the same extent as Western 
developed countries, it will be hard to justify the claim that socialist 
countries do not offer any protection to these rights.  As scholarship in 
the first phase has shown, even during the Mao Zedong era, China 
                                               
developments in China.  See Yu, Middle Kingdom, supra note 181, at 253–54 (“[T]he 
important question about the Internet in China is not only how the Internet will 
change China but also how China will change the Internet.”); see also JACK GOLDSMITH 
& TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?  ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 104, 104 
n.60 (2006) (citing Peter K. Yu, The Path of Sinicyberlaw, Presentation at Michigan 
State University College of Law Symposium:  Digital Silk Road:  A Look at the First 
Decade of China’s Internet Development and Beyond (May 23, 2005)). 
 323. As I noted in an earlier article, 
The primary driver of convergence of intellectual property laws in Asia is the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which was established in April 1994.  Except 
for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Iran and Timor-Leste, all countries in Eastern, 
Southern and South-eastern Asia (under UN classification) are members of this 
organization.  As a result, they abide by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement).  Indeed, countries such as 
China and Vietnam had to strengthen their intellectual property regimes and 
go through a strenuous accession process before they could finally join the 
WTO—in December 2001 and January 2007, respectively. 
Peter K. Yu, Clusters and Links in Asian Intellectual Property Law and Policy, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF ASIAN LAW 147, 150 (Christoph Antons ed., 2017). 
 324. See PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE:  PATENT OFFICES 
AND THEIR CLIENTS 223 (2010) (“Despite the fact that there was virtually no patenting 
activity [in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries], there was innovative 
activity.  Quite remarkably, China was able to build between 1860 and 1949 a modern 
chemical industry.”). 
 325. E.g., ALFORD, supra note 94, at 70; Jonathan K. Ocko, Using the Past to Make a 
Case for the Rule of Law, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 65, 66 (Karen G. 
Turner et al. eds., 2000). 
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offered protection through inventors’ certificates (faming zhengshu),326 
payments to authors or inventors,327 and non-property-based protection 
of these creators (similar to moral rights in Western jurisdictions).328 
Third, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
provides an attractive forum for scholars to undertake comparative 
intellectual property research.329  In this increasingly globalized world, 
such scholarship is urgently needed.330  In a recent article, Irene 
                                               
 326. See Gale, supra note 49, at 349 (noting the monetary awards to inventors 
provided through the 1963 Regulations Concerning Awards for Inventions and the 
1963 Regulations Concerning Awards for Technical Improvement Proposals); Hsia & 
Haun, supra note 47, at 282, 289 (discussing the financial awards or compensation 
provided to authors and inventors through the regulations in the 1950s and 1960s). 
 327. See 1984 H. COMM. PRINT, supra note 59, at 19 (“[The Regulations Concerning 
Awards for Inventions and the Regulations Concerning Awards for Technical 
Improvement Proposals] changed the system of awards to inventors that had been tied 
to the certificates of authorship.  In place of the annual payments, lump-sum bonuses 
in much smaller amounts were prescribed.”); ALFORD, supra note 94, at 57 (“[The 
certificates of inventions under the 1950 Provisional Regulations on the Protection of 
Invention Rights and Patent Rights] entitled persons or entities responsible for worthy 
advances to recognition and monetary rewards tied to the savings realized from their 
inventions.”); id. at 59–60 (discussing the Soviet-style of contracts with authors in the 
1950s, which provide for gaofei, or basic payments for the writings). 
 328. See Gale, supra note 49, at 349 (stating that “all monetary awards in China 
[under the regulations for invention awards in the 1950s and 1960s] were to be 
accompanied by honorary awards as well, in the form of medals, certificates and 
titles”); Loeber, supra note 55, at 913 (“The author possesses the right to the 
inviolability of his work.  This means that changes of the text may only be inserted with 
the permission of the author.  The Chinese author also possesses the right to be 
acknowledged as the author of his works.”). 
 329. See Edward Lee, The New Canon:  Using or Misusing Foreign Law to Decide Domestic 
Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 6–13 (2005) (explaining “why foreign 
law is becoming more relevant in deciding IP claims arising under domestic statutes”). 
 330. As Hiram Chodosh declared, 
[Comparison of laws in different jurisdictions] serve many overlapping 
purposes.  First, they potentially facilitate a greater appreciation of similarities 
and differences among competing laws.  Second, they are integral to law 
reform initiatives intended to reduce the differences.  Finally, comparisons 
inform the creation of private and public international law designed to 
eliminate conflicts of domestic law. 
Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons:  In Search of Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
1025, 1027–28 (1999).  Similarly, Albert Chen wrote, 
By studying the history, structure, content and operation of legal systems and legal 
cultures in different parts of the world, comparative law scholarship illuminates 
the similarities and differences in the ways in which different peoples, nations and 
civilisations solve the fundamental “law-related” problems of human society . . . .  It 
generates the data on the basis of which legal philosophers may rest or develop 
their theories about what a legal system is or ought to be, about the relative merits 
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Calboli called on U.S. intellectual property scholars to engage more 
actively in comparative legal analysis.331  As she explained, 
[such] analysis can offer additional information about diverse 
perspectives on the justification of intellectual property norms and 
the application of these norms in different national contexts.  This 
information is relevant to all scholars, including all of us in the U.S., 
for a more comprehensive evaluation of a variety of intellectual 
property issues, as intellectual property laws remain territorial laws 
despite decades of intensive international harmonization.332 
Fourth, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system 
enables researchers to appreciate the significant challenges 
confronting the developing world as well as evaluate the potential 
benefits provided by intellectual property reforms.  While scholarship 
in the first three phases has shown China’s reluctance to introduce 
stronger intellectual property protection, scholarship in later phases 
reflect China’s changing position.  Today, there is no denying that the 
country “has benefited from the TRIPS-based intellectual property 
                                               
of different forms of socio-legal arrangements and institutions, and about the 
relationship and interaction between the legal, political, economic, social and 
cultural domains of human existence in society. 
CHEN, supra note 42, at 1; see also Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property 
Litigation:  A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 453 
(2001) (“A comparativist perspective will always aid appreciation of laws.  But the 
increasingly multidimensional nature of international intellectual property litigation 
may mean that only a comparativist can fully appreciate these dimensions and accord 
them the proper weight.”); John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 690 (2002) (“[A] diverse legal system has positive 
externalities for other legal jurisdictions precisely because it provides information to 
the other jurisdictions about the value of different legal rules.”); Lee, supra note 329, 
at 21 (“Diversity in IP approaches . . . provides insurance against poorly calibrated IP 
laws.  Just as diversification can diminish the risk of loss in an investment portfolio, so 
too with IP laws can a diversity of approaches diminish the risk of over- or under-
protecting it.” (footnote omitted)). 
 331. See Irene Calboli, A Call for Strengthening the Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in the 
United States, 90 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 609, 611–12 (2016) (“[C]omparative legal analysis 
could play a larger role compared to the one that it currently seems to play amongst U.S. 
intellectual property academics, and that a larger number of U.S. scholars could turn to 
comparative legal analysis in some instances in conjunction with other research 
methodologies while conducting research in intellectual property law.”). 
 332. Id. at 637–38; see also Martha L. Minow, The Controversial Status of International 
and Comparative Law in the United States, in COURTS AND COMPARATIVE LAW 513, 528 
(Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve eds., 2015) (“Neglecting developments in 
international and comparative law could vitiate the vitality, nimbleness, and 
effectiveness of American law or simply leave us without the best tools and insights as 
we design and run institutions, pass legislation, and work to govern ourselves.”). 
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system [even though] the country would not have reached its current 
position had it implemented the TRIPS Agreement to the fullest 
extent.”333  Thus far, the TRIPS Agreement has been a “mixed bag” 
because it can help and simultaneously hurt developing countries.334  
Moreover, as I noted in previous works, China is in the process of 
crossing over from the pirating side of the intellectual property divide 
to the other more promising side.335  If so, the Chinese experience may 
inform the experience of other similarly situated, or even smaller, 
developing countries.336  As Professor Mertha observed, “The Chinese 
case is instructive because China is similar to many developing and 
postsocialist countries and, therefore, it is possible to make inferences 
from the Chinese experience to explain intellectual property 
development (or the lack thereof) in these other countries.”337 
Finally, by analyzing developments in another country, scholarship 
on the Chinese intellectual property system invites scholars to question 
intellectual property developments within their own countries or other 
third countries.  After all, comparative legal analysis has always been a 
two-way street.  In the context of legal transplants, commentators have 
noted how the transplant of a law often provides an opportunity for 
policymakers to undertake reform and to determine how a law should 
                                               
 333. Yu, supra note 23, at 12. 
 334. See Peter K. Yu, The Comparative Economics of International Intellectual Property 
Agreements, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 282 (Theodore Eisenberg & Giovanni 
B. Ramello eds., 2016) (critically assessing the TRIPS Agreement from a comparative 
economic perspective). 
 335. See Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 1 
WIPO J. 1, 10–15 (2009) (discussing the existence of a “crossover point” where countries 
consider it to be in their self-interest to move from a pirate nation to one that strongly 
respects intellectual property rights); Yu, supra note 180, at 529–32 (noting that China is 
at the cusp of crossing over from a pirate nation to a country respectful of intellectual 
property rights); see also Suttmeier & Yao, supra note 169, at 6–7 (“China is . . . poised for 
an IP transition.  Yet whether this transition will lead to greater harmonization with 
international IP norms and practices, toward ‘destroying the IP regime’ . . . , or to some 
other departure from the given order remains unclear.”). 
 336. As John Orcutt and Hong Shen noted, 
If China is successful in developing an innovative nation that includes a robust 
university technology commercialization system, it will have made one of the 
most dramatic economic transformations in history . . . .  China’s success will 
not only be important for the 1.3 billion people living in China, it could also 
prove to be the key for many in the developing world. 
JOHN L. ORCUTT & HONG SHEN, SHAPING CHINA’S INNOVATION FUTURE:  UNIVERSITY 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN TRANSITION 254 (2011). 
 337. MERTHA, supra note 44, at 23–24. 
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be adapted and assimilated.338  The transplant process may also allow 
the recipient country to become a donor in turn by sharing valuable 
comparative lessons and experiences.339 
IV. CHALLENGES 
The previous Part has underscored the importance and benefits of 
conducting research on the Chinese intellectual property system to 
both China and intellectual property scholars.  This Part turns to the 
different challenges confronting research in this area.  While some 
challenges were particularly daunting at the formative stages of the 
modern Chinese intellectual property system, they have since subsided 
considerably.  Others, however, have remained. 
The challenges that scholars most widely discussed in the early days 
of the Chinese intellectual property system was the lack of availability 
of research materials concerning that system.  Those challenges were 
particularly acute before China reopened its economy to the outside 
world.  As George Ginsburgs observed, 
The study of Communist Chinese law is fraught with many 
difficulties.  Not the least of these is the problem of getting enough 
reliable data on what the law is and how the legal system operates on 
the mainland.  Under the circumstances, watchers of the China 
scene have tried by various means to supplement the meagre fund 
of available information.  Those able to visit China on more or less 
protracted jaunts have brought back personal impressions from 
conversations with ordinary Chinese citizens as well as officials and 
party cadres.  Some have even managed to obtain permission to 
observe sessions of the local people’s courts at work and have shared 
their experiences with their less fortunate colleagues.  Systematic 
interviewing of Chinese refugees in Hong Kong and Macao has also 
                                               
 338. See ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS:  AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 35 
(2d ed. 1993) (“[A] time of transplant is often a moment when reforms can be 
introduced.”); Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 756 (2010) (“Although legal transplantation is a process 
wherein laws migrate from one country to another, it is important not to ignore the 
fact that the transplantation process also provides important opportunities for 
improvements, experiments, and new developments.”). 
 339. See Jeremy Bentham, Of the Influence of Time and Place in Matters of Legislation, in 
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 169, 185 (Adamant Media 2005) (1843) (“That a 
system might be devised, which, while it would be better for Bengal, would also be 
better even for England.”); WATSON, supra note 338, at 99 (“[T]he time of reception is 
often a time when the provision is looked at closely, hence a time when law can be 
reformed or made more sophisticated.  It thus gives the recipient society a fine 
opportunity to become a donor in its turn.”). 
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contributed to the sum total of our knowledge of legal life behind 
the so-called Bamboo Curtain.  Finally, perusal of what has been 
published on legal developments in Communist China in foreign 
languages has helped further flesh out the picture.340 
Even in the 1980s and 1990s, many legal or normative documents 
remained classified as neibu—that is, as internal documents that 
foreign researchers could neither use nor access.341 
The lack of such materials not only explains the limited scholarship 
on the Chinese intellectual property system in the first two phases,342 but 
also calls for considerable appreciation of the pioneering efforts that 
early scholars of the Chinese intellectual property system undertook.  
Although scholarship in this area has changed considerably—often for 
the better—there is no denying that later researchers, myself included, 
have greatly benefited from the precious scholarship of previous 
researchers.  In the area of Chinese intellectual property research—or, 
more broadly, Chinese legal research—the aphorism that “we are 
standing on the shoulders of giants” cannot be more accurate.343 
Although materials have been difficult to find in the first two phases, 
the accessibility of these materials has greatly increased in later phases, 
                                               
 340. George Ginsburgs, Soviet Sources on the Law of the Chinese People’s Republic, 
18 U. TORONTO L.J. 179, 179 (1968).  See generally CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW:  
RESEARCH PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES (Jerome Alan Cohen ed., 1970) [hereinafter 
CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW] (providing an excellent collection of articles discussing 
methodologies in and challenges to studying Chinese law before the country’s 
reopening in the late 1970s). 
 341. See Jerome A. Cohen, Reforming China’s Civil Procedure:  Judging the Courts, 
45 AM. J. COMP. L. 793, 803 (1997) (noting the need “to increase ‘transparency’ and 
prohibit reliance upon ‘internal’ (neibu) documents”); James V. Feinerman, China’s 
Quest to Enter the GATT/WTO, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 401, 404 (1996) (noting that 
“[f]ormerly neibu (internal) documents describing China’s foreign trade regime were 
made public to the GATT/WTO Secretariat in the early 1990s” as part of China’s effort 
to accede to the WTO); Liu Nanping, Judicial Review in China:  A Comparative Perspective, 
14 REV. SOCIALIST L. 241, 247 n.13 (1988) (“Many ‘internal’ (neibu) Party documents 
may be enforced as law where the statutes are silent on the issues they address.  These 
documents are unavailable to the general public.”). 
 342. See supra Sections I.A and I.B (discussing the scholarship in these phases). 
 343. The phrase “standing on the shoulders of giants” is often attributed to Isaac 
Newton, thanks to his 1675 letter to Robert Hooke.  See Letter from Sir Isaac Newton 
to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675) (“If I have seen farther, it is by standing on the 
shoulders of giants.”).  Nevertheless, the phrase “can be traced back to philosopher 
Bernard de Chartres in the twelfth century.”  Michal Shur-Ofry, Non-Linear Innovation, 
61 MCGILL L.J. 563, 566 n.7 (2016); see also ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF 
GIANTS:  A SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965) (tracing Newton’s aphorism and discussing 
the metaphor of dwarfs perching on the shoulders of giants). 
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especially after China’s accession to the WTO.  Article 63 of the TRIPS 
Agreement specifically includes transparency obligations, which 
require the publication or making available of laws, regulations, “final 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application.”344  As 
a result of such obligations and the related preparation for WTO 
accession, many of the laws, regulations, and judicial decisions 
concerning the Chinese intellectual property system have become 
accessible online.  While some of these research materials appear in only 
Chinese, a growing volume of materials has now become available in 
both Chinese and English.  As the quality of automated translation 
technology continues to improve, the linguistic barrier to research on 
the Chinese intellectual property system will reduce accordingly.345  
Better still, the WIPO Intellectual Property Laws and Treaties Database 
(WIPO Lex) has made available the English-language versions of many 
                                               
 344. Article 63.1 of the TRIPS Agreement provides, 
Laws and regulations, and final judicial decisions and administrative rulings 
of general application, made effective by a Member pertaining to the subject 
matter of this Agreement (the availability, scope, acquisition, enforcement 
and prevention of the abuse of intellectual property rights) shall be published, 
or where such publication is not practicable made publicly available, in a 
national language, in such a manner as to enable governments and right 
holders to become acquainted with them.  Agreements concerning the subject 
matter of this Agreement which are in force between the government or a 
governmental agency of a Member and the government or a governmental 
agency of another Member shall also be published. 
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 9, art. 63.1.  In October 2005, Japan, Switzerland, and 
the United States invoked this obligation to formally request “clarifications regarding 
specific cases of IPR enforcement that China has identified for the years 2001 through 
2004, and other relevant cases.”  Letter from Peter F. Allgeier, United States Trade 
Representative, to H.E. Mr. Sun Zhenyu, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of the 
People’s Republic of China to the World Trade Organization (Oct. 25, 2005).  This 
formal request was made before the USTR filed a WTO complaint in April 2007.  Japan 
and Switzerland also made similar requests.  See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, U.S.-CHINA TRADE RELATIONS:  ENTERING A NEW PHASE OF GREATER 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENT 14 (2006) (stating that the request was “made in 
conjunction with similar requests by Japan and Switzerland”). 
 345. See NICHOLAS OSTLER, THE LAST LINGUA FRANCA:  ENGLISH UNTIL THE RETURN OF 
BABEL xix (2010) (“When electronics removes the requirement for a human 
intermediary to interpret or translate, the frustrations of the language barrier may be 
overcome without any universal shared medium beyond compatible software.”); James 
Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 675–76 (2016) 
(“Google Translate reads superficially and in fragments; its translations aren’t great, 
but they’re good enough to make professional translators worried about the future of 
their profession.”). 
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Chinese intellectual property laws and regulations.346  A number of data 
sources and case databases, such as Beida Fabao and CIELA, have also 
emerged to facilitate research on intellectual property cases in China.347 
The second challenge concerns the lack of understanding of the 
Chinese intellectual property system, attributable to factors that range 
from language to culture to simply distance.  A vivid example is a 
keynote presentation that I once heard from a Nobel laureate who will 
remain nameless.  During the question-and-answer session, I asked the 
expert whether his view about China would differ based on the vastly 
different regional developments within the country.  Shockingly, the 
expert told me in a room full of conference attendees that he had been 
to only Beijing and Shanghai and his analysis about China would 
unfortunately have to be based on those two cities.  While I respect the 
scholar’s candor and understand his reluctance to make claims beyond 
what he had experienced firsthand, there are inherent problems in 
using Beijing or Shanghai as proxies to study China.  More 
importantly, if this noted scholar has faced such a daunting challenge 
despite his firsthand experience in China, one has to imagine the even 
greater challenges confronting those scholars who have not yet visited 
China and have only obtained information from scholarly literature—
or, worse, short media reports. 
Indeed, as shown by the research on the historical development of the 
Chinese intellectual property system, it remains difficult for scholars 
studying this system to fully understand the politically driven or related 
developments unless they have a good grasp of the Chinese political 
landscape.348  For instance, without understanding the structure of the 
                                               
 346. WIPO Intellectual Property Laws and Treaties Database (WIPO Lex), WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en (last visited May 9, 2018). 
 347. See, e.g., GORDON C.K. CHEUNG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA:  
POLITICS OF PIRACY, TRADE AND PROTECTION 39–62 (2011) (utilizing the data from 
official government statistical yearbooks); Brian J. Love et al., Patent Litigation in China:  
Protecting Rights or the Local Economy?, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 713, 723–25 (2016) 
(utilizing the Chinese court records collected in the “China IP Litigation Analysis” 
(CIELA) database created by the law firm Rouse); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We 
Hardly Know:  Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
773, 790–809 (2011) (utilizing the data provided by the White Paper on the Intellectual 
Property Rights Protection in China and the cases provided by the database Beida Fabao 
launched by Peking University); Xie Huijia, Empirical Research on Criminal Copyright 
Infringement in China, 8 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 36, 36 n.2 (2018) (utilizing over 
1500 cases provided by the database Beida Fabao). 
 348. See supra text accompanying notes 275–82 (discussing scholarship covering the 
political developments concerning the Chinese intellectual property system).  For 
example, Martin Dimitrov highlighted the complexity concerning those Chinese 
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Chinese government,349 the problem relating to partial decentralization,350 
                                               
government agencies that have intellectual property enforcement portfolios: 
[At the time of the book’s publication], only two bureaucracies with IPR 
enforcement portfolios have a vertical (i.e., centralized) bureaucratic 
structure, the GAC [General Administration of Customs] and the STMA [State 
Tobacco Monopoly Administration]; both agencies serve as primary revenue 
generators for the consolidated national budget:  centralization allows the 
central government to establish better control over the tax revenue it collects 
from these agencies.  The SAIC [State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce], the AQSIQ [General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection, and Quarantine], and the SFDA [State Food and Drug 
Administration] are partially centralized.  Other bureaucracies with an IPR 
enforcement portfolio are fully decentralized:  the Ministry of Culture (MOC), 
the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the Ministry of Health (MOH), the 
General Administration of Press and Publications (GAPP), the National 
Copyright Administration of China (NCAC), and the MPS (known as the 
Public Security Bureau or PSB at the local level).  [SIPO], though formally 
decentralized, functions in practice as a quasi-centralized bureaucracy, since 
it only penetrates down to the provincial level, a structure that makes 
monitoring easier than for bureaucracies with deeper reach. 
DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 50. 
 349. See generally Li Mingde, The Process of Intellectual Property Law Reform in China, 8 
QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 26 (2018) (providing an authoritative analysis of the various 
processes that have been used to enact or amend Chinese intellectual property laws). 
 350. As Peter Corne explained, 
Ideally, authorities are supposed to share power according to a system of dual rule 
(shuangchang lingdao).  Problems that arise are supposed to be resolved by the 
unifying authority of the CCP at the same level, which normally has an office and 
a deputy secretary in charge of the area in question, and which has jurisdiction 
over it.  In reality, however, there is no dual rule.  There is rule by either tiao tiao 
or kuai kuai authorities depending on their relative power and the issue at hand. 
PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA:  THE ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL 
SYSTEM 87 (1997) (footnote omitted); see also DIMITROV, supra note 90, at 42 (noting 
the complications created by “the principle of ‘one system of government offices, two 
nameplates’ (yige jigou, liangkuai paizi)”); Andrew C. Mertha, China’s “Soft” 
Centralization:  Shifting Tiao/Kuai Authority Relations, 184 CHINA Q. 791 (2005) 
(discussing the institutional cleavages and fragmentation in China that have made it 
difficult for the government to centralize its regulatory bureaucracies).  Likewise, Fred 
Bergsten and his coauthors declared, 
Many in the United States believe that China’s one-party system gives Beijing 
total power and control over all levels of government.  The image, perhaps left 
over from the Maoist cult of personality era, of a single leader or core group of 
leaders responsible for and in command of all aspects of Chinese society still 
pervades the American imagination.  This perception of absolute authority has led 
US policymakers and industry groups to focus on securing top-down commitments 
from Chinese leaders to resolve bilateral economic and other issues.  That the 
leaders sometimes do not fulfill these commitments endlessly frustrates the 
Americans who have sought them, who view this as negligence on the part of 
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the handling of budgets and personnel,351 and the complex conditions in 
local economies,352 the analysis of the Chinese enforcement infrastructures 
is at best superficial, if not completely off base. 
The third challenge pertains to the “moving target” nature of 
developments concerning the Chinese intellectual property system, 
                                               
Chinese leaders, lack of political will, or even outright malfeasance. 
 Beijing’s ability to unilaterally impose its will throughout China is, 
however, highly limited.  For a variety of reasons . . . , China’s authoritarian 
regime lacks the capacity to implement many of its decisions throughout the 
polity, a limitation that has important implications for policymaking in 
Beijing.  The leadership has to gauge carefully what it can and cannot get away 
with vis-à-vis local authorities; how much political capital will be required to 
enact controversial policies at local levels; and how much discretion to allow 
local authorities in policies set at the national level—recognizing that the 
center has no capacity to enforce absolute obedience to its edicts.  The policy 
process can frequently result in vague national policy pronouncements that 
look less like hard and fast rules than abstract guiding principles—
exhortations to local authorities to “do the right thing” that leave considerable 
latitude for local recalcitrance.  Even when Beijing issues more categorical 
commands, local compliance is far from certain. 
BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 302, at 75. 
 351. As Professor Mertha noted, 
One part of the enforcement story is the degree to which a given enforcement 
bureaucracy is independent of its “host,” or superior, bureaucracy . . . .  [B]oth 
the copyright and the patent administrative enforcement agencies become 
increasingly absorbed in their superior bureaucracies the farther on goes down 
China’s administrative rungs . . . .  Bread-and-butter issues such as personnel and 
budgetary matters are managed by these superior bureaucracies, making the 
copyright and patent bureaucracies dependent on their “host” units. 
MERTHA, supra note 44, at 15.  Likewise, Daniel Chow observed, 
Rivalries have developed among the various parallel government entities charged 
with public enforcement against counterfeiting.  The authority to combat 
counterfeiting results in larger budgets and more staffing, power, and prestige.  
Raids are also potential revenue generating activities because the authorities 
confiscate cash, goods, machinery, and equipment, including cars, and then sell 
the confiscated goods at public auctions.  Fines imposed upon counterfeiters are 
paid into government coffers and some administrative agencies give cash bonuses 
to personnel who participate in successful raids.  Government authorities also 
routinely ask companies to reimburse the cost of lodging where travel is required, 
the cost of hiring trucks to load and move confiscated goods, and the cost of 
storing the goods if a private warehouse needs to be rented.  Some government 
authorities will also ask companies to pay case handling fees. 
Chow, Counterfeiting, supra note 114, at 31 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 30–31 
(discussing the importance of case fees and other payments to officials); DIMITROV, supra 
note 90, at 211–12 (discussing case-handling fees (ban’an fei) and bribes (hongbao)). 
 352. See Chow, Commercial Piracy, supra note 114, at 218–20 (using the town of Yiwu 
to illustrate the importance of counterfeiting activities to local economies). 
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similar to the challenge of studying international intellectual property 
normsetting through the ever-changing plurilateral intellectual property 
negotiations, which have moved from ACTA to the TPP to the RCEP to 
now the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP).353  Since the adoption of modern Chinese 
intellectual property laws in the 1980s and 1990s, the patent and trademark 
laws have been revised three times, the copyright law twice, and the anti-
unfair competition law once.  At the moment, China is already exploring 
the Fourth Amendment to the Patent Law, while it is working hard to finish 
revising copyright law for the third time.  In August 2008, China also 
introduced an anti-monopoly law,354 which has serious ramifications for the 
protection and licensing of intellectual property rights. 
The final challenge relates to the implicit bias that has creeped into 
any discussion of the Chinese intellectual property system.  As this Part 
has noted earlier, many foreign researchers of intellectual property 
laws and policies in China still have a rather limited understanding of 
the country.355  As a result, their views have inevitably been colored by 
                                               
 353. Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, 
Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements-concluded-but-not-in-force/cptpp/comprehensive-and-progressive-
agreement-for-trans-pacific-partnership-text [hereinafter CPTPP].  Although the United 
States withdrew from the TPP Agreement in January 2017, the remaining eleven TPP 
partners developed the CPTPP, a modified version of the original agreement.  See CPTPP 
vs. TPP—The Differences, N.Z. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/agreements-under-
negotiation/cptpp-2/tpp-and-cptpp-the-differences-explained (last visited May 9, 2018) 
(explaining the differences between the TPP and the CPTPP); see also CPTPP, supra, 
annex (listing the provisions that have been suspended from the TPP Agreement). 
 354. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2008, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (China); 
see also H. STEPHEN HARRIS JR. ET AL., ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA (2011) 
(providing a treatise-length analysis of the law); Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition 
Policy Reforms:  The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231 (2008) 
(discussing this law and the related competition policy reforms); Thomas Pattloch, 
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, in PATENT LAW IN GREATER CHINA, supra note 54, at 313 
(discussing the various intellectual property issues raised by the Chinese Anti-Monopoly 
Law); Xu Shiying, Intellectual Property Protection and Competition Law, in CHINESE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY LAWS, supra note 54, at 323 (discussing issues 
lying at the intersection of intellectual property and competition law in China). 
 355. As the late William Jones reminded us: 
Chinese law is very easy to misunderstand.  It is not at all certain that anyone—
Chinese or foreign—understands it.  The reason for this is that when we think 
about law, we think about a formal legal system of the western type.  We look 
at China and expect to find such things as a law of contracts, a bench and bar, 
and all the other paraphernalia that we associate with law.  At present, one can 
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what they have read through scholarly literature, the mass media, or 
other sources.  While these sources are not always biased,356 the scholars’ 
lack of understanding has made it particularly difficult for them to 
determine whether the views expressed by others are in line with the 
reality.357  These challenges are the most daunting when exploring 
                                               
find such institutions in China, but they are modern imports.  Until recently, 
they did not exist.  What one found instead—and still finds—quite easily, are 
a vast number of statements by China’s most prominent thinkers, notably 
including Confucius, that show great hostility to what we think of as law. 
William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal System, in UNDERSTANDING 
CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM:  ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEROME A. COHEN 7 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 
2003); see also PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA:  AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
WRITING ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 198 (1984) (“All of us are to an extent prisoners 
of our environments, trapped in one or another set of parochial concerns.  And the 
truth we retrieve is inevitably qualified by the intellectual and emotional 
preoccupations each of us, through our vocabulary and concepts, brings to bear on 
the study of the past.”); Nari Lee, Intellectual Property Law in China—from Legal 
Transplant to Governance, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 5, 10 (“Researchers 
working on the topic of Chinese law are . . . warned of the possibility that the concept 
of law may be so different in China that an eager application of so-called functional 
comparison would lead to an incorrect observation or conclusion.”); Stanley Lubman, 
Methodological Problems in Studying Chinese Communist “Civil Law,” in CONTEMPORARY 
CHINESE LAW, supra note 340, at 230, 230 (“[I]f we are to appreciate nuanced 
differences between institutions in China and elsewhere, we must move from 
presuppositions rooted in our own systems to others, more neutral.”); William P. 
Alford, “Seek Truth from Facts”—Especially when They Are Unpleasant:  America’s 
Understanding of China’s Efforts at Law Reform, 8 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 177, 184 (1990) 
(discussing the impediments that have impaired American scholars from 
understanding Chinese legal development). 
 356. See Yu, supra note 6, at 1127–29 (discussing the concern about the potential 
exploitation of differences between China and the United States). 
 357. See COHEN, supra note 355, at 4 (arguing that most American historians ask the 
wrong questions about China’s past); James Lilley, Trade and the Waking Giant—China, 
Asia, and American Engagement, in BEYOND MFN:  TRADE WITH CHINA AND AMERICAN 
INTERESTS 36, 36 (James R. Lilley & Wendell L. Willkie II eds., 1994) (“Americans have 
always had a propensity for misunderstanding China.”); MANN, supra note 89, at 373 
(asserting that one of the greatest misperceptions of Washington in the 1990s is that 
China does not understand American politics); WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, THE RISE OF 
CHINA:  HOW ECONOMIC REFORM IS CREATING A NEW SUPER POWER 400–01 (1993) 
(stating that misconceptions of China and Japan have always troubled American 
relations with Asia because Americans do not know as much about Asia as they do 
about Canada and Europe). 
This lack of understanding can also go in the other direction.  As the late Victor 
Li recounted his experience accompanying the Chinese table tennis team during its 
1972 U.S. tour, 
The Chinese visit coincided with our Presidential election year in which 
Senator Eugene McCarthy was entered in some of the primaries.  Upon seeing 
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highly polarized topics, such as those concerning whether the United 
States should impose sanctions on China, file a WTO complaint, or 
even initiate a trade war.358  Given the contentiousness of many debates 
concerning the Chinese intellectual property system, implicit bias will 
remain a continuing challenge for researchers in this area. 
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
Part I has identified five phases in which fairly distinct bodies of 
scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property system have been 
developed.  Although new phases will appear as the system continues to 
evolve, the conclusion of that Part has not discussed what phase, or phases, 
will emerge after the fifth phase of indigenization and transformation.359  
                                               
some of his campaign literature, one of my Chinese companions asked 
whether Gene was related to Joe.  I told him no. 
 He continued, “Wasn’t Eugene McCarthy purged in 1968?”  No. 
 “What has he been doing the past several years?”  At that point I began to 
realize that we were heading toward a misunderstanding since I had to reply that 
among other things, McCarthy had been teaching poetry at McAllister College. 
 “He was not purged, huh?”  No. 
 “Then this was not a case of removing McCarthy on the left to balance 
the removal of Lyndon Johnson on the right?” 
LI, supra note 72, at 5. 
 358. See Martin Farrer, China Promises “Necessary Response” to US Tariffs as Trade War Fears 
Grow, GUARDIAN, Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/08/ 
china-promises-necessary-response-to-us-tariffs-as-trade-war-fears-grow (“The prospect of a 
trade war between China and the United States has increased after Beijing’s foreign 
minister said it would make a ‘necessary response’ in the event of Donald Trump 
introducing punitive tariffs on steel and aluminium imports.”); Trade Wars:  A Lose-Lose 
Deal, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2018 (noting the growing worries of a looming lose-lose 
“trade war of attrition”); see also PETER NAVARRO, THE COMING CHINA WARS:  WHERE 
THEY WILL BE FOUGHT AND HOW THEY CAN BE WON (2007) (discussing the various 
potential conflicts between China and the United States).  See generally Daniel Chow, 
China’s Coming Trade War with the United States, 81 UMKC L. REV. 257 (2012) (examining 
the U.S.-China trade deficit and the major bilateral trade disputes that may arise in the 
next four years). 
 359. As Phoebe Li surmised, 
I name the [next] stage the “mass innovation” stage, whereby the development 
agenda for a “xiaokang” society is a critical theme in striking a balance in 
intellectual property monopolies.  The primary goal for this nascent phase is 
therefore not to blindly transplant foreign intellectual property infrastructure 
but to conscientiously build a development-oriented intellectual property 
institution that reflects local characteristics.  A “mass innovation” patent 
regime should be able to redress the disparities and to balance the interests of 
big corporations with those of mass entrepreneurs.  It should differentiate 
certain fields of technologies for the purpose of safeguarding the public 
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Indeed, it will be difficult to predict what the future will hold for not only 
the Chinese intellectual property system, but also the international 
intellectual property system.  Despite the inherent difficulty in making 
predictions, it will be useful to offer some brief observations on the 
future directions of scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system.  Although these observations are inevitably personal, they draw on 
developments that have already begun in the area of Chinese legal 
scholarship or intellectual property scholarship in general. 
First, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system are 
likely to pay greater attention to international intellectual property 
developments involving China.  Thus far, a growing number of 
scholars have already explored the development of China’s free trade 
agreements, the exclusion of China in both the ACTA and TPP 
negotiations, and China’s active role in the RCEP negotiations.360  In 
the future, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system 
will pay even greater attention to the regional or international 
intellectual property norms that China sought to create or shape.  They 
will also be highly interested in any new initiatives that China has 
undertaken—an obvious example being the “one belt one road” or 
belt-and-road initiative.361 
Second, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system 
will undertake more research on intra-country developments.  While 
                                               
interest and not be compromised by private patent monopolies.  Joseph 
Stiglitz elaborates on the idea that a development-oriented intellectual 
property regime requires special consideration to ensure effective 
competition, access to lifesaving medicines, the transfer of technology, and 
protection of traditional knowledge and genetic resources. 
Phoebe Li, Patents, Mass Innovation and the Xiaokang Society, 8 WIPO J. 97, 104 (2017) 
(footnote omitted). 
 360. See supra text accompanying notes 288–95 (discussing the scholarship covering 
these topics). 
 361. See generally Lee Jyh-an, The New Silk Road to Global IP Landscape, in LEGAL 
DIMENSIONS OF CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE 417 (Lutz-Christian Wolff & Chao Xi 
eds., 2016) (analyzing China’s “one belt one road” initiative from the intellectual 
property perspective and identifying its potential opportunities and challenges); Peter 
K. Yu, Building a New International Intellectual Property Infrastructure Through China’s Belt-
and-Road Initiative, 14 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (discussing the 
development of a new international intellectual property infrastructure through China’s 
“one belt one road” initiative); see also High Level “Belt and Road” Conference Urges Closer IP 
Collaboration for Economic Growth, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG. (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/offices/china/news/2016/news_0008.html 
(reporting WIPO’s participation in the two-day High Level Conference on Intellectual 
Property for Countries Along the “Belt and Road” in Beijing on July 21, 2016). 
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intellectual property scholars will continue to explore issues that are 
important to the country as a whole, they will conduct more research 
on the country’s internal developments, thanks to the active 
participation and growing support of provincial intellectual property 
offices in China, the arrival of new regionally based developments, and 
the increased volume of data concerning provinces, prefectures, 
counties, townships, and villages.  Such a shift from nation-based 
analyses to finer-grained analyses will greatly enhance our 
understanding of the Chinese intellectual property system.362  After all, 
the wide divergences within China suggest the pointlessness of 
analyzing China as if the country were homogenous.363  What is true 
for one province often does not hold for many others.364 
                                               
 362. See Yu, supra note 6, at 1118–22 (noting the importance of developing a more 
sophisticated understanding of provincial and local differences); see also Special 
Provincial Review of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in China:  Request for 
Public Comment, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,969, 34,970 (June 16, 2006) (requesting public 
comments “to spotlight strengths, weaknesses, and inconsistencies in and among 
specific jurisdictions”); Intellectual Property Rights Issues and Imported Counterfeit Goods:  
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. & Sec. Review Comm’n, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (written 
testimony of Myron Brilliant, Vice President, East Asia, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
Washington, D.C.) (“[T]he root of China’s IP problem resides in the provinces.  It 
is . . . absolutely critical that we cultivate the support of the provincial/local officials, 
as well as local industry, if IP enforcement is to be addressed in a truly meaningful 
way.”); CHEUNG, supra note 347, at 39–62 (discussing Guangdong, Beijing, Zhejiang, 
and Fujiang as “new ‘hot spots’ of counterfeiting”). 
 363. As I noted in a recent article, 
Based on the 2016 figures on invention patents provided by the State 
Intellectual Property Office of China, Jiangsu, Guangdong, and Anhui 
provinces—the provinces with the three largest volumes of applications—had 
a total of 184,632, 155,581, and 95,963, respectively.  Meanwhile, Yunnan, Jilin, 
and Gansu provinces had a total of only 7,907, 7,537, and 6,114, respectively.  
The latter figures were less than one-tenth of the figures in the more 
developed provinces.  If one includes provinces and autonomous regions with 
fewer than 4,000 patent applications, such as Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Ningxia, Qinghai, Hainan, and Tibet, the statistical contrasts between the two 
groups will become even starker . . . . 
Peter K. Yu, A Spatial Critique of Intellectual Property Law and Policy, 74 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2045, 2093–94 (2017). 
 364. As I noted in an earlier article, 
China is “a country of countries.”  The country is large, complex, diverse, and 
“sometimes internally contradictory.”  The Chinese speak different languages, 
enjoy different cuisines, grow up with different cultures, and subscribe to 
different historical and philosophical traditions.  Conditions in Beijing are often 
very different from those in Guangzhou, intellectual property strategies that are 
effective in Shanghai are likely to fail in a village in Guizhou, and the trade 
patterns found near the coasts are very different from those found inland. 
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Third, scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system will 
inevitably focus more on developments in specialized areas.  Indeed, 
Chinese legal scholarship has already become more specialized today 
than it was two decades ago.  Gone are those books and articles 
studying the overall Chinese legal system, which are common in the 
1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.  Appearing in their stead are books and articles 
covering a specific body of law, or even some specific domestic legal 
problems.365  While this type of scholarship enables foreign researchers 
to actively engage their Chinese counterparts on specific laws, policies, 
cases, and topics, the more specialized focus takes away opportunities 
for scholars to identify larger trends and developments concerning the 
Chinese intellectual property system. 
Fourth, in the past decade, scholars in this area have begun to study 
those spillover issues that do not fit squarely within the intellectual 
property field.  Section I.E already discusses the interrelationship 
between intellectual property and indigenous innovation.366  In the early 
to mid-1990s, especially during the U.S.-China negotiations, intellectual 
property protection is often discussed alongside market access.367  
Today, policymakers and scholars have devoted considerable attention 
to intellectual property-conditioned government incentives—that is, 
measures that the government has provided to promote creativity and 
innovation.368  As the Chinese intellectual property system becomes 
                                               
Yu, supra note 6, at 1118; see also Yu, supra note 94, at 173, 203–13 (discussing the wide 
regional and sectoral disparities in China); Yu, supra note 93, at 36 (“The type of 
intellectual property standards that work well for major cities (such as Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangzhou) may not work well for the countryside.  Likewise, standards 
that suit the prosperous coastal areas may be inappropriate for the poor rural west.”). 
 365. See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous 
Marks Doctrine in China, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 57 (2015) (discussing the 
trademark squatting problem in China); Benjamin Pi-Wei Liu, The Glocalization of 
Patent Linkage in China, in CHINA AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 163 (providing an 
interesting and in-depth discussion of patent linkage in China); Wu Weiguang, China’s 
CMC system and Its Problems from the Copyright Law of 1990 to Its Third Amendment, in CHINA 
AND EUROPE, supra note 93, at 213 (outlining the defects of the system for the collective 
management of copyright and related rights in China and its possible changes in the 
forthcoming Third Amendment to the Copyright Law); Xie, supra note 347 (using 
empirical research to identify the defects of criminal copyright infringement laws in 
China and advancing solutions to address these defects). 
 366. See supra text accompanying notes 168–77 (discussing this interrelationship). 
 367. See ZHENG, supra note 54, at xxvi (“In the 1996 Sino-U.S. negotiations, what the 
USTR really wanted was not the impossible short term elimination of pirate copies, 
but access to the Chinese markets for its cultural products.”). 
 368. See generally ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-CONDITIONED GOVERNMENT 
2018] A HALF-CENTURY OF SCHOLARSHIP 1137 
 
more complex, researchers will devote more time and effort to 
studying measures complementary to the intellectual property system. 
Fifth, scholars in this area, especially those in China, will inevitably 
devote attention, energy, and resources to the growing waves of 
intellectual property problems that now arise in the developed world 
and at the global level.  We have already seen Chinese scholars 
undertaking research on problems posed by the internet and the 
digital revolution369—problems that are explored by non-Chinese 
scholars and that will affect virtually any part of the world.  Likewise, 
research concerning Big Data, Internet of Things, blockchains, 3D 
printing, artificial intelligence, robotics, autonomous vehicles, 
nanotechnology, and synthetic biology can be classified as generic.  
While it will still be instructive to explore whether these problems will 
affect China to the same extent as they will affect other parts of the 
world, there is no denying that much of the research in these emerging 
areas is global in scope.  In short, scholars in China may just be 
conducting research on the same or highly similar topics as scholars in 
other countries.  As a result, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual 
property system that we find in this area may just be a subset of the 
overall body of scholarship—featuring Chinese perspectives or China-
based examples, perhaps. 
Finally, there has been an active and growing discussion of new 
modes of innovation in the past decade.  For instance, intellectual 
property scholars have explored how we can develop incentives for 
innovation outside the intellectual property system.  Indeed, the so-
called “IP without IP” literature has become increasingly important 
and popular in Europe and the United States.370  Only time will tell 
                                               
INCENTIVES (Dan Prud’homme & Song Hefa eds., 2016) (discussing these incentives). 
 369. For this body of literature, see generally Du Ying, Secondary Liability for 
Trademark Infringement Online:  Legislation and Judicial Decisions in China, 37 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 541 (2014); Ke Steven Wan, Internet Service Providers’ Vicarious Liability Versus 
Regulation of Copyright Infringement in China, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 375; Wan 
Yong, Safe Harbors from Copyright Infringement Liability in China, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 635 (2013); Wang Jie, Not All ISP Conduct Is Equally Active or Passive in Differing 
Jurisdictions:  Content Liability and Safe Harbour Immunity for Hosting ISPs in Chinese, EU, 
and US Case Law, 37 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 732 (2015); Xie Huijia, The Regulation of 
Digital Rights Management in China, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 662 
(2008); Xue, supra note 177; Xue Hong, Les Fleurs du Mal:  A Critique of the Legal 
Transplant in Chinese Internet Copyright Protection, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 168 
(2007); Zhu Dong, Beyond Safe Harbour:  Secondary Trademark Liability of Online Auction 
Sites in China, 7 QUEEN MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 265 (2017). 
 370. As Amy Kapczynski recently observed, 
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whether scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property system will 
also proceed in the same direction.  While Chinese scholars have often 
embraced research topics that are considered cutting-edge abroad—
especially in Europe or the United States—the ongoing academic and 
policy discussions in China seem to have focused on the potential 
benefits and the much-needed calibration of the intellectual property 
system.  Due to the structure of Chinese academic institutions, the 
funding support for research projects, and the country’s continued 
large-scale piracy and counterfeiting problems, Chinese academe 
seems to have not yet experienced the same divide between intellectual 
property attorneys and policymakers on the one hand and intellectual 
property scholars on the other.371  While the former advocate a 
maximalist view of intellectual property protection, the latter prefer 
the opposite.  In China, if the scholarship focuses on the limitations 
and exceptions in the intellectual property system, those limitations 
                                               
IP scholarship has for decades been centered on a simple account:  IP is 
necessary to achieve the information production that we as a society desire.  
But over the last few years, the field has come to recognize that IP as an 
approach has both significant costs and substantial limits.  In response, an 
important new scholarly literature on “intellectual production without 
intellectual property,” or “IP without IP” has emerged. 
Amy Kapczynski, Order Without Intellectual Property Law:  Open Science in Influenza, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 1539, 1542–43 (2017) (footnotes omitted).  For scholarship in this 
area, see generally KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY:  
HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012); Jacob Loshin, Secrets Revealed:  Protecting 
Magicians’ Intellectual Property Without Law, in LAW AND MAGIC:  A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS 123 
(Christine A. Corcos ed., 2010); Christopher J. Buccafusco, On the Legal Consequences of 
Sauces:  Should Thomas Keller’s Recipes Be Per Se Copyrightable?, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
1121 (2007); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP?  Accommodating Intellectual 
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437 (2010); 
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore):  The Emergence of 
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 
(2008); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:  Innovation and 
Intellectual Property in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687 (2006). 
 371. See James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome:  What the Squabbles over Genetic Patents 
Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 107–
09 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (describing the “bipolar disorders of intellectual property 
policy”); Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2004) (expressing concern “that the increasingly binary tenor 
of current intellectual property debates . . . obscures other important interests, options, 
critiques, and claims for justice that are embedded in many new claims for property 
rights”); Maggie Wittlin et al., What Causes Polarization on IP Policy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018) (investigating the source of polarization on intellectual property 
debates); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. 
L. REV. 1, 8–12 (discussing the bipolar intellectual property debate). 
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and exceptions tend to be justified based on the needs for either 
development or social equality, as opposed to new “IP without IP” 
innovation models.372 
CONCLUSION 
In examining the past half-century of scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system, this study has shown how historical 
developments have heavily influenced scholarship in this area—both 
in phases and through isolated major incidents.  This study has also 
shown that scholarship in this area has undergone an interdisciplinary 
turn.  As a result, scholarship on the Chinese intellectual property 
system has become richer, more diverse, and more sophisticated. 
While it is impossible to cover all scholarship on the Chinese 
intellectual property system in the past fifty years, this Article seeks to 
capture the changing developments in the field.  It has also devoted 
greater coverage to those works that were published before the mid-
1990s and in non-legal disciplines.373  After all, those works tend to be 
                                               
 372. Interestingly, some of the rare scholarship discussing China from the “IP 
without IP” angle actually came from Kal Raustiala and Christopher Sprigman, the two 
leading scholars in “IP without IP” literature.  See Kal Raustiala & Christopher Jon 
Sprigman, Let Them Eat Fake Cake:  The Rational Weakness of China’s Anti-Counterfeiting 
Policy, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:  CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
263 (Sun Haochen et al. eds., 2015) (examining China’s knockoff economy and 
explaining why legitimate branded luxury goods and counterfeits can coexist in the 
country); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, Fake It till You Make It:  The Good News 
About China’s Knockoff Economy, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2013, at 25, 30 (noting the 
need to “keep Chinese copying in perspective and recognize its upsides along with its 
costs”).  But see Eric Priest, Copyright Extremophiles:  Do Creative Industries Thrive or Just 
Survive in China’s High-Piracy Environment?, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 467 (2014) (offering 
a critical response to this line of scholarship). 
 373. Many articles and book chapters cited in this Article were published in the 
United States, due to their wide availability on HeinOnline, LexisNexis, and Westlaw 
and through free online repositories.  Their emphases could be quite different from 
those found in publications from other parts of the world.  See Shi & Weatherley, supra 
note 118, at 448–63 (noting the differences between the China-EU intellectual 
property debate and the China-U.S. debate).  Nevertheless, as the sources cited in this 
Article have shown, a growing number of non-U.S. scholars have published their works 
on the Chinese intellectual property system in U.S. journals.  Many non-U.S. 
publications have also been included in HeinOnline, LexisNexis, or Westlaw.  Notable 
European intellectual property journals that immediately come to mind are the 
European Intellectual Property Review, the International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law (formerly the International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright 
Law), and the Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property.  In addition, while I struggled 
to locate journal articles published outside the United States, due to constraints 
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less familiar to scholars studying the Chinese intellectual property 
system, especially those in the legal discipline. 
Today, China is at a crossroads concerning what type of intellectual 
property law and policy it should adopt.  Owing to the changing 
political environment in the United States and the now significantly 
different expectations of China at the international level,374 the U.S.-
China intellectual property relations are also at a crossroads.  The wide 
range of scholarship discussed in this Article will no doubt provide 
useful insights into the different ways to address challenges and 
opportunities that are slowly emerging at these crossroads.  It is my 
hope that the systematic analysis provided in this Article will make it 
easier for us to locate the relevant scholarship. 
                                               
imposed by U.S. library collections and a lack of ready online access, I managed to 
locate many books and book chapters published in English outside the United States. 
 374. These exceptions are due in large part to the growing strength of China’s 
aggregate economy.  Although most commentators have placed China as the world’s 
second largest economy, some suggested that China might already have been the 
largest based on select metrics.  See Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Chinese Century, VANITY FAIR 
(Jan. 2015), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/01/china-worlds-largest-
economy (“2014 was the last year in which the United States could claim to be the 
world’s largest economic power.  China enters 2015 in the top position, where it will 
likely remain for a very long time, if not forever.”). 
